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ABSTRACT 
over the past two decades social theory and 
research have focused increasingly on issues of criminal 
de c i s i o n - m a k i ng and d e t e rren ce . T h i s  inter­
discipl inary movement draws from criminology , economics , 
and psychology , which share common assumptions that 
point toward a model of rational decision-making . Each 
body of thought considers criminal decision-making as 
being no different than non-criminal decision-making . 
Deciding whether to commit a crime is cons idered a 
"decision problem" , a unique one no less , but a decision 
that is resolved similarly to other decision probl ems . 
The central objective of my research is to enhance 
our underst anding of decision-making , specifically 
individual career criminal decis ion-making about whether 
or not to commit a cr ime , va rious alternatives 
considered in the decis ion problem , and influences on 
the decis ion processes . 
This dissertation reviews literature on decision­
making processes as explicated by perceptual deterrence , 
economic ,  and cognitive decision-making theories . They 
serve as theoretical guidance for this research . I then 
review previous research on perceptual deterrence and 
criminal decis ion-making processes and suggest that both 
the merits of rational decision-making theory and 
proposed modifications of it are debated with little 
iv 
empirical guidance . 
A purposive sample of 60 adult male repetitive 
offenders incarcerated in the Tennessee Department of 
Co rrect i ons was sel ected and i�terviewed at two 
dif ferent po ints in time . The interviews focused on 
each subj ect's criminal calculus , i . e . , their decis ion­
making processes . The findings provide a description of 
criminal dec i s i on-making from which typologies of 
de c i s i on-mak ing were constructed . Offenders were 
separated . into Type I and Type II lambda categories , 
based on offense frequency , resulting in the following 
typological constructs : ( 1 ) the Type I lambda offender; 
( 2) the non-drug-addicted Type II lambda offender; ( 3 )  
the drug-addicted Type I I  lambda of fender; ( 4 )  the 
hustl ing Type II lambda offender . 
The maj or conclusion of the study is that criminals 
do not engage in rational decision-making . They 
especially do not weigh the poss ible legal consequences 
of their actions . Negative consequences are far less 
influential than positive consequences . This conclusion 
has impl ications for deterrence and decision-making 
theories in that they may not explain adequately the 
dec isions made by repetitive property criminal s .  The 
research a l s o addresses the question of offense 
special ization . My findings are at odds with those who 
v 
argue for a "generalist "  position suggest ing that 
special i zation does occur when criminal activities are 
viewed over time . Theoretical and methodological 
suggestions for future research of this nature are 
offered . 
vi 
PREFACE 
The research for this dissertation is part of a 
larger research proj ect entitled "Perceptual Deterrence 
and Des i stance from Crime : A Study of Serious , 
Repetitive Property Offenders . " The research proj ect 
was directed by Pro fessor Neal Shover and was funded by 
a National Institute of Justice research grant , Number 
86 1-CCT-15 . Without ·this funding this dissertation 
would not have been possible . 
The larger research · proj ect was a longitudinal 
study of adult males imprisoned twice or more for 
property crimes such as armed robbery and burglary . A 
purposive sample of 60 offenders incarcerated in the 
Tennessee Department of Correct ions was selected . Each 
of fender was pa id $150 for participat ing in the 
research . Confidential , tape recorded interviews were 
conducted with each subj ect , in two-waves within a 12 -
month period . The interviews were conducted by research 
ass istant David Honaker and mysel f. The first interview 
was conducted within four months of each subj ect ' s  
release from prison and the second interview within nine 
months after release . Informed by deterrence theory , 
the interv iews focused on each subj ect ' s  criminal 
calculus , i . e . , the ir expectations of the l ikely ga ins 
and losses of further criminal behavior . Both official 
vii 
records and sel f-reports of involvement in crime were 
used to measure the dependent variables : the extent and 
nature of involvement in criminal behav ior during the 
fol low-up period . Data analysis consisted of internal 
compari sons of subgroups of participants whose criminal 
calculus showed distinct variation . 
D a t a  a n a l y s es and interpretation for thi s 
dissertation are the sole respons ibil ities of the author 
and do not represent those of the principal investigator 
or the National Institute of Justice . 
viii 
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CHAPTER I 
THEORETICAL CONTEXT AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
INTRODUCTION 
The central objective of this study is to enhance 
our understanding o f  cr im inal decision-making by 
describing decision-making processes among repetitive 
property offenders . It is guided by prescriptive 
dec is ion-making theories and has implications for those 
theories and their appl icabil ity to repet itive property 
criminals . 
The de c i s i o n -m a k i n g  p r o c e s ses include the 
resolution of a decision-problem of whether or not to 
commit a crime , various alternatives considered within 
the decision problem, and influences on the decis ion 
process e s . From self-reported accounts of these 
processes obtained in interviews conducted at two points 
in time , typologies of decision-making are constructed 
and impl ications of the findings for future research are 
explored . 
PERCEPTUAL DETERRENCE THEORY 
Criminologists historically have shown continued 
and diverse interest in deterrence theory and research . 
Although conceptual differences pervade the theoretical 
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literature , a core hypothesis has emerged : namely , law 
violation is inversely related to the threat of legal 
puni shment (Grasmick and Mill igan , 1 9 7 6) . The 
dete rrence do ctrine has been defined thus ly : " an 
increase in the probabil ity or severity of punishment 
for a particular type of crime , or both , will reduce the 
rate at which that crime is committed , other things 
being equal "  (Cook , 19 8 0 : 2 1 6) . 
The foundational premise of the deterrence doctrine 
is that individual behavior is the product of rational 
del iberation about the expected risks and benefits of a 
particular course of action . According to deterrence 
theory , law abiding individual s seek the benefits of 
conformity (e . g . , network acceptance , social standing) 
and avo id the costs o f  devi ance ( e . g . , network 
ostracism , sel f embarrassment , legal penalties , loss of 
social standing) . The expectation of both social 
approval for conformity and punishment for deviance are 
imp o r t a nt v a r i a b l e s  i n  e xp l a i n i ng c o nformi ty . 
Deterrence theory , however , emphasizes the fear of 
punishment , shaped by external and internal controls , as 
the variable that best explains conformity to state­
created law (Hirschi , 1969) . For deterrence theorists 
then , legal punishment is des igned not as retributive in 
nature but as social control (Meier and Johnson , 1977; 
Gibbs , 198 1) . For , it allegedly affects the future 
2 
behavior of the punished individual specifically and 
society generally . 
In recent years , deterrence theorists have 
emphasized the importance of the psychological processes 
of individuals ' decision-making . Perceptual deterrence , 
a rational -choice model of criminal decision-making , 
highl ights the importance of the actor ' s  assessment of 
the potent ial costs and benefits of various behavior 
options . The actual deterrent effect of sanctions is 
mediated through and is a product of individual s '  
perceptions of sanction threats . In this way , the 
certa inty and severity of pun i shment becomes a 
"mechanism for information transmiss ion rather than 
simply . . a sanctioning system" (Geerken and Gove , 
19 7 5 :  4 9 8 )  . Deterrence theory , therefore , has made a 
trans ition to perceptual deterrence theory . Perceptual 
deterrence processes focus on human decision-making 
wh i c h  e n t a i l s  i n d i v i d u a l s '  e s t i m a t i ons ( i . e . , 
perc eptions ) o f  the risks and rewards of crime 
commission and the certainty and severity of punishment . 
Thi s  expl ains the growing interest in perceptual 
deterrence . 
Human decision-making consistently has been a topic 
of intrigue for social scientists . Various theories 
have been 
individuals 
suggested , each purporting to explain how 
make decisions , that is , make choices 
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between alternatives . Understanding this process is 
especially troublesome since choices usually must be 
made 11 in the absence of certain knowledge of their 
consequences" (S ills , 1968 : 34)  . 
theoretical explanations , two 
economic and cognitive--remain 
From this quest for 
branches of thought-­
unsurpassed in their 
contributions to our understanding of decision-making . 
Like perceptual deterrence theory , economic and 
cogn i t i ve de c i s i o n -making theories exp l a i n how 
individual s  behave when con fronted with decis ion 
probl ems (i . e . , perceptions of choices among acts , 
perceptions of the consequences of a given act , and 
perceptions of the contingencies relating consequences 
to acts) . 
ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING THEORY 
Decision-making theory was first developed by 
mathematicians and economists (Lee , 197 1) . over the 
past two decades economists have proposed various 
propos itions and causal models to explain rational 
decision-making . Although an overwhelming maj ority of 
the research on law and individual behavior has focused 
on j udicial discretion , risk/benefit analyses proposed 
by economists have been appl ied increas ingly to the 
decision-making processes of criminals (e . g .  , Becker, 
19 68 ; Firey , 1969 ; Palmer , 1977) . 
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Economists purport that criminals are normal 
individual s who are not in need of rehabil itation but 
who act rationally ( Becker , 1968 ; Sul l ivan , 197 3 ) . 
" Cr ime is as sumed a priori to involve rational 
calculation and is viewed essentially as an economic 
transaction" (Clarke and Cornish , 19 8 5 : 1 5 6 )  • The 
economic model suggests 
processual culmination of 
19 76 ; Hill , et AI., 197 9 ) . 
that decision making is a 
progress ive steps ( Becker , 
These steps are not mutually 
exclusive and some overlap does occur ( for simpl icity , I 
have collapsed some of these steps and present them here 
in modified form) " . The first step is to define the 
problem ( e . g . , to burglarize or not to burglarize) . To 
accompl ish this , one must gather information by such 
methods as talking with others who may have confronted 
similar problems , observing other 1 s behavior , reading, 
and watching television and films . Second , decision 
alternatives must be identified and cons idered . This 
step impl icitly involves assessing the benefits that one 
hopes to attain . Fail ing to do so , may result in a 
less-than-optimal decision . Then third , one must 
determine i f  the same or more rewarding benefits could 
be derived from another action . This evaluation usually 
is determined by the individual 1 s short or �ong-term 
plans , perceptions of the costs and rewards , and 
personal preferences . Those alternatives not pertinent 
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or feasible by the decision-maker can be el iminated . 
Optimal criminal decision-making , j ust as non-criminal 
dec ision-making , according to the economic camp , takes 
place through a rat ional progress ion of these steps . 
" Economists accept as an article of fa ith , and assert as 
a revealed truth , the proposition that man is rational ,  
. . 
that he is free to choose among alternat ive behaviors , 
and that his choice is governed by a des ire to maximize 
his own wel l being" (Orsagh , 1983 : 392) . This article 
of fa ith holds that humans calculate. The concept of 
rat ional criminal decision-making is founded on two 
distinct but related ideas . Firstly ,  the economic 
approach to decision-making proposes that individuals 
are rational in their decis ions to commit crimes . This 
approach rests on two bas ic assumptions about criminal 
decision-making . The first is that individuals have a 
real istic perception of the probabilities of being 
sanctioned and of the severity of the sanct ion (i . e . , 
risk) . Research , however ,  shows that the general public 
has incorrect perceptions of the probabil ity and 
severity of sanction (Jacob , 197 9 ) . In fact , research 
shows that law abiding individuals oyer-estimate the 
probab il ity and severity of legal sanction while 
criminals estimate more realistically (Meier , 1978; 
Parker and Grasmick , 1979) . Some economists define 
" loss " due to sanction very narrowly (e . g . , lost income 
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while imprisoned) . Most theorists , however ,  agree that 
"loss " involves pecuniary and non-pecuniary components 
(e . g . , Brown and Reynolds , 1973) . Research shows too 
that offenders consider the expected benefits more than 
the expected risks in making a decis ion to commit a 
crime (Carroll , 1978) . And it has been recommended that 
future research closely examine perceived bene fits 
(Peterson , gt AI . , 1980) . 
The second assumption is that criminals act after 
rat i onal ca lculation rather than impul sively . A 
rational act is purposive and conscious to obtain an 
obj ective. " To act rationally is to employ one ' s  reason 
to select the most appropriate means for the attainment 
of one ' s  empirical ends " (Nettler , 1984 : �66) . One acts 
r a t i on a l ly i f  "given a cho ice betwee n  vari ous 
alternatives he selects what appears to be the most 
desirable" (Palmer , 1977 : 5) . Research shows , however , 
that many criminals live hedonistic l i festyles that 
demand more income than their legitimate j obs afford 
(Petersilia , g li . , 1978 ; Jacob , 1979) . And this 
demand for more money often results in impulsive 
opportunist ic behavior rather than rationally calculated 
behavior . Economists consider this impulsive behavior 
as " irrational" (Sull ivan , 1973) • 
An economic approach secondly suggests that the 
selection of an illegitimate occupation (e . g ,  burglary) 
7 
is a rational , calculated decision (Letkemann , 1973:  
Hol zman , 1982:  Nettler , 1984:  Luckenbill , 19 8 5) , or 
simply put , "a question of occupational choice " (Clarke 
and Cornish , 1985 : 156) . Individuals involved in 
conventional criminal behavior often begin their crime 
commission at an early age and often within a group 
setting whose norms support the deviant l ifestyle of 
theft for profit (see , e . g . , Luckenbill , 19 8 5) . An 
economic approach suggests that one generally continues 
this behavior if the " result is general ly 
pos itive " (Clarke and Cornish , 19 8 5 : 170) . These 
individuals demonstrate a partial commitment to criminal 
behavior as a way of life (Clinard and Quinney , 19 67) . 
Career property criminals report that they take pride in 
their craft which relies on nerve , coolness , and network 
connections . They enj oy leisure between j obs , autonomy , 
and non-routinized l ifestyles . They contrast the ir 
l ives to the alternate drab " square-j ohn " l i festyle 
(Akerstrom , 19 8 5) . "Given the low risk o f  penalty and 
the high probability of reward and given the absence of 
pangs of gu i lt and the presence of hedoni stic 
preferences , crime is a rational occupational choice" 
for some individuals (Nettler,  1984 : 178) . Even after 
being arrested several times , these career criminals may 
think their career cho ice is more rational than the 
alternatives available to them . 
8 
COGNITIVE DECISION-MAKING THEORY 
Although economists first developed dec ision-making 
theory , psychologists soon followed suit . Cognitive 
decis ion-making theory is the product of debate among , 
on one hand , economists who support rational decis ion­
making and , on the other hand , psychologists who support 
a less-than-rational approach to human decision-making . 
Psychologists have focused increas ingly on deviant 
behavior and the methods used by individuals when 
confronted with the decis ion to commit a crime (e . g . , 
Konecni ,  � gl . , 197 6; Carrol , 19 7 8; 19 8 2; Konecni and 
E b b e s e n , 19 7 9 ;  C o o k , 19 8 0 ) . Unt i l  recently , 
criminologists largely have ignored cognitive psychology 
and individual ' s  decision-making (Clarke and Cornish, 
19 85) . Three developments have renewed interest in 
individual criminal dec i s i on-making : the Chi cago 
School ' s  interest in "his world "; the failure and 
rej ection of the rehabil itative ideal (Morris ,  19 74) ; 
and the introduction of new means of crime control 
(e . g .  , selective incapacitation) (Clarke and Cornish , 
19 85) . 
Cognitive psychology treats the decision-maker as a 
" limited information processor who has many different 
simpli fying strategies for making choices " (Johnson and 
Payne , 19 8 6 : 18 0) . When individuals are faced with a 
decision , they frame it as a decision-problem .  
9 
This 
problem is defined by "the acts or options among which 
one must choose , the possible outcomes or consequences 
of these acts , and the contingenc ies or conditional 
probabil ities that relate outcomes to acts " (Tversky and 
Kahneman , 19 8 1 : 45 3 ) . For exampl e ,  a potential property 
offender is faced with a decision--whether to commit a 
particul ar property crime . He cognitively frames a 
"dec i s i on-prob lem" and uses his own psychological 
perceptions to evaluate the choices of crime commission 
or non-commiss ion . In evaluating his choices , he may 
also evaluate the perceived consequences of each cho ice 
or act and the probabil ity of an outcome to a particular 
act . 
When making choices about gains and losses , the 
imperfections of individuals ' perceptions and consequent 
de c i s i ons may c l oud the possib le outcomes and 
contingencies of their decisions . Thus , psychologists 
argue that although acting rationally based on the ir 
perceptions , individuals often do not act optimally 
(Goldberg , 197 0 ; Gardner , 19 8 5 )  and may fail to "make 
decisions that ( are ] obj ectively the best" (Clarke and 
Cornish , 19 8 5 : 15 9 ) . Rather , two different people can 
select two different behaviors -- both o f  which are 
rational to them , but formed by their individual 
subj ective perceptions (Palmer, 1977 ) . The cognitive 
model clearly supports this subj ectivity in criminal 
10 
decision-making . The bel ief is that individuals do not 
"conceptualize the possible sanctions they face and 
therefore cannot be eas ily deterred from crime " 
(Carroll , 1982 : 57)  . Decision makers , including those 
involved in criminal decision-making , almost " invariably 
choose a course of action without knowing for certa in 
what its consequences will be " (Hill , � ll· , 19 7 9 )  • 
Also the " riskiness of an individual ' s  decisions may 
vary according to whether the decision is made al one or 
as a group member" (Clarke and Cornish , 19 8 5 : 1 6 0 ) . 
Hence the concept risky shift . Other variables that may 
account for this less-than-optimal decis ion-making are 
t h e  i nd i v i d u a l ' s  p e r s o n a l i ty , e th i c a l  n o rm s , 
psychological considerations , and the individual ' s  own 
subj ective util ities (Hill , gt g! . , 1979 ) . Thus , 
psychologists argue , economic decision-making theory 
fails to explain empirical decis ion-making . 
Brie fly , then , economic decision-making theory 
views human beings as rational utility maximi zers , who 
make rational decisions after careful del iberation about 
the possible acts and outcomes of those acts . The 
economic approach is in accord with the class ical school 
of criminology . Both postulate that crime is a rational 
choice aimed at maximiz ing pleasure (Becker and Landes , 
1974: Carroll , 1978 ) . The economic model has received 
' '  
criticism for its failure to predict individual choices 
1 1  
accurately . These failures usually are due to an 
individual ' s  "cognitive l imitations , short-cut decision-
making , and process ing heuristics" ( Lattimore and Witte , 
19 8 6 : 13 3 ) . Cognitive decision-making theory views 
huma n decis ion-ma king as l e s s -than-rat ional where 
i nd iv i d u a l s  make s i mpl e examinations o f  th e i r  
opportunities and make decisions that can be far short 
of optimal . 
To understand deci s ion-making processes , we 
therefore , should consider the subj ectivity of profit 
and pain as well as individual differences in obj ective 
' 
ci rcumstance s .  By suggesting that criminals are 
rational actors , the impl ication is that they have a 
real ist ic perception of the potential certainty and 
severity of punishment and that they act after rational 
calculation . They may act , however , with l imited 
rationality rather than ful l rational ity . 
The rational choice perspective on crime assumes 
that offenders seek to bene fit themselves by the ir 
criminal behavior ; that this involves the making of 
decisions and choices , however rudimentary on 
occasions these choices might be ; and that these 
processes , constrained as they are by time , the 
o f fender ' s  cognitive ab i l ities , and by the 
ava i l ab i l ity o f  re levant information , exhibit 
l imited rather than normative rationality ( Cornish 
and Clarke , 198 7 : 9 3 3 ) . 
Limited rat ional ity cons iders the limitations of 
ind iv i d u a l ' s  cap a c i ty to a cqu i re a n d  process 
information . Individuals allegedly make a few simple 
and concrete examinations of their· opportunities and 
12 
r 
' 
make decis ions that can be far short of optimal (Cook , 
198 0 )  . It may well be , as Bentham said , that "all men 
calculate , "  but unl imited calculation may not represent 
adequ a t e l y  d e s c r ipt ive dec i s i on-mak ing . Since 
individuals differ in their perceptions and subsequently 
in the ir decisions , the perceptions of individuals and 
the formation of these perceptions are the integral 
components of decision-making . Three related but 
divergent bodies of thought about decision-making--
economic , cognitive , perceptual deterrence -- serve as 
theoretical guides for my research . 
relevant empirical studies . 
A CRITIQUE OF DECISION-MAKING RESEARCH 
Next , I examine 
D e t e r r e n c e  i nve st igators have examined the 
relationships between aggregate crime rates and various 
operationalizations of the certainty and severity of 
punishment ( e . g . , Gibbs , 1968 ; Tittle , 19 69 ; Jensen , 
1969 ; Chiricos and Waldo , 197 0 ; Bailey and Smith , 1972 ; 
Bailey , 19 75 ; Ehrl ich , 1975 ; Blumstein , � gl . , 197 8 ) . 
The conclusions from these aggregate-based studies 
support a deterrent effect for the certainty but not for 
the severity of legal punishment ( Chambliss , 19 66 ; 
Gibbs , 1968 ; Jensen , 1969 ; Tittle , 1969 , 1980 ; Chiricos 
and Waldo , 197 0 ; Waldo and Chiricos , 1972 ; Tittle and 
Rowe , 19 7 4 ) • Since these studies rely on aggregate 
13 
data , they share a common fundamental weakness --they 
tell us l ittle about the processes of individual 
decision-making and calculus . By contrast , perceptual 
de t e r r e n c e  r e s e a r c h e r s  f o c u s  spe c i f i c a l l y  on 
individual ' s  assessments of the probability of sanction . 
Samples used in perceptual deterrence research have 
met criticism . Three groups of subj ects have been used 
exclus ively by perceptual deterrence researchers-­
students , marginally criminal adults , and incarcerated 
offenders . High school students have been used in some 
deterrence research ( e . g . , Erickson et gl . , 1977 ; 
Jensen � gl . , 1978 ; Jensen and Stitt , 19 8 2 ; Rankin and 
Wells , 1983 )  • Samples of col lege students , chosen 
primarily for their accessibil ity to academics , also 
have been used ( e . g . '  Waldo and Chiricos , 1972; 
S ilberman , 197 6 ; Paternoster et ll·' 19 8 2 a , 19 8 2 b ,  
198 3 )  • Researchers of marginally criminal adults 
e x am i ned percept i ons of sanct i on threat s among 
individuals who commit at worst minor crimes that are 
not met with grave soc ial disapproval or legal 
punishment ( e . g . , Grasmick and Mill igan , 19 7 6 ; Meier and 
Johnson , 1977 ; Grasmick and Bryj ak, 19 8 0 ; Grasmick , 
1985 ; Green , 1985) . Samples of incarcerated offenders 
offer more insight into the perceptions of individuals 
involved in serious crimes (Petersilia , 19 8 0 ) . Like 
students , these samples were chosen primarily for 
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accessibil ity ( e . g . , Petersil ia et al . ,  1978 ; Peterson 
et ll· , 198 0 ) . Recently researchers have suggested 
moving beyond these pioneering samples to those of 
problem populations , namely , career property offenders 
(Paternoster � gl. , 19 82a ; Glassner and Carpenter 1 9 8 5 ; 
Pil iavin , et � . , 1986 ) . 
In most perceptual deterrence research , subj ects 
are asked to sel f-disclose such items as previous 
criminal behavior , perceptions of sanct ion threats , and 
the i r  expectat ions for future criminal ity (e . g . , 
Grasmick and Milligan , 197 6 ; Erickson et � . , 1977 ; 
Jensen et � . , 1978 ; Grasmick and Bryj ak , 19 8 0 ; 
Pa ternoster � gl . , 19 8 2 , 1983 ; Grasmick, 198 5 ) . 
Genera l l y , sel f-report data are collected cross­
sectional ly via anonymous forced-choice quest ionnaires 
(e . g . , Grasmick and Mill igan , 19 76 ; Erickson et gl . , 
1977 ; Grasmick and Bryj ak , 19 8 0 ;  Grasmick , 198 5 ) . Since 
these surveys re ly on anonymity , they disal low 
comparisons to official criminal records ( e . g . , Peterson 
g_t g_l .  1 19 8 0 )  • 
Cross-sectional data collection may confuse the 
temporal order of perceptions and behavior ( e . g . , 
Grasmick and Bryj ak, 198 0 ; Jensen and Stitt , 19 8 2 ; 
Sa lt zman � ll• I 19 8 2 ; Minor and Harry , 1 9 8 2 ; 
Paternoster n al . ,  19 8 3 ; Rankin and Wells , 198 3 ; 
Paternoster � al . , 1985 ; Pil iavin et � . , 19 8 6 ; 
15 
Paternoster , 19 8 7 ) . · S ince cross-sectional data 
collection relies on the participants ' retrospective 
accounts , critics contend that little can be learned 
about perceptions that precede behavior . These studies 
have been criticized for fail ing to measure a deterrent 
effect ( i . e . , behavior preceded by perceptions ) and 
allegedly have measured an experiential effect ( i . e .  , 
perceptions preceded by behavior) . To overcome this 
methodological weakness , researchers recently have 
called for greater use of longitudinal studies ( e . g .  , 
Farrington , 1979; Paternoster §t � . , 198 3; 198 5 ) . It 
has been suggested that longitudinal studies afford the 
opportunity to detect changes in individuals perceptions 
of the i r  c ircumstances and allow for prospective 
predictions by the respondents (Farrington , 1979 ) . It 
has been suggested that future research focus on " future 
deviance rather than • • .  past deviance " (Tittle , 1977: 
58 6 )  . 
Still other researchers inform us that cross­
s e c t i on a l measurements can be as re l i ab l e  as 
longitudinal if the researcher is  sensitive to causal 
ordering ( Lundman , 198 6 ) . To this end , researchers 
suggest that the temporal sequence of events clearly 
should be elaborated by the researcher to guarantee the 
respondent is aware of such order . Thus , in an 
interview , a researcher may ask the individual about 
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thoughts and perceptions prior to the act to establish 
such causal ordering . 
Self-report measures in studies of perceptual 
deterrence often are criticized as unreliable (Jensen 
and Stitt , 1982 ) . These measures , it is charged , 
impl icitly contain bias due to individuals ' inabil ity to 
recall or unwillingness 
behavior (Tittle , 1980 ) . 
to report prev"ious criminal 
Thus , the rel iabil ity of sel f-
report studies is at the mercy of the subj ects ' memories 
and honesty ( Farrington , 198 3 ) . To rectify this 
weakness , critics suggest us ing both self-report data 
from in-depth interviews , and official measures of 
previous criminal behavior ( Petersilia , 198 0 ) . 
P r ev i o us re search has been cri t i c i z ed for 
methodological weakne sses and a l s o  for ignoring 
components of the criminal calculus . Critics contend 
that deterrence theory and research over-emphasize the 
threat of punishment as conformity-inducive and ignore 
the perceived benefits of crime commi ssion (e . g . , 
Cl inard and Quinney 19 67: Petersil ia , et Al,. , 1978: 
Grasmick and Bryj ak , 198 0 ) . Some research shows that 
those engaged in criminal decision-making are rational 
actors and consider the perceived benefits of crime as 
important as the perceived risks ( Bennett and Wright , 
19 8 4 ; Nettl er , 1 9 8 4 ) . Other research does not 
substantiate criminal activity as rational decision-
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making but rather opportunistic ( Petersilia et al . ,  
1978; Carroll , 1978; 1982 ) .  
Critics of previous deterrence research contend 
that if we posit theories at the micro level , we need 
micro data ( e . g . , Jacob , 1979 ) . Thus , interviews 
increasingly have been used to measure deterrent 
effects . These interviews produce qual itative data 
about individuals ' risk perceptions and previous and 
subsequent behavior ( e . g . , Petersil ia gt A! . , 1978; 
Richards and Tittle , 1982; Rankin and Wells , 198 3; 
Shover , 198 5 ) . These studies endeavor to "get inside 
peop l e ' s  heads" to understand the ir individual 
perceptions of rewards and sanction threats the maj or 
control mechanism posited by deterrence theory (Gibbons , 
1979:12 2 ) . 
The study of individual criminal behavior has 
r e c e ived l i t t l e  a t t e ntion from dec i s i on-making 
researchers . Often the research samples suffer similar 
weaknesses as those in deterrence research -- namely 
the i r  weak general i z ab i l ity to empirical problem 
populat i ons ( i . e . , individuals involved in actual 
criminal decision-making) • 
Studies of criminal decision-making typically focus 
on minor criminal offenses such as traffic offenses , 
shoplifting , and income tax evasion ( e . g . , Brown , 198 1; 
Buckle and Farrington , 1984 ) .  Although these studies 
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use di fferent methods ( surveys and observat ions ) the 
findings are very similar and make common sense : young 
males tend to engage more in 
than females and the elderly . 
"risky" decision-making 
These studies also fail 
to "get inside peoples ' heads , " meaning , their focus 
typically is elsewhere than individual ' s  perceptions of 
the dec ision-prob lem and the alternative actions 
available to them . 
The economic and psychological decision-making 
research to date rely on both aggregate and individual 
data ( e . g . , Rettig , 1963 ; Sj oquist , 1973 ; McPheters , 
19 7 6 ;  Carroll , 1978 ; 19 8 2 ) • A study whose findings 
support rational decision-making examines average gains 
from three index crimes (viz . , robbery , burglary and 
larceny over $50 ) . The significant finding from this 
research is that an increase in the probabil ity of 
arrest and conviction and an increase in the punishment 
result in a decrease in the number of maj or property 
crimes , thus bolster ing the deterrence doct rine 
( Sj oquist , 197 3 ) . 
But critics contend that too much attention and 
weight are given to the threat of legal sanction . Legal 
threat does not operate in a vacuum and may not be · as 
important in the calculus process as extra-legal threat 
(Meier , 197 8 ) . Researchers traditionally have ignored 
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extra-legal sanction threats and stigma (Jensen and 
Erickson , 197 8 ) . 
McPheters ( 19 7 6 )  found that as the expected gains 
decrease , the number of crimes increase . Aqain , this 
research uses aggregate data for the average real ga ins 
from robbery , the frequency of robberies , and the 
probabil ity of arrest and conviction . The results from 
this research suggest that in the face ·of decreasing 
ga ins f rom robbery , the number o f  crimes that 
individuals commit increases . One explanation offered 
for this is perhaps individuals act as satisficers 
rather than maximizers (Simon , 1976) . This explanation 
recognizes the complexities of the calculations involved 
in decision options . Possibly individual s  opt for 
stable satisficing rather than optimal maximization .  A 
second expl anation i s  that the probab i l ity and 
perceptions of arrest and conviction are declining . 
With this decrease in risk, marginal criminals enter 
into robbery which may increase the number of robberies 
while at the same time decrease the average ga ins from 
robberies . Thus , amateurs may account for the increase 
in crimes accompanied by a decrease in gains ( Z imring 
and Hawkins , 1968; McPheters , 197 6 ) . 
A significant finding from a study using 59 
offenders is that the decis ion to commit a crime is 
based on a simple,  additive , and unidimens ional analysis 
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of crime opportunities (Carrol l ,  19 78 ) . This finding is 
in oppos it ion to the economic approach where criminal 
decision-making is a complex multipl icat ive we ighing of 
benefits and risks . The sample appeared more responsive 
to the pos itive gains from crime than the risk 
probabil ities and changes in penalties ( Carroll , 197 8 ) . 
A fol l ow-up study suppo rt s the use o f  l imited 
rational ity since complex situations rely , in part , on 
limited comparisons and j udgments . Thus , compared to 
optimal responses , human responses appear non-optimal . 
The facts that people do not always make the most 
rat i onal dec i sions , that they may pay undue 
attention to less important information , that they 
employ shortcuts in the processing of information , 
and that group decisions may be di fferent from 
individual ones are all clearly relevant to an 
understanding of criminal decision making ( Clarke 
and Cornish , 19 8 5 : 160 ) . 
It may well be that sal ient features of the s ituation 
( i . e . , the decision-problem) may dominate the decis ion-
making ( Carroll , 198 2 ) . 
Previous case studies of individual offenders 
illuminate the logistics of crime , criminal networks and 
criminal ideologies about legitimate work, the lure of 
crime , and the autonomy it affords (Sutherland , 19 3 7 ; 
Chambl iss , 1972 ; Inciardi , 197 7 ) . Much has also been 
written about the organization and structure of criminal 
careers and networks (Shover , 1972 ; 1973 ; Best and 
Luckenbill , 198 2 ) . 
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Studies of perceptual deterrence and individuals 
engaged in decision-making tend to evaluate only target 
selection for various crimes rather than the decision­
making process that precedes target selection and the 
criminal act ( e . g . , Maguire , 1980 ; Maguire and Bennett , 
1982 ; Bennett and Wright , 198 4a ; 198 4b ; Akerstrom , 198 5 ;  
Rengert and Wasilchick , 198 5 ) . Since these studies 
focus on target selection , they purposely ignore the 
individual ' s  decision to commit or not commit crimes . 
Doubtless , these decisions are inter-related , but , they 
involve different assessments of different decision 
problems . In the target selection decision-making 
research , ind ividual s  describe the properties of 
particular targets that are appealing or frightening . 
These studies use a variety of research methods and some 
of which are innovative. For example , burglars were 
walked through a neighborhood and asked to identify 
those characteristics of various targets that were 
appeal ing or unappeal ing to them as burglars . But these 
research proj ects simply illustrate the methods used by 
property offenders in making a decision about whether to 
rob or burglarize a particular house or business ( e . g . , 
Best and Luckenbill , 198 2 ; Bennett and Wright , 1984 a ;  
1984b) . Target selection research shows the decision to 
commit or not commit a particular crime generally 
precedes target selection (Maguire , 1980 ; Maguire and 
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Bennett , 1982 ; Bennett and Wright , 1984b) . This 
decis ion problem presently remains unexplored . 
In sum , studies of perceptual deterrence and 
ind i v i du a l  d e c i s i o n - m a k i ng have i n c reased our 
und e r s t a nd i ng o f  the deterrence/ de c i s i on-making 
processes . Nonetheless , findings from studies which 
use samples of students , non-criminal adults , and 
incarcerated offenders have l imited external val idity 
( Paternoster et ll· , 198 2a) . For example , we cannot 
genera l ize those f ind ings to the population of 
unincarcerated adults engaged in criminal decision­
making until we study samples drawn from this population 
( Pil iavin et gl . , 198 6 ) . Nor can we general ize these 
findings to individuals who have demonstrated careers in 
property or garden-variety crimes , nor to non-criminal 
decision-making (Glassner and Carpenter , 1985 ) . 
I n v e s t i g a t o r s  have n e g l e c t e d  t o  e x a m i n e  
respondents ' explanations and elaborations of their 
perceptions , decision-making processes , and the issue of 
deterrence . Thi s  weakness remains desp ite the 
recognized need for studies which employ personal and 
qualitative measures of deterrent effects and the 
offender ' s  perspective (Jensen §t Al· , 197 8 ; Jacob , 
1979 ; Paternoster §t £l . , 1982a ; Glassner and Carpenter , 
198 5 ; · clarke and Cornish , 198 5 ; Pil iavin gt gl . , 198 6 ; 
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Tuck and Riley , 19 8 6 ) . Paternoster ( 19 8 7 )  has drawn the 
fol lowing conclusion about the state of the field:  
In many ways , perceptual deterrence research has 
advanced about as far as is possible in its present 
form . It has moved from simple bivariate measures 
of association between perceived sanction threats 
and sel f-reported behavior to the est imat ion o f  
complex two and three-wave multivariate causal 
models . Additional studies in the same mold with 
the simple addition of waves or variables would not 
contribute substantially to our understanding of 
the deterrence process . Unfortunately , even in 
spite of past efforts , al l we know in general is 
that perceptions of the certainty and severity of 
punishment do not seem to deter the trivial and 
infrequent behaviors of high school and university 
students . With only a few and isolated exceptions , 
perceptual deterrence research has not gone beyond 
the science of sophomores described by Jensen � 
� .  ( 19 78 ) . Therefore , perceptual deterrence 
researchers must conduct survey research of high­
criminal ity adult samples . Only this next 
progress ion can determine whether perce ived 
sanction threats play a role in inhibit ing more 
serious and more frequently occurring criminal 
conduct ( Paternoster , 198 7 : 2 13-2 14 ) . 
Paternoster ' s  advice is well-taken and serves as 
guidance in the development of my research obj ectives . 
The central objective of my research is to . enhance our 
und e r s t a n d i n g o f  de c i s i on -mak i ng , spe c i f i ca l l y  
individual career cr�minal decision-making about whether 
or not to commit a cr ime , various alternatives 
cons idered in the decis ion problem , and influences on 
those decis ion processes . 
CONTEXTUAL SETTING 
We know that, a relatively smal l proport ion of 
of fenders is respons ible for a substantial percentage of 
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index crimes ( Blumstein , 19 8 6 ) . These individuals are 
often cal led "career criminals . "  One study found that 
25 percent of a sample of 624  Cal ifornia inmates were 
career criminals .  They were responsible for 60 percent 
of armed robberies and burglaries committed by the 
entire sample ( Peterson gt al . ,  19 8 0 ) . This group has 
been labeled a problem population because during their 
careers in crime , they are responsible for the maj ority 
of thefts , burglaries , armed robberies , forgeries and 
buying and sell ing stolen goods . Thus to understand the 
process of and influences on the decision-making of 
those offenders who establ ish careers in crimes, the 
obvious "problem population" is that of the career 
criminal , rather than samples used previously . 
The selection of a criminal career is cons idered by 
some researchers as a rational selection , given the 
individual ' s  alternatives (Hol zman , 198 2 ) . Case studies 
of entry into the criminal lifestyle report that 
individuals enter this alternate lifestyle early in l i fe 
and learn the trade in the same manner as others who 
learn a legitimate occupation ( Sutherland , 1 9 3 7 ; Irwin , 
1 9 7 0 ; Chambliss , 19 72 ; Inciardi , 1977 ; Luckenbill, 
198 5 )  •:  To establish a criminal career , one must first 
have the opportunity . Therefore , one must be introduced 
to senior people in the field , establish networks among 
individuals , learn the language of the profession, and 
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learn the rudiments of business transactions . These 
career neces s ities must be met in i l l egit imate 
o c cupat i o n s  s im i l a r  to l e g i t i mate o c cupations 
( Letkemann , 197 3 ) . Research shows that one learns the 
trade by meeting , observing and talking with senior 
people in the field ( Farrington , 197 9 ) . "Background 
conditions can predispose individuals to deviance by 
means of shaping their circumstances and orientations . 
But . • •  contextual conditions channel individuals ' 
predispositions toward concrete activities " ( Luckenbill , 
198 5 : 15 1 ) . 
Although these "career" criminals generally are 
sanctioned at some point in their l ives , their careers 
continue even after experiencing sanction . They may be 
arrested , j ailed or imprisoned numerous times but their 
cr iminal activities often are not offset by the 
sanctioning experience . Since after their release , 4 9  
percent o f  former prisoners will return to prison again ,  
they apparently are persuaded l ittle, by legal sanction , 
to desist from crime (Beck and Shipley , 198 7 ) . A recent 
Bureau of Justice Report states that at least "8 0 
percent of the men and women held in local j ails in 1983  
had a prior criminal conviction . About two-thirds had 
served time before in a j ail or prison , and about a 
third had served a prior sentence at least twice" (BJS ,  
19 8 6 : 49 ) . 
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These career criminals begin their careers at a 
young age and often terminate them only with impending 
old age ( e . g . , Irwin , 197 0 ; Meisenhelder , 197 5 ;  1977 ; 
Frazier , 197 6 ; Greenberg , 198 3 ; Hirschi and Gottfredson , 
198 3 ; Shover , 198 5 ) . Still , l ittle is known about the 
nature and incidence of offending due to the methods 
used in previous studies ( Buckle and Farrington , 198 4 ) .  
"The question has not properly been considered whether 
those individuals who habitually make criminal decisions 
think in different ways from other people" ( Clarke and 
Cornish , 198 5:16 1 ) . These repetitive offenders , it has 
been observed , steal habitually and constantly are alert 
to opportunities for personal gain to the point that 
this " attitude becomes second nature " ( Irwin ,  198 5: 88 ) . 
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CHAPTER II 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
This research is ethnographic and inductive . The 
theories and research of rational decision-making serve 
as guides in shaping this research , its obj ectives , 
methodol ogies , research questions and ontological 
inquisitiveness . This research , however ,  is inductive 
and offers explanations based on observation rather than 
theory testing . Thus , this research and its findings 
are discussed in relation to existing theories but not 
limited by them ( e . g . , Glaser , 1967 ) . 
Weaknesses typically found in decision-making and 
deterrence research may be overcome by an inductive , 
ethnographic research methodology and by util izing a 
mul t ip l i c i ty of data sources and data collection 
techniques .  To this end , I used both official records 
of the samples ' criminal invol vementj incarceration and 
self-report data . I collected sel f-report data by using 
both personal ethnographic interviews and structured 
questionnaires . These data are not anonymous and 
therefore readily comparable to official records . 
The processes of the risk-benefit calculus were 
explored to determine how career property criminals make 
decisions about whether to commit or not to commit 
crime . To arrive at such an understanding , I had each 
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participant focus on how the decis ion to commit a crime 
was arrived at , various alternatives cons idered in the 
context of the dec ision problem , perceptions of the 
likel ihood of various outcomes , and the effect of those 
perceptions on decisions . Critics suggest when an 
individual is prevented or deterred from committing a 
particular crime , he is simply displaced to other 
criminal act ivity . Researchers in form us that 
"additional ways of investigating displacement are 
needed , and in particular , studies which focus upon the 
offender ' s  own explanations for his decisions and 
cho i ces {Cornish and Cl arke , 1987 : 9 3 5 ) . When 
discussing alternatives , each respondent focused on both 
legitimate and illegitimate alternatives . Thus , this 
research enl ightens us on the types of alternatives 
considered during the decision-making process and also 
when criminal action is displaced . This analys is of 
individual dec is ion-making processes is unique to 
criminological research and addresses those issues that 
critics recently have called for. 
My p o s i t i on and those of others i s  that 
"parsimonious accounts of criminal behavior • • • do not 
have to be complete explanations • • but only ones 
good enough to accommodate existing research and to 
suggest new directions" ( Clarke and Cornish , 1985 : 14 9 )  • 
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As mentioned earl ier , decision-making investigators 
have called for ethnographic researchers to explore the 
dynamics of individual decis ion-making . These recently 
suggested directions support the research methodology 
for my research . The research methodology for this 
dissertation is described in the following chapter . 
SAMPLE SELECTION 
Th i s  r e s e a rch used a samp l e  with greater 
generalizabil ity to an important criminal population 
than those used previously . The sample provided 
empirical data about retrospective and present-day 
decision-making among " ordinary" career criminals . 
With the cooperation of the Tennessee Board of 
Paroles , a sample of 60  male career property offenders 
nearing release from Tennessee prisons was selected . 
Thi s  part i cul ar samp l e  was used to enhance our 
understanding of empirical decision-making among an 
actual chronic problem population . For purposes of this 
research , "career criminal" was operational ized by the 
following criteria: ( 1 ) he must be serving at least his 
second prison incarceration for felony property crimes ; 
and ( 2 )  one of his incarcerations must have been for 
either burglary or armed robbery . Researchers recently 
have insisted that studies of criminal decision-making 
be crime-specific for the "deterrence processes and the 
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factors taken into account are l ikely to vary greatly • 
• among different crimes" (Clarke and Cornish , 1 9 8 5 : 
167 ) . Since burglary and armed robbery account for the 
maj ority of property crimes reported yearly ( other than 
petty theft ) , they are the logical choices for this 
research (Uni form Crime Reports , 19 8 5 ) . Thus , to ensure 
inclus ion of those typical rather than atypical property 
offenders in the sample , and to be crime-specific , those 
selected must have been incarcerated for one of the two 
most common property crimes . 
Two other criteria were used in selecting the 
sample . First , those selected must have been approved 
for parole and have a release date not to exceed four 
months after the initial first-wave interview . This 
ensured that the sample was released from prison nine 
months prior to the second interview . Research in 
criminal recidivism shows that most recidivists are re­
incarcerated within six to nine months after their 
prison release ( Beck and Shipley , 198 7 ) . The logic was 
that those in the sample who would be re-incarcerated 
were more l ikely to be prior to the second interview . 
Second , the participants must have been at least 25 
years of age . . This minimum age criterion was to 
increase the likel ihood of obtaining informat ion from 
the part icipants that showed reflection on their l ives 
that often eludes young adults . Also , since sample 
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members had to be serv ing the ir second pr ison 
incarceration , they more than likely could not have 
establ ished long-lasting careers in crime at a young age 
of less than 2 5  years . 
The sample was l imited to males since they better 
rep resent career property offenders than females . 
Research shows that males account for the great maj ority 
of all property crimes and that females traditionally 
have not been actively involved in property crimes 
(Mann , 1 9 8 4 ; Morris , 1987 ) . Therefore , to better 
understand the decision-making processes of individuals 
establ ishing long-lasting careers in property crime , 
males are the logical choice . 
To obtain the names of the population from which 
the sample was drawn , I visited the Tennessee Board of 
Paroles in Nashville and reviewed prospective parolees ' 
Pre-Release Plans . . These informed me who had been 
granted parole , from which Tennessee institut ion , the 
of fense for which they were incarcerated , and the 
anticipated date of their release . Federal Bureau of 
Investigation "rap sheets" were then reviewed to obta in 
ind ividual ' s  incarceration histories . These "rap 
sheets" are part of the Parole Board ' s  central files and 
therefore were readily accessible . 
This research is part of a larger research proj ect 
funded by the National Institute of Justice . The larger 
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proj ect ' s  principal investigator contacted , by letter , 
those individuals who met the sample criteria . The 
letter described briefly the purpose of the research , 
methods of sample selection , and monetary compensation 
for participating . Shortly thereafter , the other 
graduate assistant and I visited them where they were 
incarcerated and explained further the research to them . 
After a thorough explanation of the research and 
informed consent procedures , the individuals were asked 
to participate . They were informed that the decis ion to 
participate was entirely theirs ' and that they would not 
be penal ized for refus ing to participate ( see Appendix A 
for informed consent form and Appendix B ,  Figure 1 for 
sample demographics ) . All information divulged by the 
participants is confidential and accessible only to the 
research staff . The sensitivity of this type of 
research demands ethics of sensitivity and guaranteed 
confidential ity ( e . g . , Ellen , 198 4 ) .  
Respondents were paid $50 after the first interview 
( i . e . , the interview conducted in prison) and $100 after 
the second interview ( i . e . , the interview conducted nine 
months after their release from prison) . Payments were 
made through the Treasurer ' s  Office at the University of 
Tennessee . These payments were subsidized by federal 
research grant monies from the National Institute of 
Justice . 
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DATA COLLECTION 
Although this research rel ied on decision-making 
theories as its guide , it was not restricted by the 
limitations of those theories . Rather , this research 
describes empirical decision-making among this sample of 
property offenders . 
Three methods of data col lection were used in this 
· research : analysis of official arrest and incarceration 
r e c o r d s ; e thnograph i c  s em i - s t ru c tu r ed personal 
interviews which were audio taped and later transcribed ; 
and structured questionna ires (see Appendix A for 
interview guides and questionnaires ) .  The use of 
multiple data sources ( i . e . , triangulation) ,  yielded 
several accounts of a single event which provided an 
internal val idity check ( Burgess , 198 2 ) . 
Official records were reviewed prior to the first 
interv iews to compare them to the participants ' 
retrospective accounts of their arrest and incarceration 
histories . Some information was available via computer 
at the Board of Paroles and some was ava ilable only in 
file folders . Without the use of official records and 
the individuals ' sel f-reporting , there would not have 
been a method for cross-checking the incarceration 
histories . This way , if any contradictions did arise , 
they were resolved either during the interview or soon 
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afterwards to obtain an accurate history of arrests and 
incarcerations . 
The interviews were conducted and the survey 
questionnaires administered at both measurements . The 
surveys included questions about the participants ' 
perceptions of the risks and rewards of crime commiss ion 
and how these contributed to their decision-making . 
During the ethnographic interviews (which provided the 
most important data for this research) , I focused 
spec ifically on the participant ' s  criminal calculus and 
how criminal decision-problems were framed and resolved . 
This was accomplished by having the participant , at both 
interviews , describe how the decision to commit a 
specific crime was arrived at , his method of assessing 
the perceived risks and rewards of the crime and various 
alternatives to crime ( i . e . , his criminal-calculus ) .  In 
th is way , actual career criminals '  decision-making 
processes are explained within a theoretical decis ion-
making context guided by deterrence and decision-making 
theories and by us ing an ethnographic methodology . The 
probing revealed those independent variables that best 
explain the dynamics of the criminal calculus . Various 
explanatory factors were discussed with the participant 
to tap those variables that best explain the dynamics of 
his criminal calculus . The variables that wer� . explored 
. 
include aging , the threat of legal sanction , the 
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i n d i v i d u a l ' s  s e l f - i m a g e , a n d  f a m i l i a l  
attachment; commitment . Other variables were discovered 
and modif ied as this ethnographic research process 
developed and as some sense was made of the qual itative 
data . 
The intensive interviews were semi-structured to 
elicit from the informant detailed accounts o f  decis ion-
making . Most 
a s ymmet r i c a l . 
social research relationships are 
I n  th i s  �thnograph i c  rese arch , 
participants were treated as key informants possess ing 
knowledge unknown to those outside their reference group 
or profess ion (Hammersley and Atkinson , 198 3 )  • This 
research , which rel ied heavily on establ ishing rapport , 
operated on the assumption that human relationships form 
when two people meet and talk , especially about 
sens itive information (Agar , 1977)  • The use of these 
multiple key informants ensured greater data reliabil ity 
( Lofland and Lofland , 198 4 ) . Using this approach , the 
interviewer could better assure rel iabil ity by letting 
the participant know , if need be , that he was "conwise" 
when certain information appeared dubious (Fraz ier , 
197 8 ) . 
S e l f- report data collection problems are not 
insurmountable .  Careful planning and execution of the 
research with the _ support of a well des igned interview 
schedule ,  believable assurances of confidentiality ,  and 
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ski lled interviewing contribute to successful self­
r e p o r t d a t a  co l l e c t i o n  ( e . g . , M i n o r , 1 9 7 8 ) . 
Establishing rapport in any qual itative research proj ect 
is of the utmost importance and can be dif ficult 
especially with suspicious individuals who , for good 
reason , do not trust outs iders . Generally accepted 
guidelines for establishing rapport and trust were 
adhered to in this research ( e . g .  , Beck and Adams , 
197 0 ) . "Intensive interviewing is a guided 
conversation whose goal is to e l i ci t  from the 
interviewee rich , detailed materials that can be used in 
qual itative analysis . It is to discover the informant ' s  
experience of a particular topic or situation . Many 
soc ial situations can be directly apprehended only 
through intens ive interviewing" ( Lofland and Lo fland , 
198 4 : 12 , 13 ) . "The interviewer must be an active 
l istener , he or she must l isten to what is being said in 
order to assess how it relates to the research focus" 
(Hammersley and Atkinson , 19 8 3 : 1 14 ) . 
The participants were asked a host of questions 
guided by models of decision-making about their own 
individual decision-making . They were questioned about 
the way they defined and gathered information about the 
problem prior to their deciding to commit or not commit 
a crime . They were questioned about the various 
alternatives cons idered in the decis ion-problem , the 
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manner of evaluating alternatives , and their perceptions 
of the costs and rewards of choosing one alternative 
over another . 
DATA ANALYSIS 
The data from the questionnaires were used for 
simple percentages ( found in chapters 3 and 4 )  and bi­
variate statistical analyses ( e . g .  , cross-tabulation) . 
After having cross-tabulated the key decision-making 
variables , to discover they revealed no significant · 
relationship , some were collapsed , re-coded , and cross­
tabulated again . The cross-tabulations showed nothing 
signi ficant , other than an internal validity check 
(these data are available but not included in this 
text) . Data analyses focused specifically ,on those 
var i ab les that shape and reflect decision-making 
processes and the individual ' s  subj ective perceptions of 
the benefits and risks of crime commiss ion ( e . g . , 
knowledge and perceptions of legal and extra-legal 
sanction threats ; their economic situational setting ; 
network support systems) .  
The interviews were audio taped and transcribed . I 
then read the transcripts and searched for information 
pertinent to the research obj ectives . Those dialogues 
that pertained were highlighted in various colors that 
were coded to specific obj ectives ( e . g . , orange was 
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coded to perceptions of rewards of crime commission ) . 
Later the 60 transcripts were analyz ed by each color-
highl ighted dialogue . The interviews yielded empirical 
d a t a  a b out i nd i v i du a l s  in spec i f i c s ituat ions 
( Spradley , 197 9 ) . Those dialogues were then subj ected to 
standard qualitative data analyses to better understand 
criminal decision-making and its changing character . 
Throughout the course of the research , data were 
gathered and kept in the form of field notes (e . g . , 
Patton , 198 7 ) . These notes were used to make analytic 
"sense" of the career criminal ' s  calculus . This inflow 
of data produced a "sparking of ideas" which were 
written , filed ,  organized , and used in the ethnographic 
analyses (Glaser , 1978; Lofland and Lofland , 1984;  14 9 ) . 
These are not fully developed working papers but 
periodic written notes whereby progress i s  
assessed , emergent ideas are identi fied , research 
st rategy is sketched out , and so on . The 
construction of such notes therefore const itutes 
precisely that sort of internal dialogue , or 
thinking aloud , that is the essence of reflexive 
ethnography . such an activity should help one 
avoid lapsing into the natural attitude and 
thinking as usual in the field . One is forced to 
question what one knows , how such knowledge has 
been acquired , the degree of certainty of such 
knowledge , and what further lines o f  enquiry are 
implied (Hammersley and Atkinson , 1983 : 164-165 ) . 
From these field notes , typologies of decis ion-
making were constructed . During the course of this 
research , such typologies were created and revised with 
di f f erent cha racteristics , names , and labels . I 
eventually opted to use typologies with quantitatively 
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dist inguishing l ines o f  demarcation rather than 
typologies in previous research , namely Type I and Type 
I I  Lambda dec ision-makers . These typologies are 
expl icated in the fourth chapter . Briefly , the Type II 
Lambda decision-maker is one who has committed a great 
number of felonies ( at least 100 during his l ifetime ) 
and a Type I Lambda decision-maker is one who has 
committed less than 100 felonies across his li fetime . 
These Lambdas represent quantitative differences in 
decision-making types , with real empirical qual itative 
differences associated with each . These di fferences are 
explicated in chapter four . 
Al so , typo logies were constructed o f  those 
variables that were identified as impeding rational 
decision-making . Typology construction and other ways 
of making sense of qualitative data , took place during 
the research process and data collection . 
In ethnography the analysis of data is not a 
distinct stage of the research . Formally, it 
starts to take shape in analytic notes and 
memoranda ; informally it is embodied in the 
ethnographer ' s  ideas , hunches ,  and emergent 
concepts .  In this way the analysis of data feeds 
into the process of research design . This is the 
core idea of grounded theorizing: the collection of 
data is guided strategically by the developing 
theory . Theory building and data collection are 
dial ectically l inked (Hammersley and Atkinson , 
198 3: 174 ) . 
As these data were analyzed along the course of the 
research , they called for revisions of the interview 
guide . Topics were revised , deleted , and added to the 
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guide over the course of the year and a hal f .  An 
important advantage of ethnographic research is its 
flexibility .  "The strategy and even direction o f  the 
research can be changed relatively easily , in line with 
changing assessments of what is required by the process 
of theory construction . As a result , ideas can be 
quickly tried out and , if promising , followed up" 
(Hammersley and Atkinson , 198 3 : 2 4 ) � 
A LOOK AHEAD 
The following chapter provides qual itative data on 
three specific issues . First , the chapter describes the 
respondents ' accounts of their own motivations , the 
alternatives available to them and considered by them , 
and the mechanism that facil itated their decision­
making . These variables are components o f ,  but precede 
the actual decision . Therefore , those components of 
theoretical decision-problem resolution are related to 
empirical data from this sample of repetitive offenders . 
Second , chapter three describes generally , from the 
interview data , the decision to commit a crime . This 
d e s c r i p t i o n  e xp l i c a t e s  the c a l c u l u s , mot ives , 
alternatives ,  and mechanisms typically found among this 
samp l e . Thi rd , the fol l owing chapter describes 
generally , from the interview data , the decision to not 
commit a crime . This description explicated the 
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calculus typical ly used among this sample and compared 
it to the calculus used when the decis ion was made � 
commit a crime . Thus , the three primary issues of the 
following chapter , provide an account of decision­
prob l em resolution related to those variables of 
decision-making theories and to decis ions to commit and 
not to commit specific crimes . 
After these general findings are discussed in 
chapter three , they are related to speci fic decision­
making typologies constructed from this sample . These 
dec i s i on-making typologies along with some simple 
percentages are found in chapter four . The chapter also 
contains a case-study of each typology for illustrative 
purposes .  The fifth and final chapter relates the data 
findings and analysis to the theories that guided this 
research and o f fers some impl ications for those 
theories . 
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CHAPTER III 
AN ANALYSIS OF OFFENDER DECISION-MAKING 
As discussed in chapters one and two , proponents of 
prescriptive decision-making assume that the individual 
decision-maker analytically resolves a decision-problem 
through a l ogica lly cal culated series o f  steps 
culminating in a "rational decision . "  This research 
uses those social-psychological variables that are 
indicative of decision-problem resolution theories and 
research as l ines of inquiry . A wealth of information 
was elicited from each participant . Most important for 
this research was the individual ' s  reconstructing of two 
spec i f i c  c r im i n a l  d e c i s i o n-prob l ems and the i r  
resolution . Each participant was asked to recall the 
most recent crime that he had committed and could 
remember clearly . At that point , all daily events , 
conversations , and thoughts during the decision to 
commit the crime were reconstructed and probed . In this 
way , 60 crime-specific criminal decision-problems , their 
framing and resolving were obtained . 
Likewise , each was asked to think about the most 
recent occasion when they decided not to commit a 
specific crime for reasons other than being frightened 
off by the police or a would-be witness or victim . 
Again , all daily events , conversations , and thoughts 
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during the decision to not commit a crime were 
reconstructed . Thus , a crime-speci fic decision to not 
commit the crime was obtained from those offenders who 
could recall a specific time . 
MOTIVATIONS ; FRAMING THE DECISION-PROBLEM 
Social psychologists inform us that motivation is 
intrinsically wedded to goal attainment . Researchers 
studying motivation focus primarily on the various 
factors that determine what psychologists call "goal-
directed behavior . "  Goal directedness is of central 
imp o rt ance in understanding motivated behavior . 
"Motivated behavior can perhaps best be described by its 
purpos e fulness and persistence until the goal is 
reached" (Van Doren , 197 2 ; 3 69) . That behavior usually 
will continue if the result is beneficial or positive . 
Goal attainment generally is preceded by perceptions of 
expected benefits from a particular act which become 
motives for engaging in a particular act . 
To analytically understand motive is difficult for 
motive cannot be observed directly but rather must be 
inferred from behavior or the individual ' s  self-
report ing about the p re-behavioral thoughts and 
perceptions . 
I 
Motive is an essential component of criminality for 
j urists and investigators of decision-making . Jurists 
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are interested in motivation since it is an integral 
part o f  intent or "mens rea . "  Decision-making 
researchers are interested in motivation for it is part 
of the decision-problem ,  part of the expected benefits 
produced by engaging in a particular act , and part of 
the calculable results perceived by the problem-solver . 
The most common motivating force among these 
offenders was the " quick, easy money" they bel ieved that 
would obtain from committing crimes . Fi fty-three of 60 
gave "money" as their maj or motivator for committing 
crimes . 
Q . Why do you think you did the armed robbery? 
A .  For the money . 
Q . Any other reason? 
A .  I j ust wanted money . ( # 1 )  
The financial attractiveness coupled with the 
perceptions that legal sanction threats are next to nil 
(to be elaborated in this chapter) explain a great deal 
of the decision-problem framing among many of these ,  
especially the high frequency offenders (these offenders 
are discussed in chapter four) . 
Q . What about crime is attractive to you or 
appealing? 
A .  It doesn ' t  take very long , the profit is 
quick . I f  I worked construction I would make 
a week when I could make that much in 15 
minutes . It ' s  pretty much why its appeal ing . 
( # 007 ) 
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Q .  Why did you do it , for the money , or 
excitement , or 
A .  Oh , for the money and no , I don ' t  think it was 
excitement , it was j ust for the money . ( # 14 ) 
Q .  Why did you do that , why did you decide to 
break and enter? 
A .  For the money , to get drugs to get high on , 
you know . ( # 6 )  
Q .  Why did you do it , or why did you do a 
burglary? 
A .  Broke and needed money and wasn ' t  working , you 
know , and j ust needed money to drink and 
party , it wasn ' t  for bills . ( # 14 ) 
A less often stated motivation ( 3  of 6 0 )  for 
committing crimes was for the sense of accomplishment . 
Q .  Why would you do it? 
A .  Because I enj oyed it and the people with me 
enj oyed it . I ' m the type of person man if I 
could steal something from way in the back row 
or if the store manager is standing here and I 
could take something right under his nose , 
that ' s  what I ' d get . 
Q .  Why would you prefer that? 
A .  Because it was more of an accomplishment . ( # 7 )  
This motivation typically was coupled with the desire 
for easily obtainable money or a sense of enj oyment . 
Q .  What do you think the maj or motivations were 
to commit shoplifting? 
A .  Because it ' s easy money , it ' s exciting to do 
it , it ain ' t  never hard to sell the stuff .  
But wanting to do it man , wanting to do it . 
· Love to do it . Love to do it would be the 
word . ( #7 )  
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Two ind iv idual s  reported in vivid detail a 
motivation for their crimes unlike that of others. Both 
are high frequency burglars who considered crime a very 
fun and exciting game . The game-l ike rewards served as 
motivation-enough for their will ingness to commit 
crimes . The easy money , which was motivating , paled in 
signi ficance to beating the opponent of the game and 
getting over on the law .  
Q .  Why did you do it? 
A .  I f  I had to write a damn paper on the reason I 
steal they would be one sentence -- It was for 
the game . It ' s a high , now , I mean it ' s . 
exhilarating . I mean , some people l ike 
racquet ball and some people l ike tennis and I 
get off going through doors . ( #4 2 )  
Successfully completing the game provided a sense 
of accomplishment , a pos itive feel ing , and reinforced 
their belief that they had won the game . They 
functioned with the knowledge that in this game , l ike 
others , there emerges a winner and a loser . And when 
they were arrested and convicted , they simply admitted 
that they had lost the game , at least temporarily . 
Q .  What do you mean when you say " I  lost for 
now . "  
A .  It got to be a game . I • ve been locked up 
since I was 16 . I ' ve wasted the best years of 
my l ife , I can never get them back because 
I • ve played this game of " I ' m  going to beat 
them" you know and then you get to the stage 
of you wonder who in the hell is it I ' m trying 
to beat . But it got to be a game . I played 
the game and lost . You got me . Let ' s  go 
ahead and run it and start it over , you know . 
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Q .  Did you feel like you were winning the game? 
A. Well it starts , it ' s  j ust like the trumpets at 
a horse race. I mean that sounds a silly way 
to sum up , but now , that ' s  the damn , that ' s  
j ust about it. It ' s  like a starting gun at a 
swim meet , you j ust , that starts the game. 
And it ' s  not ended until you stand before that 
j udge , you know , or you beat it. It ' s  j ust 
like a chess game. I ' m trying to stay a step 
ahead. I mean , fuck , it ' s  a challenge. I 
mean , by God , it gets down to where it ' s  j ust 
me against them and that ' s  the way it is. To 
me , getting over on him or beating him at this 
game is 90 percent of it. The fucking money 
ain ' t  nothing. Getting over on them is what 
it is. It got to where I j ust liked it. 
Q .  What did you like about it? 
A .  The excitement and the feel ing of , you know , I 
fucked them , I mean , I had got over on them. 
They put their best investigators and I fucked 
them man. I sit back and laugh thinking. 
Really basically , and you know yoursel f ,  it ' s  
a sorry mother-fucking thing , but I mean it ' s  
j ust , it provides that damn challenge. Crime 
was a game • . . with a whole lot of real ity 
to it. ( #4 2 )  
Another lesser used motivation , and used only by 
two armed robbers , was retal iation founded on vengeful 
motives. These armed robbers claimed to have suffered 
severely due to official governmental decision-making , 
or lack of. Both lost legitimate earnings , both 
believed the government had done them an inj ustice , and 
one was homeless at the time of his most serious crimes. 
They acted criminally for revenge , striking out at a 
general ized other or striking out at legitimacy as a 
representat ion 
I 
of government. Their crimes were 
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expressive acts and they bel ieved they were getting even 
with the status quo or the State . 
One armed robber ' s  motivation clearly was shaped by 
his "definition of his s ituation . "  He bel ieved that 
some of his legal earnings from early in his l i fe were 
wrongful ly collected from him by the Internal Revenue 
Service . He claimed to have lost nearly all of his 
legaily earned capital . It was then that he decided to 
\ 
\ 0 enter:� cr1.me as a way of retaliating against the system 
or legitimate society . Also it was a matter of 
principle to him since he later defined work as vanity 
where individual workers end up with l ittle to show for 
their labor . 
Q . Did you try and find a j ob? 
A .  I was determined then that I wasn ' t  going to 
work and make a l iving . I wasn ' t  going to go 
out and work all day and week after week and 
pay the government for working . I mean this 
is the way I felt then . I felt that if I went 
out and got a j ob ,  which I did , and I was 
making $60 to $70 a week . They took federal 
tax out , they took state tax out , they took 
medicare out , they took Social Security out 
and by the time I got my check they had 
already took out $ 3 0  or $40 . So why would I 
work to pay the government for working , you 
know . That ' s  the way I felt . ( # 3 7 )  
The other armed robber expressed similar rebell ion 
against � government that he bel ieved had done him an 
inj ustice and refused to assist him in solving his 
problems . 
A .  The government did this somewhat to me too , 
you know , by denying me benefits . 
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Q .  Your Social Security? 
A .  Yeah . I mean I was desperate . I didn ' t  know 
what the hell I was going to do because I 
couldn ' t  even keep the roof over my head . I 
moved into my car and I didn ' t  have much of a 
car , but I slept in my car for a long time . 
I ' ve had three back surgeries and now I ' ve got 
heart trouble on top of the back surgery so 
how in the hell am I going to get a j ob? My 
wife took me to Mental Hospital because 
I did have an alcohol ic problem and drugs and 
I asked her to take me there and she did and I 
got turned away from over there , saying they 
didn ' t  have the funds or money to help me and 
there was no room for me . No place for me 
there . 
Q .  And you had gotten turned down for Social 
Security before that? 
A .  Right . I had many problems , you know , mental 
problems . It got to the point where I knew I 
needed help and I couldn ' t  get it . And that 
whole chain of events got me right to prison . 
I was on my Social Security , you know , and 
they cut it out and when they cut it out it 
l ike to cut my life off . I lost my Social 
Security , I lost my truck , you know , and I 
didn ' t  know what the hell I was going to do . 
I done it out of desperation and frustrated at 
life ,  no help , no money , living in a car . I 
couldn ' t  even take a bath , you know , nowhere 
to take a bath . I felt less than worthless . 
( # 2 0 )  
Those who committed crimes out of vengeance calculated 
their crimes emotionally rather than logically , as the 
fol lowing participant ' s  comment illustrates . 
A .  When you ' re mad l ike that and a person did 
something to you , you be in a mental state of 
mind , you know , you don ' t  give a damn about no 
pol ice or being locked up or a j udge or no 
damn nobody else . ( # 3 7 )  
Motivation , though , typically i s  composed o f  several of 
these inter-related perceived benefits rather than 
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simply one . Although most participants reported one 
primary motivation , many reported lesser motivations or 
latent benefits . 
Attention now is given to the next analytical 
component of deci s ion-making the alternatives 
cons idered while resolving a decision-problem . 
ALTERNATIVES 
Recent literature indicates that decision-making 
invest igators should examine closely an important 
theoretical component of prescriptive decision-making 
processes -- namely , the alternatives cons idered by the 
dec i s i on -maker while resolving a decis ion-problem . 
Investigators of criminal decision-making recently have 
pointed to the need for specific information about the 
offender ' s  mental calculus to determine his perceptions 
of his legitimate opportunities for getting money ( e . g . , 
Feeney , 198 6 ) . Investigators interested in crime 
displacement are also intrigued by the offender ' s  
calculus since displacement may not result in legitimate 
actions but more typically illegitimate ones . Feeney 
( 198 6 ) , for example , reports that his sample of armed 
robbers usually cons idered another illegal alternative , 
rather than a legal alternative , to armed robbery . 
Akerstrom ( 198 5 )  analyzed crime as work , much the 
same as Hol zman ( 1979 ) . Akerstrom found that criminals 
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often have legitimate j obs . But crime , as a j ob ,  
provided rewards that the ir legitimate j obs did not 
provide , e . g . , quick easy money and psychological 
fulfillment or usefulness . Holzman ( 19 8 3 ) , us ing LEAA 
data of 1974 , found that 9 5  percent of his sample of 
criminals had full-time j obs at the time of their 
arrests . But they "moonlighted" in illegal occupations 
and saw themselves as entrepreneurs who would someday 
own their own businesses . 
Two points from these studies are compared to my 
research sample . First , many in this sample also dream 
of one day owning their own bus inesses and envis ion 
themselves as entrepreneurs , innovative ones too be 
sure , but entrepreneurs nonetheless . The ir dreams of 
owning a business give them some hope of earning a 
legit imate wage while exercising their nerve in making 
the plunge into their own business , enj oying autonomy , 
being their own boss , and creating and revis ing rules 
guiding their own work behavior . They have a des ire to 
apply the ir skills (e . g . , coolness and nerve ) to a 
legitimate autonomous j ob ,  as the following typical 
comment illustrates . 
A .  I ' m going to live out my fantasy or whatever 
it is,  you know , about getting this house and 
building me a business of my own , you know , I 
want to be the boss . ( # 2 0 )  
Q . Do you think being locked up will have a 
negative impact on your trying to find a j ob? 
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A .  Probably not because I ' m going to be self­
employed . I ' 1 1 probably get a grocery store 
with a l ittle gas station hooked to it and 
sell beer . And with a l ittle luck a Stop and 
Go or something . I have a good business mind . 
( #8 )  
These proj ections are representative of their distorted 
perceptions of their legitimate options . 
Second , nearly all of those in my sample were not 
employed full time at the time of their arrest and most 
were unemployed . Nearly all of the 60 could be located 
in one of two economic categories : unemployed and 
underemp l oyed . Th is dichotomy is important for 
understanding alternatives available to and considered 
by them while resolving criminal decision-problems . 
Rather than focus on individual differences between 
Holzman ' s  1974 sample and mine , a place to focus with 
more explanatory power may be on structural changes that 
have occurred within the domestic labor market . Market 
demands have changed to the point that employers now 
demand from employees more education , special ization , 
computer skills , and stable work experience than ever 
before . It has become a buyer ' s  market , so to speak . 
Just as 15th century peasants were "marginalized" by a 
macro change in production , these individuals with 
little j ob skills increasingly have been displaced . and 
increasingly have lost what l ittle stake in conformity 
they had . 
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Q .  Did you see any alternatives at all , l ike did 
you think you had a chance at a j ob? 
A .  Yeah , but at that time j obs were hard to find 
especially for a young man that didn ' t  have no 
education and been in trouble , you know . 
( # 1 0 )  
Q .  Did you see any alternatives t o  committing 
robbery? 
A .  I tried [ to find a j ob ] . The moment you said 
you was put in j ail or a reference or 
something like that , you was out . ( # 1 1 )  
Drug use and dependency have increased s ince 1974 
and the population using these drugs has broadened . A 
recent Bureau of Justice report based on survey research 
of a large sample ( 2 7 , 000 ) reveals that one-half of 
state inmates sentenced to prison for property crimes 
were daily drug users ( Innes , 198 8 ) . Many in this 
sample were severely addicted to drugs to the point that 
they could not maintain a regular full time j ob .  
Q .  Before you got locked up this time did you 
think crime was morally wrong? 
A .  Yeah , I knew i t  was wrong , but l ike I say , man 
it was wrong in the eyes of the beholder , you 
know . I mean , I ' m needing a shot of dope , 
it ' s  not wrong for me to go get it , you know . 
I have to get it , however I can . To me it 
wasn ' t  wrong . I had to have it and I had to 
get it from somewhere . ( #5 7 )  
Al so , a l egitimate j ob with a salary that they 
realistically could have expected to earn would have 
offered them less money than they needed to support 
their serious habits . 
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A .  I tried to stay away from crime other than 
sell ing cocaine . I was determined not to rob 
any more and when my cocaine sales did not 
contribute enough to my cocaine consumption , 
then it became necessary that I rob . Nobody 
would hire me . I was an ex-con and I tried , I 
really tried to get gainful employment . There 
was nobody looking to hire me with my record . 
I went in as a j uvenile and came out as an 
a du l t  and d i dn ' t  have any l eg it imate 
employment resume to submit . Employment was 
impossible . So , I started robbing . ( # 3 )  
Legitimate Alternatives 
During their in-depth description of resolving a 
cr iminal dec i s i on-prob l em ,  each was asked about 
alternative actions they may have considered at that 
time . The question was left open-ended , leaving them 
free to offer accounts of legal or illegal alternatives 
that they may have considered . A few reported pursuing 
legal alternatives prior to illegal ones . The most 
common legal alternative considered was an attempt to 
borrow money from relatives or friends . Of the ' 6 0 ,  
three attempted borrowing money prior to deciding to 
commit the crime that they recounted in detail . This 
legitimate alternative is one that requires minimal 
initiative and investment of time and is certainly in 
line with a thief ' s  normal attempts at obtaining money 
with l ittle initiative and investment of time . 
Q .  Did you consider doing anything else for 
money , at that time? 
A .  I went to the bank four different times , I 
went to four or five different loan companies , 
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you know , the ones that say come on in and 
borrow money on your word and all this .  
That ' s  a crock of shit . They ain ' t  nobody 
going to lend you nothing . I mean , you know , 
it ' s  there for the taking , but it ain ' t  there 
for the loaning . ( # 4 3 )  
Some related that ·they had success ful ly borrowed money 
before , but reali zed they could not rely continually on 
that opt ion . 
Q . Did you think of anything else that you could 
do to get money , l ike borrow it? 
A .  No , I ' d  done run that in the ground , see . You 
burn that up , that ' s  burned up right there , 
borrowing . ( # 2 4 )  
For some who previously had relied on borrowing money , 
the well had run dry , so to speak , and they were unable 
to borrow more . 
Q . You said you tried other ways to get money . 
Like what? 
A .  I had went to my sister ' s  house to get some 
money , you know , I went to ask her to let me 
have some money and she s a i d  at that 
particular time she couldn ' t .  I asked my 
sister • • but I couldn ' t  convince her to 
let me have the money . ( # 4 )  
working for money certainly was considered an 
alternative at some point in these individuals ' l ives . 
Q . At that time you said you were out 
you took this [gun ] running j ob .  
any other alternatives that you 
· chosen? 
of work and 
Did you see 
could have 
A .  Not there unless I wanted to g� to work in the 
coal mines with my wife ' s  cous1ns . I couldn ' t  
see myself coming out of a coal mine at four 
o ' clock in the afternoon , black sooted face . 
( #8 )  
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Q . Did you see any other way to get those things? 
A .  Well yeah . I had seen the way my father was 
getting the things that he had , you know in 
life . But , I just wanted things then and 
there . Like a new car , I couldn ' t  see mysel f 
working for two years saving money and then 
going out and putting it on a car . I wanted 
my car then and there . ( #4 8 }  
They did not consciously think of working each time they 
confronted a decision-problem of committing a crime . In 
fact , only two of fenders reported searching for 
legitimate work while resolving the criminal decision-
problem . Another two reported they had previously 
sought legitimate work while committing crimes , but to 
no avail . The maj ority previously had appraised working 
for a wage and had rej ected that option due to : ( 1 } 
the i r  inab il ity to s ecure emp l oyment ; ( 2 }  the 
limitations in working for a living ; or ( 3 }  their 
refusal to work for a l iving . 
Q . When you all were talking about robbing this 
man over in did you think "I could go 
out and work" or did you think of doing other 
things for money? 
A .  I f iqured shoot , why go out and work when a 
man can go out here and do this right here and 
make a whole lot of money j ust in a little 
bit . ( # 12 ) 
Work provided them with less-than-fulfill ing wages and 
psychological rewards . Based on their experience in the 
legitimate work worl d ,  they were conscious that 
legitimate work offered subsistence wages . Also , in a 
restrictive controlled work place , they were not free to 
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use their individual skills ( e . g . , cool , nerve , and 
network connections ) .  They typically bel ieved that 
l eg i t i m a t e  work f a i l ed to o f fer autonomy and 
satisfaction . 
Q .  Does work bore you , legitimate work? 
A .  Yeah . I f  I can ' t  get something that keeps my 
mind working and keeps me going I can ' t  • • •  
I ain ' t  got that good a damn mind , but I mean 
I ' ve got to keep busy . 
Q .  And burglary does that for you? 
A .  Oh , hell yeah . I was having too good a time . 
I thought this is fun . Hell , the whole town 
is mine . ( 4# 4 2 ) 
Q .  Did you ever see any alternatives that you 
could have taken instead of breaking into 
houses and stealing boats and tractors? 
A .  This lady I was l iving with , she had a girl 
friend . • • [who ] owned a big old trailer park 
and she offered . · . • she told me " I ' 11 give 
you $500 a week to come up here and run it for 
me , to keep the maintenance up . "  But , shit , I 
was done into burglaries so bad man that I 
wasn ' t  about to give up an easy damn j ob l ike 
that for , you know , to go out and actually 
work . ( 4#3  3 )  
Q .  Did you , at that time , think o f  any 
alternative to doing the armed robbery? 
A .  At the time I really didn ' t  l ike working , you 
know , because the l ife I was l iving , you know , 
the money that I was getting was way more easy 
than you know , going out and working for it . 
( 4# 1 6 )  
Q .  Did you think of anything else you could do 
for money , at that time? 
A .  Well , it ' s  not every day you can go out in an 
hour ' s  time and make $500 to $1000 , you know . 
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There • s j ust no j ob in the world that pays 
that and even if you didn ' t  make but $200  or 
$3 00 that • s more than you could make in a 
week . And say for an hour ' s  work , you take 
off al l week and not worry about working no 
more . ( # 2 1 )  
Work was not a viable option .for some o f  these 
individuals . Many admitted that the bene fits derived 
from illegal adventures dwarfed those derived from 
working . 
Q . Why did you do the forgery • • • at that time? 
A .  I didn ' t  want t o  work and I didn ' t  want t o  do 
no armed robberies . I didn ' t  want to break in 
some place and a forgery was pretty much the 
easiest thing . 
Q . So it sounds like you ' re saying that the money 
you • ve made illegally far outwe ighs the 
money you can make--
A.  Far outweighs . I don ' t  mind working but it ' s  
hard work all day and kill yoursel f for 
really nothing . ( # 007 ) 
A few high frequency participants (discussed in chapter 
four) made a conscious decision to not work a legitimate 
j ob and instead to support themselves with illegal 
earnings . These individuals typical ly had few expenses 
and shunned investing in a legitimate li festyle . 
Q . You didn ' t  used to work did you? 
A .  Not at all . I wouldn ' t  work i f  you asked me 
to work . I thought it was other ways to do 
things bes ides working . I thought you were a 
fool to work , you know . Why should you work 
you fool . You a in • t never going to have 
nothing . That • s what I used to say . , · f 
Q . How about picking up an odd j ob for half a 
day? 
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A .  No , I thought I was too cool , too cool man . I 
thought I was too good . That would have been 
against my dignity to try to work . I wouldn ' t  
want nobody to know that I was doing that . 
( # 2 4 )  
The maj ority o f  these individual ' s  legitimate 
opportunities to earn a decent wage were institutionally 
limited . �hey were aware of that , at least intuitively , 
and often opted for illegitimate means to obtain 
immediate success goals ( e . g . , Merton , 1968 ) . The 
maj ority had " everything going ag�inst them . " That is , 
most either had dropped out of school or were dismissed 
at a young age and were unable . to develop marketable j ob 
skills . Thus , when they did work they nearly always 
rel ied on menial j obs and moved from one j ob to another . 
All had been in prison at least one time before so after 
their first incarceration they also found themselves 
labeled and stigmatized as " ex-cons . "  They then 
experienced those well-known difficulties associated 
with being an ex-con . 
Q .  Did you see any other a lt ernatives to 
committing robbery like a j ob ,  did you think 
you could find a j ob? 
A .  I tried . Back there in them days it wasn ' t , 
uh ,  the moment you said you was put in j ail or 
something like that , you was out . When you 
commit the crime , you commit it and you get 
sentenced to pay a debt to society . But that 
debt ' s  never paid . You cannot pay that debt . 
You ' re screwed the rest of your l i fe .  ( # 1 0 )  
Doubtless , education , j ob skills , work experience 
and a " clean record" provide individual s  with legitimate 
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institutional opportunities ( i . e .  , they provide social 
status , mobility , and economic stability ) . Lacking 
these particular assets in their l ives , many of these 
individuals became innovators . They innovated by 
replacing legitimate means with illegitimate . A recent 
Bureau of Justice survey points to similar patterns . 
The Justice research reports that " social conditions • . 
may l imit opportu
.
nity and reduce an individual ' s  
investment in society , leading to both drug abuse and 
criminal behavior" ( Innes , 19 8 8 : 2 ) . 
The maj ority of these 6 0  had less than a high­
school education , had developed no j.ob skills , had not 
established a stable and durable record of employment , 
had a criminal record , and a great maj ority were 
addicted severely to drugs or alcohol . On one hand , 
then , since numerous alternatives were not evaluated 
during the decision-problem resolution , it appears that 
a step of "rational decision-making" was not fully 
exhausted , 
rat i onal . 
making their decision-making less-than­
But , on the other hand , given their 
and circumstances , their decision-making backgrounds 
appears 
p l ac ed 
logical , 
w i th i n  
i f  the decision-making process is 
the p s y ch o l ogy o f  " s i tuational 
rational ity" where the individual ' s  own subj ective 
appraisal and obj ective needs and ways of meeting those 
needs are limited and hence evaluated s ituationally (cf 
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Gordon , 197 3 ) . Given the demands of their needs and the 
limitations of obtaining them, their actions , including 
ignoring other alternatives ,  appear somewhat logical , 
especially given the fact that the maj ority thought they 
would not get caught and they believed if they were 
caught the punishment was defined as no great threat . 
Illegitimate Alternatives 
A recent Bureau of Justice survey o f  2 7 , 0 0 0  state 
prisoners reports that 40 percent of state prisoners 
sentenced for property crimes were under the influence 
of a drug when they committed the crimes ( Innes , 198 8 ) . 
This figure would include those individual s  who were 
addicted to a drug and those individuals who used drugs 
as a mechanism to commit the risky decis ion and action . 
Many of my respondents reported they committed 
crimes to purchase drugs to which they were addicted . 
Q . Why did you do it , at that time? 
A .  You • re out there l iving that kind o f  l i fe ,  
you 1 re j ust taking chances and plus I was 
do ing drugs real heavy , powerful drugs , and I 
liked it and by me l iking that I took them 
chances . I really didn • t think about the risk 
period then hardly . All I thought about was 
j ust getting dope and I ' d  go to any lengths to 
get it . The urge for that dope is stronger 
than getting caught so I ' d go ahead and do it . 
I was doing it just to get money and it was 
for that damn dope . I didn • t really , you 
know , think about all the trouble , you · know , 
I ' d end up in or anything . I was j ust wanting 
to get the money for dope . ( # 2 ) 
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Q . How did your drug use contribute to committing 
crimes? 
A.  But whenever you get hooked on coca ine , man ,  
you ' ll do anything in the world for it , 
whatever you need to do it what you 1 11 do . 
( # 3 )  
Q . Why did you commit forgeries at that time? 
A .  That ' s  the reason I was doing the forgeries , 
you know to get money to buy the drugs with . 
Q . That was the main reason? 
A .  That was the only reason . ( # 2 )  
Q . What reason did you do those crimes for? 
A .  I n  orde r  to obtain money to purchase 
narcotics , drugs , shooting drugs . 
Q . Did you use a lot of drugs? 
A .  Constantly .  It was money for drugs . Now I 
know if I didn ' t  have that drug hab it I 
wouldn ' t  be in this prison . It had got to the 
point that , you know , I real ly wasn ' t  out 
there for nothing but just to do drugs . ( # 1 6 )  
The interviewees knew that crime would be monetarily 
rewarding and a rational way to obtain what they needed . 
Using Merton ' s  modes of adaptation ( 19 4 9 )  and Gordon ' s  
( 1973 ) analys is of the rational ity of property crimes , 
it is apparent how these addicts defined the situation 
as such that it became necessary to pursue illegitimate 
means to obtain phys ical necessities physically 
addicting drugs . 
Q . Did you ever see another way to get ·money 
other than crime? 
A .  Well working , no . There was no other way to 
support a drug habit and the best way , the 
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fastest way was stealing . I mean , it was 
always something to steal . All I had to do 
was look for it and it was always something to 
steal somewheres . ( # 4 5 )  
A .  A person as a drunk and an alcoholic I found 
out now , I know now , there ' s  no rational 
thinking of any sort . What you might feel is 
normal is total ly abnormal . It was l ike some 
reality to everything , you know , you ' re really 
running in a twilight zone . There ' s  no 
rational thinking you know . ( # 2 4 )  
Q .  Did you think o f  getting money elsewhere? 
A .  With drugs you don ' t  rationali z e .  
decision you make . You don ' t  
consequences , the pros , the cons . 
it . ( # 10 )  
It ' s  j ust a 
weigh the 
You j ust do 
Wh i l e  examining alternatives considered within 
criminal decision-making , Cornish and Clarke ( 19 8 7 )  
suggested that criminals typically think only of illegal 
alternatives before committing a crime . Of those in my 
sample who actually cons idered an alternative to the 
crime that they eventually committed , the maj ority 
reported likewise . 
Q .  Did you think o f  other ways o f  making money? 
A .  Well every now and then I might run across 
something that I could get right spur-of-the­
moment . But mainly I stayed with robbery . 
Q .  Are you talking about legal or illegal? 
A .  Illegal . ( # 16)  
But , when considering another illegal act , almost all 
did not want to change their MO or " specialty" at that 
particular j uncture in their careers • .  Most reported 
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considering another crime of the same type that they 
were thinking of committing . 
Q . Did you consider doing anything else? 
A. I mostly did armed robbery . Reason why 
because that was the quick and eas iest way of 
getting money cause if you do a burglary then 
whatever you get you have to sell it or you ' ve 
got to find somebody to buy , but if you do 
armed robbery it ' s  money right there . ( #7 )  
Q . At that time , did you consider doing anything 
else besides the robbery? 
A .  I ' m thinking , well in a burglary , i f  I go 
break in something I ' ve got to turn around and 
sell it , whereas if I rob these people I ' ve 
got the money right then . ( # 1 )  
While resolving the decision-problem o f  committing 
or not committing a crime , the maj ority considered only 
the type of crime they were committing regularly at that 
particular period of their career and most had a 
specific target in mind . The decision , then , was not 
one that involved in-depth calculations of their 
specialty and a criminal alternative and the perceived 
benefits from each . Some general ideas about the 
alternatives available to them were known but never 
considered viable due to the individual ' s  l imited 
knowledge about the alternatives and his willingness to 
participate in such alternatives . Some quickly compared 
their MO to another crime , but most plodded right along 
and committed the criminal act with no thoughts of doing 
anything other than that particular criminal act . 
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• 
The maj ority ( 4 3  of the 60)  reported that they did 
not cons ider any alternative to the crime that they 
committed . 
Q . Did you ever talk about do ing anything else to 
get the money or did that ever enter the 
conversation? 
A .  No , that never came up . • . we never did talk 
about , you know , going and looking at thi s ,  
finding a j ob .  It was always , you know , 
taking something , you know , and it never 
crossed our mind , you know , why don ' t  we go 
and check out this j ob ,  you know , this and 
that . That wasn ' t  even --wel l ,  it wasn ' t  on 
my mind , you know, and didn ' t  none of the rest 
of them ever bring up the conversation . ( # 1 6 )  
Q . D i d you s e e  any al ternat ives t o  the 
shopli fting that you were doing at that time? 
A .  Never looked for none because there wasn ' t  
anything that I enj oyed more than shoplifting . 
( #7 )  
Q . Did you think about any alternatives to make 
money that day [ the day of the burglary ] ?  
A .  Oh , besides breaking i n  there? 
Q . Yeah . 
A .  No , that ' s  the only one I ,  that ' s  all I knew 
of at the time . ( # 14 ) 
Th i s  heuristic dev ice o f  not contemplat ing 
alternative actions could be in l ine with the principle 
of immediate util ity , which states that a " course of 
conduct is the right one for an agent if and only if it 
is the best alternative under the circumstances ; and the 
best alternative is the one that has the best overall 
consequences" (Hill , � gl . , 1979 : 4 8 ) . Given their 
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circumstances ,  many of these offenders , especially the 
severely drug addicted , may be choos ing the best 
alternative general ly sinqe crime often nets them their 
immediate needs or desires . 
Q . Did you ever think about doing anything legal 
for money? 
A .. No . I was doing drugs real heavy and , you 
know , work was out . . At that time all I 
considered was crime . ( # 1 6 )  
The point is , even though they still may be acting in a 
util itarian fashion , they do not consciously think of 
alternatives to a specific crime . 
Crime appears to have been a " rational response" 
for most of these criminals -- a rational response to 
success goals offered as obtainable by this society ; 
goal s  that legitimate-l iving individuals often desire 
and affordably can obtain . They believed there was no 
better method of obtaining money and possessions than 
illegally . But , shortly after their criminal actions 
they usually had little money or goods to show for their 
efforts . They typically blew the money on drugs and 
easily consumable commodities . The "easy money" most 
report , was also easy to spend . Al l participants report 
that illegally obtained money " spent faster" than 
legally obtained , and that for them , the old adage , easy 
come , easy go , has a ring of truth to it . So they had 
little to show for their risky venture and labor . 
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It became clear while interviewing the sample 
members that they have less-than-optimal knowledge about 
legitimate alternatives . Although some cons idered 
legitimate alternatives , those who did had l ittle 
information and knowledge about them . The decision-
prob l em reso lution c l early was reduced to the 
individual ' s  subj ective information evaluation . Their 
lack of knowledge about earning a legitimate living 
became obvious during the interviews . Most had l ived on 
legitimate earnings very infrequently during their 
l ive s . But , after having served two or more 
incarcerations , and nearing their release , they believed 
they would be able to survive and be somewhat content on 
legitimate earnings . They usually had no idea that they 
may be destined to reap subsistence wages . Some 
believed that evidence to support their abil ity to l ive 
on legitimate earnings was the fact that they l ived 
comfortably in prison on their prison earnings and that 
they certainly can live as well in the free-world . They 
failed to consider that they had almost no living 
expenses while incarcerated . 
A .  I see i f  I can work in here [ prison ] making 
$50 or $40  a month and can survive and l ive 
off of that , then I won ' t  have no problem 
going out in society working i f  it ' s  nothing 
but minimum wages . ( # 1 6 )  
6 8  
MECHANISMS THAT FACILITATE CRIMINAL DECISION-MAKING 
During the course of this research it became clear 
that many individual ' s  decision-making was facil itated 
by a mechanism that enabled them to participate in a 
risky act even in the face of very real and severe 
consequences .  The mechanism functioned as a rationality 
depressant that enabled the individual to decide in a 
seemingly less rational manner than he would have 
otherw i s e . Some of these mechanisms were used 
consciously by the offender to enable him to complete 
the risky decision/action that he desired to do whi le 
other mechanisms were used unconscious ly and typically 
unbeknownst to the offender . 
The first mechanism is also the most commonly used 
drugs and alcohol . For many , risk typically was a 
feel ing s im i l ar to "butterfl ies " rather than a 
perception of real possible consequences of their 
actions . The use of th is mechanism alleviated 
"butterfl ies " during the decision-making process and 
during the crime . This mechanism (the use of alcohol 
and drugs) allowed them to overcome nervousness and 
engage in a risky decision and event which they 
reportedly could not have done otherwise , as the 
following dialogue illustrates . 
A .  So I was always kind of nervous unless I had 
done drunk a few beers or smoked some weed to 
build my nerves up . 
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Q . Drinking and smoking . 
you typ ical ly did 
robbery? 
Is that something that 
before pull ing off a 
A .  Yeah . I needed something to build my nerves 
up , to relax me , you know, stop me from 
shaking . If I ' m a little intoxicated I ' m 
ready for it , whatever goes down . ( # 1 6 )  
Many had some idea that they wanted to commit a crime 
before they began indulging in alcohol or drugs . They 
often first rudimentarily decided to commit the crime 
and then drank or drugged for courage to complete the 
risky act . 
Q . Was the booze to get your courage up? 
A .  Yes , yes , yes , yes . See , I wanted t o  do that 
(burglary] anyway before I started drinking , 
but I didn ' t  have no help . So , what I ' d do is 
I ' d  get me some help . I cal led it false 
courage . Because that ' s  the courage that I 
need and I ' ve never been the one to do 
anything without false courage . ( # 2 4 )  
Q . What happens to your courage when you start 
drinking? 
A .  Alcohol gives me more strength to do stuff 
l ike that . I would always be a drinking when 
I would do that stuff . It would always kind 
of boost me up and build my hopes up that I 
could do it . That alcohol and stuff where I 
was drinking that partly , made me j ust go 
ahead and do it . Because when you get to 
drinking you drink so much and you get so 
drunk or something or another l ike that you ' l l 
do anything . ( # 12 )  
Many claimed to always need "a buz z "  before committ ing 
their crimes . The potential risk of their actions was 
deadened by the "buzz . "  One armed robber explained it 
this way : 
7 0  
A .  I would get kind o f  buzzy before I would do it 
because you get ready to do something and 
you ' r e s t ra ight man you ' l l be hav ing 
butterflies . If you ' re up there buz z ing 
you ' re going to have a little butterfly but 
after you get in there and get situated well 
then it ' s  a piece of cake . You ' re rul ing 
everything . ( # 16 )  
And another robber explained it similarly . 
A .  I can ' t  sit here and think o f  a crime that I 
went in and pulled an armed robbery when I was 
strai ght . Maybe I ' d smoke a j oint or 
something and sometimes I was drunk , but I 
always had a l ittle buz z when I went in . ( # 1 )  
Also the following dialogue with a burglar illustrates 
how a "buz z "  acted as a mechanism that enabled him to 
indulge in the risky decision and venture . He described 
travel ing with his cohorts to the house they had planned 
to burgle .  
Q . Usually are you straight or high when you 
break into a place? 
A .  I l ike to have a buz z . I t  calms you down a 
l ittle bit , to build the courage up , I guess . 
Q . Were you smoking and drinking on the road? 
A .  Oh yeah . Always have you a cold beer before 
you go out . 
Q . Why would you? 
A .  To build your , to give you the courage not 
j ust to build your courage up . Just to give 
it to you , give you that , knock the edge off . 
( # 14 ) 
A second mechanism used was the offender ' s  
unreal istic or erroneous perceptions of the punishment 
severity for the crime he contemplated committing . Each 
participant reported that they knew their actions were 
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wrong and illegal and therefore did their best to avoid 
capture . But , a great number of them did not know the 
severity of the punishment for that particular act until 
after their arrest . Most learned the "going rate" for 
certain crimes after their arrest , rather than before 
(Walker , 198 5 )  • Their perceptions of the severity of 
legal sanction were unreal istic . Therefore , risk was 
weighed with less weight than it ideally should have 
been . One armed robber thought , for example , that his 
f i r s t  a rmed robbery conviction would yield a 
probationary sentence rather than a lengthy prison 
sentence . He never considered his chances of going to 
prison for a lengthy sentence . 
Q .  So before you learned the penalty for armed 
robbery , did you know that you could go to the 
penitentiary for it? 
A .  Well , I thought that , you know , I hadn ' t  never 
got caught for robbery or nothing . I thought 
I ' d go to j ail and they ' d  put me on probation 
or something the first two times . So I . really 
didn ' t  pay too much attention to the penalty 
because I knew if I got caught that first time 
I might spend a few days in j ail and I knew 
that my first time . • . I could get probation 
since it was my first offense . After my first 
conviction , five years for robbery , I really 
found out the penalty , you know . ( # 1 6 )  
Some burglars reported they thought burglary carried a 
three year sentence rather than a 10 year sentence . The 
rationality of their decisions can be questioned s ince 
they did not cons ider real istically the possible 
outcomes of their actions . They were predisposed to 
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calculate erroneously since they viewed punishment 
unreal istically . They therefore , resolved criminal 
decision-problems with less-than-full knowledge about 
the real possible outcomes of various decis ion and 
actions . 
Q . Did you know you could get some time as a 
j uvenile for burglary? 
A • . 
\' 
' 
\ 
Q .  
. A .  
Everybody told me , said "Hey , " said you know , 
"they ain ' t-all they ' re going to do is give 
you probation . "  ( # 4 2 )  
Did you have knowledge o f  the potential 
penalty for doing ( strong-armed robbery ] ?  
In the state of Tennessee , absolutely not • 
This class X crime penalty that ' s  supposed to 
be a deterrent • . I wasn ' t  aware of any 
class X ,  I wasn ' t  aware of any penalties 
whatsoever . ( # 10 ) 
A third mechanism was the use of conversations with 
cohorts as part of the decision-making process . Social 
psychologists inform us that one way to reduce fear or 
anxiety prior to engaging in a risky decision or event , 
is to become engrossed in an absorbing activity , such as 
conversation with others or with oneself .  Thus , by 
us ing· an absorbing activity , the fear sometimes can be 
escaped which reinforces the behavior until the risky 
decision/action has been completed . This is a fear-
avoidance mechanism . Conversation not only allowed 
cohorts to discuss the logistics of the crime but acted 
as a means of encouraging each other through the 
dec i s i on -making process and the crime commission . 
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Cohorts often recounted previous successful crimes as a 
means of encouraging each other . This mechanism is 
similar to that used in organized athletics , where , 
members of a team recount past victories prior to 
meeting an opponent as a way of "psyching" each other up 
or encouraging each other to bel ieve they will be 
successful in the event facing them . 
Q . So did you all talk about other things besides 
the specific plan to encourage each other? 
A .  Probably , old burglaries , you know , l ike 
" remember the one at so and so we did last 
week , " you know or something l ike that . ( # 14 )  
Conversation among these participants , however ,  was 
usually one-sided where the individuals discussed only 
the anticipated benefits of the ir actions , rather than 
weighing the anticipated benefits against the poss ible 
risks . This mechanism , in-part , impeded a rational 
calculation . 
Q . Well as you all rode around and drank and 
smoked that day thinking about doing the crime 
what kinds of things did you all talk about? 
A .  We talked about when we got all that money 
that they said that man had , we talked about , 
oh we would do this and do that with that 
money , we was going to go and buy some nice 
cars and make us some hot rods and stuff out 
of them and build them up and make them mean 
and stuff . ( # 12 ) 
Q . Tell me what kinds of things were talked about 
or what kinds of things you thought about . 
A .  Thought it would be easy . And what we ' d  make , 
how much money we ' d  make and what we ' d  get , 
how much we ' d  make off of it . 
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Q .  What kinds of things were you thinking in your 
own mind , that maybe you all didn ' t  talk 
about? 
A .  I was thinking about the big lick . ( #4 1 )  
A fourth mechanism identified during the course of 
this research was the influence of older individuals in 
these men ' s  l ives . Most respondents reported they 
started committing crimes at a young age and were 
strongly encouraged or influenced to do so by an older 
individual who already was involved in crime and who 
therefore , was viewed as more knowledgeable about the 
risky decision/action . This finding is not in l ine with 
pres cript ive dec i sion-making . Individuals ideally 
should conceptualize their preferences independently of 
other individuals . 
A .  I always wanted t o  hang around the older guys 
and when I did , you know, I run into , you 
know, the guys that I hung around with that 
was older , you know, they was into drugs . In 
order for me to be in with the crowd , I always 
like to hang around older people . 
Q .  Were they into burglaries too? 
A .  Yeah , they was into some o f  everything . The 
things that I seen them do , you know , I l iked 
it and I wanted to do it mysel f  because I 
thought it was a big thing , you know , if you 
did that you was cool and all that . ( # 16 )  
The older individual would point out that he had 
succes s ful ly committed crimes and they , with his 
assistance and expertise , could do l ikewise . 
Q . Tell me about that conversation that you all 
had , what kinds of things were said and what 
kinds of things went through your mind . 
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A .  I was scared . I said , " I ' ll tell you what . "  
I said , "we may get in trouble or we might end 
up getting killed by doing this , " because I 
hadn • t  never did nothing l ike that . But he 
said , "No , " said " everything will be alright . "  
Said , "you ain ' t got nothing to worry about . "  
So , I kindly figured to mysel f well I guess 
maybe it will be alright . 
Q .  So , why did . you think it would be? 
A .  Because he had got out of a lot of stuff and 
he had did a lot of stuff and had never got 
caught at it . I figured wel l  if he can get by 
with all them things I know we can get by with 
this j ust one thing . ( # 12 ) 
Those reporting the use of this mechanisms bel ieved that 
the olderjwiser person already had considered the 
potential risks and benefits of crime and had calculated 
correctly . They rel ied on the older criminal to do the 
thinking and they , then , did not have to consider the 
rational ity of their actions . 
A .  We always had a handgun on every burglary that 
we done . 
Q .  You carried a gun? 
A .  I never did carry one but mostly the oldest 
person in the group always had the gun , you 
know , and he would be the one that , you know , 
looked out , you know make sure everything was 
ok . ( # 1 6 )  ' 
This influence of the older/wiser and more experienced 
individual facilitated decisions to commit crimes , 
especially early ones . Nearly every participant had his 
decision-making influenced by an olderjwiser individual 
early in life ; those who committed the fewest number of 
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crimes across their l ives continually rel ied on the 
expertise of the olderjwiser individual . 
The respondents reported they also felt a certain 
amount of peer pressure from older associates which 
affected the decision-problem resolution . 
Q . What good did you see coming to you from doing 
these burglaries besides the money to buy 
thing with . Anything else? 
A .  My friends • • • they was a l l  older than I was 
• 
• • it made me feel that you know I was ok . 
I was , you know, cool and I could hang with 
them . ( # 1 6 )  
A fifth mechanism was the ability t o  put thoughts 
of possible negative consequences out of mind . 
Q .  So what negative things did you think about? 
A .  At the time you block out all those thoughts . 
you ' ve got to have the money and when you 
get the money then you ' ll worry after that . 
Q .  You block out the thoughts . 
I ' ve heard other people 
elaborate on that? 
That ' s  something 
say . Can you 
A .  No , I can ' t ,  no I couldn ' t  really explain . I 
couldn ' t  make it any clearer really . It ' s  
j ust something you know you do . You block it 
all out because ,  you know , wel l  some people 
maybe not , but you know it ' s  wrong . It eat me 
a lot of times . 
Q .  Did it that day? 
A .  No , at the time you don ' t  think about nobody 
but yoursel f ,  Mr . Greed , you know . 
Q .  I might have misunderstood you . On the ride 
up there to do this thing ( burglary ]  you were 
thinking about some of these negative thing·s 
but you managed to somehow block them out of 
your mind . 
A .  Oh , you j ust block them for now , you know . 
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Q .  I guess I ' m having a hard time understanding 
how i f  you ' re thinking about [ negative 
consequences ] how you could actual ly remove 
that from your mind or block it out of your 
mind . 
A .  Well you don ' t , 
temporary block. 
you know . 
( #4 5 )  
It ' s  j ust a 
They claimed to have worried only minimally about risks 
prior to doing the crime . But when they actual ly were 
doing the crime , they managed to put those concerns and 
worries of the risks out of their minds , as the 
following dialogue illustrates . 
A .  When I walked in the place I really didn ' t  
think nothing . I mean it was j ust 1 ike my 
mind was blank when I walked in . I knowed 
what I was in there for . ( # 1 )  
Q .  How worried were you that you ' d  get caught and 
sent back to prison? 
·A . I tried not to think about getting caught as I 
was doing it . That ' s  something you real ly 
j ust kind of keep on the back burner until it 
actually happens and then you start worrying . 
( # 57 ) 
Not only was thinking of risks a distraction to 
concentrating on the logistics of the crime , but it also 
was viewed as unlucky or " negative producing . "  Most of 
the people who used this mechanism stated that they 
typically attempted to think positively to produce 
positive results rather than think about the potential 
negative consequences . By not thinking about them , they 
bel ieved they could somehow prevent them from coming to 
pass . 
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Q . How worried were you when you all did these 
burglaries that you ' d  get caught for it? 
A .  Well , personally , you try not to think about 
it while you ' re doing it because i f  you start 
thinking about it really bad before you do it 
it ' s  going to make you nervous and more apt to 
make mistakes , · so you try not to worry about 
it . ( #2 1 )  
A mechanism i s  that which facil itates act ion , that 
is , a decision . That decision or action is then 
followed by an action , that is , a crime . Both of these 
actions typically are related to one or more mechanisms . 
Nearly all 60 of the respondents rel ied on the use of 
mechanisms . 
Given the use of these mechanisms , it is obvious 
that criminal decision-problems typically are resolved 
in a less-than-rational fashion . Criminal dec is ion-
making departs from models of prescriptive decision­
making . 
DECIDING � COMMIT A CRIME 
Cornish and Clarke ( 19 8 5 )  address the issue of 
crime specificity in decision-making research . In the 
research at hand , where the central obj ective is to 
understand the resolution of a criminal decision-
problem,  much of the interview focused on one speci fic 
crime , the events leading up to that crime , and most 
important , the individual ' s  thoughts and conversations 
during the actual decision-making . The crime itself and 
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the target were only of peripheral interest . Each 
respondent was asked to recall the most recent crime he 
had committed and could remember clearly . At that point 
we then reconstructed all events in temporal order 
preceding the crime and then through the crime itsel f .  
The emphasis , however ,  was on the decision about whether 
to commit the crime . Attention was given to those 
va riab l es of central importance in prescriptive 
dec i sion-making processes , namely , the individual ' s  
knowledge and perceptions of the l ikely positive and 
negative consequences of his actions , the alternatives 
considered in resolving the decision problem and the 
mechanism ( i f app l icab l e )  that fac i l itated the 
individual ' s  decision to participate in the risky · 
decision; event . 
Legal Bi2k Perceptions 
During the crime , thinking of risks was distracting 
and interfered with performing well in the task they had 
chosen . 
A .  I never real ly thought about getting caught 
until , pow , you ' re in j ail , you know , you ' re 
in j uvenile or something . That ' s  when you go 
to· think about it . ( # 17 ) 
A.  I never cared about the risks . I don ' t  think 
any man can care about the risk or he wouldn ' t  
do it . I would never let anything stop me 
from doing something because of the danger or 
the risk . ( # 3 7 )  
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Q . So how much do you think you feared getting 
caught? 
A .  I didn ' t . I never did think about i t  really . 
Not to a point that it would make me undecided 
or anything l ike that , you know . I knowed I 
wasn ' t  supposed to get caught . I j ust figured 
every time I wouldn ' t  get caught . I never 
thought that I would get caught for nothing 
that I did . ( # 2 3 )  
Even those who knew full well the possible consequences · 
of their actions functioned with the bel ief that they 
would not be apprehended or suffer negatively . 
Q . So , it sounds l ike as you were approaching an 
armed robbery you thought about going to 
prison . 
A .  Yeah . 
Q .  And you also knew that your mama knew what you 
were into and you said that bothered you . 
A .  Yeah . 
Q . And you also j ust now said you were worried 
about getting killed or kill ing somebody . So 
knowing all those things • • how did you 
manage to go ahead and do the armed robberies? 
A .  I was doing it j ust to get money . I didn ' t  
really , you know , think about all the trouble , 
you know, I ' d  end up in or anything . ( # 16) 
Q . These burglaries you committed , did you worry 
much about getting caught while you were doing 
it? 
A .  No . 
Q . What about afterwards? 
A .  Noooo . I didn ' t  give a damn . And the pol ice 
couldn ' t  catch a damn cold i f  it wasn ' t  for 
the snitches . ( # 6 )  
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Others described being "torn" between whether or 
whether not to commit the crime . Their indec is iveness 
was exasperating to them. They were not all that clear 
about why and how they chose that particular course of 
action . It is not that they were all that committed to 
their decis ion but rather they were committed to making 
some decision . Action stemming from indecisiveness is 
not unique to criminal decision-problems . Law-abiding 
individua l s  daily re solve l egit imate non-criminal 
problems in much the same way . They dec ide by "throwing 
up their hands " ,  so to speak , in exasperation . This 
type of "decis ion" reflects their inabil ity to ful ly 
evaluate alternatives and their possible outcomes within 
the decision-problem . 
Q . I ' ve heard some of the other fellows I ' ve 
talked to mention an expression similar to 
what you used then when you said "Fuck it , 
I '  11 j ust go ahead and do it . "  Can you 
explain that to me? What did it mean to you 
when you just sa id that to yourself at that 
time? 
A .  When you say "Fuck it" you don ' t  want to deal 
with it you j ust whatever is up you ' re going 
for it , you know . When you say "Fuck it , " you 
know , you ' re saying " Fuck it , I ain ' t  going to 
worry about this no more . " You ain • t  going 
to worry about nothing , you ' re fixing to go 
out there and j ust do whatever it is to do to 
get it . It ' s  a problem that ' s  up now that you 
don ' t  want to deal with so you ' re running from 
the problem . ( # 1 0 )  
One armed robber described this mode o f  resolving 
the decision-problem as he waited on his would-be 
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victims . He described being undecided but then made a 
frustration-laden decision . 
Q . So you stood around for about 4 5  minutes 
waiting on them? 
A .  Right . 
Q . What kinds of things did you think about? 
A .  I ' m thinking must I do this here or must I 
not? I said I don ' t  need to do this here . 
And I just said I ' m going to do it , I ' m going 
to j ust do it , I ' m going to do it . ( # 4 )  
Nearly all claimed to have rarely thought of the 
potential legal consequences of criminal ity . 
Q . As you did burglaries , what came first the 
crime or thinking about getting caught for the 
crime? 
A .  The crime comes first because it ' s  enough to 
worry about doing the actual crime itself 
without worrying about what ' s  going to happen 
if you get caught . ( # 2 1 )  
Two common themes dominated their dec is ions to commit 
crimes . First , they believed they would not get caught 
and second , they bel ieved if they were caught , the 
prison sentence would not be lengthy or difficult to 
complete . 
Q . Prison must not be much of threat to you . 
A .  It ' s not . Prison wasn ' t  what I thought it 
was , you know . 
Q . What do you mean by that? 
A .  When I went in it was , wel l  at that point in 
time it was kind of an awful thing to go to 
prison . That ' s  what I had always heard , but 
when I got there and then found out the "Well 
hell , look who is here , " you know . " I  didn ' t  
know he was here or they was here , " you know . 
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And then I seen that I ' m a man j ust like they 
are and I can make it and I went and come back 
so quick . ( # 0 0 7 )  
These individuals know the " ins and outs" of the 
correctional system , e . g . , points for "good and honor 
time " and how much time will be deducted from their 
sentence . Therefore , they could rationalize their 
sentence easier knowing that they actually would not 
serve their full sentence . While c�mmitting crimes they 
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were aware of the ropes of the system and , therefore , a 
prison sentence was not as weighty a threat as it may 
have been if ( 1 )  they had not �own the ropes of the 
system or ( 2 )  if there was not a reduction in time 
served for a prison sentence . 
Q . When I asked you how much time you did , you 
said "nothing, 18 months . "  Did that not seem 
like much time to you? 
A .  I always thought it wasn ' t  nothing because I 
went and did it and come on back here . But it 
real ly wasn ' t  18 months , it was 13  months and 
something . See they give me 18 months , see 
they give me so much off for good behavior . 
Just like this time I ' m doing now . To you 15 
years would be a lot of time because you don ' t  
quite understand it , but after you get into 
the system here then they give you so many 
points for this and so many points for that , 
you know, and when you get through looking at 
that you real ly don ' t  have to stay as long as 
you , you know . ( # 2 4 )  
One easily can see the threat of incarceration , the 
most severe form of punishment the State can levy for 
property crimes , was no threat to many of these 
individuals . Again , they typically did not think about 
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the legal sanction when deciding to commit crimes . 
Even those few who did think about punishment and those 
who previously had encountered legal sanction , perceived 
it as no great punishment threat . 
Fra z ier and Me isenhe lder ( 1 9 8 5 )  report from 
interviews with 9 5  male property offenders some insights 
on decision-making . Their participants did not desire 
punishment , as some theorists have suggested , and they 
did not feel guilty for their actions . These findings 
are similar to mine . The great maj ority of these 60 
never thought of punishment or capture and they did not 
feel guilty about what they had done . This is not to 
imp l y  that they are amoral . Both Fraz ier and 
Meisenhelder and my findings support the offenders as 
moral and feeling guilty at some points in their 
careers . Even while engaging in criminal actions they 
knew their act ions were wrong . But , they were able to 
rationalize them due to desire or necessity , or they 
were able to put the wrongfulness of their actions out 
of their minds and not dwell on them . 
Extra-Legal Ri§k Perceptions 
Extra-legal risks are those risks beyond the 
parameters of the legal system. They typically include 
/ fear of sanction by· parents , employers , or peers . 
Extra-legal sanctions , however , are more than fear of 
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sanction . They also include the fear of disappointing 
significant others , such as family or employers , losing 
a j ob ,  or having difficulty securing employment . 
The interviewees reported that they rarely worried 
about their family discovering they were committing 
crimes . When the participants were asked about thinking 
of their parents while deciding to commit a crime , 
almost all reported they had no worries . This is 
surpris ing since most reported that their parents are 
the most significant other in their lives . They did not 
think about the possible hardships imposed on their 
family as a result of their arrest or incarceration . 
When they finally witnessed first-hand the .difficulties 
their family endured they , often for the first time in 
their l ives , realized the results of their criminal 
act i ons . One individual who had committed some 
forgeries offered an enl ightening example . 
A .  Well when we got over there , the dude looked 
at me , and said , " is this your son? " And she 
said "yeah , do you have the picture? "Would 
you let me see the picture? " He showed her 
the picture and sure enough it was a picture 
of me standing up there siqning the check to 
get it cashed , you know , so no way out . And 
my mom looked at me , man , and I seen that hurt 
in her eyes , you know , and I j ust didn ' t  know 
what to say . But then it hurt me j ust that 
much more because my girl friend was standing 
behind me and she saw it too and it j ust , you 
know , it was l ike I j ust shattered two l ives 
right there man . At that very moment I felt 
remorse .  I felt bad about it . ( # 5 8 )  
And a burglar similarly expressed himself . 
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Q . What were the worst things about doing time? 
A .  Well one o f  the worst i s  l ike when your family 
comes to visit you and you see them leave and 
see a lot of pain and a lot of hurt in their 
eyes . You know yourself that you ' re doing 
alright , but it hurts them a lot worse than it 
does you . You can see that . It ' s  plain . 
( # 4 5 )  
Many now claim they do not want to cause their family 
similar hardships in the future . Those 3 3  participants 
who have successfully desisted claim now that if they 
were faced with a criminal decision-problem ,  they would 
cons ider the effects of their criminal actions on their 
parents . 
Fear of extra-legal sanction threat from their 
friends discovering they were committing crimes , or 
their disappointment over their incarceration was nearly 
non-existent . The friends of most of these individuals 
are also thieves . Their behavior among their associates 
and friends was not viewed as all that deviant but 
rather as normal acceptable behavior . The following 
dialogue illustrates this point as the participant 
"turned the tables" and interviewed the researcher . 
Q . Okay , let me ask this here . Didn ' t  the people 
that you grew up with always do crimes and 
stuff? 
A .  There were some people that I knew that were 
always into crimes , you know , everybody ' s  
shopli fted . But as far as people I hung 
around with into more serious things--
Q . such as? 
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A .  Burglary or armed robbery • 
entering , vandalizing . 
. breaking and 
Q .  Would you bel ieve that I don • t  have nothing 
personal against your crowd , but I never 
remember going to school with them . It seemed 
l ike everybody that I knew was damn near into 
the same way that I was or they was wanting to 
be or claiming to be or something . 
A .  That ' s  surprising . 
Q .  Well , your story is also surpris ing . ( #7 )  
Benefit Perceptions 
The perceived benefits from criminal activities are 
those positive expectations that motivate individuals to 
engage in a risky decision and action . Motivations are 
discussed generally earlier in this chapter . However , 
it is important to discuss these anticipated benefits 
again within the context of the actual decision commit a 
crime . The risk-benefit calculus is misleading for 
understanding criminal decision-making . The decision-
making process appears to DQt be one of rational 
evaluation or calculation between benefits and risks 
that these criminals perceive could occur . Rather , the 
decision is one where the benefits only are considered 
and risks are ( 1 )  rarely thought about or ( 2 )  minimally 
considered but are put out of their minds . Risk was a 
distraction to those individuals who were able to 
eventually rid themselves of it . The decision was one 
of how to cope with the crime . That is , the decision to 
88 
commit a crime was a decision predicated on the 
anticipated benefits and not the calculated expected 
product of the benefits versus the risks . The decision 
was one of coping with the action, not necessarily the 
logistics of putting the possible negative consequences 
out of the mind -- perceptions of consequences that 
distracted from the act itsel f .  A few reported that 
they could not commit a crime if the negative thoughts 
lingered in their minds . If they were unable to rid 
themselves of the perceptions of the possible negative 
consequences , they would not go through with the act 
that they otherwise previously have decided to do . So 
risk is not a variable that appears in every calculus 
for every crime . When risk surfaces , it is evaluated 
( e . g . , the individual asks if it is inst inct or real ) 
and acted upon . It typically is cast aside as a 
nuisance from the task at hand . 
As addressed earl ier when discussing motivations , 
the single most popular motivation and perceived benefit 
from criminal activity was money . 
Q . So , when you were doing these burglaries then , 
what benefits did you see coming from them? 
A .  The money to make it from day to day , to pay , 
you know, to pay me gas , pot , party money , to 
have a good time . 
Q . Some people say they break into places for the 
thri l l  of it or the excitement or the 
accomplishment of it . 
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A .  It never give me no thrill and I really wasn ' t  
accomplishing nothing but putting money in my 
pocket so I didn ' t  get no thrill because of 
it . ( # 14 ) 
Q .  S o  it sounds like you ' re saying that the money 
you ' ve made illegally far outweighs the 
money you can make--
A .  Far outweighs . I don ' t  mind working , but it ' s  
hard to work all day and kill yourself for 
really nothing . ( # 007 ) 
The attractive qualities that criminal ity offers 
are wel l  illustrated from the above quote . The 
financial attractiveness coupled with the next to nil 
perceptions of legal sanction threat illustrate a great 
deal of the decision-making processes found among many 
of these respondents , particularly the high frequency or 
Type II lambda respondents . 
Q .  What bene fit did you see coming from 
shoplifting and committing other crimes? 
A .  Just getting money to run around on the 
weekends with and buy some beer and whiskey 
and shit like that . ( #5 )  
Benefits identified other than money were excitement , 
getting over on the powers that be , respect from peers , 
and control . These anticipated benefits , however , 
should be considered latent benefits and not the prime 
obj ective considered when they resolved a criminal 
decision-problem . 
Q . What was the reason· you did the burglary? 
A .  Well for the money , for the money . That ' s  the 
only reason I did any burglaries . Really any 
crime at all would be for the money . And the 
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excitement , you know , it was always there , but 
it was for the money , more or less . 
Q . Did you see any other benefits coming from 
doing burglaries or was it just the money? 
A.  Just the money . 
Q . You didn ' t  do it because it was exciting or -
A.  It was fun , you know , I guess it was kind of 
. exciting in a way . ( #14 ) 
Exerting power and controll ing victims and the 
crime s ituation were particularly important latent 
benefits to armed robbers . 
Q . Is that a pretty scary experience when you 
walk in with a gun pulled asking for money? 
A .  No , it ' s  not really scary because you know 
you ' ve got control of the situation , you know , 
it ' s  a surprise , you know element of surprise . 
You go in and you throw a gun on the table and 
everybody flips out . But it never did scare 
me because I always j ust put mysel f in their 
position . But it ' s  just that getting in that 
door , you know , after you get through that 
door it ain ' t  nothing , it ' s  l ike you ' re 
running , like you own that place . 
Q . You said like you own the place? 
A .  Yeah , you are rul ing everything , you kno� , 
because everybody , whoever is in there l.s 
going to pay attention to you . I didn ' t  want 
to hurt nobody the only thing I wanted was the 
money . If you go in there you ' ve got to play 
that act all the way out whether you get hurt 
or not . 
Q . I think you ' re saying you were also prepared 
to do whatever to get the money? 
A .  Right . I t  wouldn ' t  b e  that they ' d  try t o  harm 
me it would be that they wouldn ' t  give up the 
money . Because you see if you go in there and 
then let them tel l you what to do then there 
ain ' t  no sense in you going it there at all . 
( # 1 6 )  
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Fraz ier and Meisenhelder ( 19 8 5 )  report that many of 
their 9 5  property offenders found crime to be exciting 
and believed they were getting over on someone or away 
with something . Many in my sample report the same . In 
fact , nearly all 60 found it exciting . But , excitement 
was a latent benefit neither primarily nor obj ectively 
sought after . Very few respondents reported excitement 
as a reason for committing crime . Rather , quick , easy 
money was the most common reason for doing crime . I f  
committing crime was also exciting , then that added more 
pleasure to a financially rewarding activity . But , few 
entered crime motivated primarily by a desire for 
excitement . 
Reppetto ( 1974 ) interviewed 97 burglars and found 
money to be their primary motivator . Excitement was 
mentioned most often among the young and least often 
among the old . This age-related difference is s imilar 
for the 60 men of this research . Motivation responses 
were measured across three different age periods of 
these mens ' lives . These data show that excitement was 
often a primary motivator among the young , but its 
importance lessened with age until it typically became , 
at most , a latent benefit and motivating force . 
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DECIDING NOT TO COMMIT A CRIME 
During the interviews , each was asked to describe 
the most recent time that they could remember clearly 
when they made a conscious decision to nQ.t commit a 
crime . When this question was asked , every participant 
related a specific time when they were displaced ( i . e . , 
their mission was aborted ) due to a police officer or a 
would-be witness . When this cons istent pattern emerged , 
the question was then qualified by limiting their 
reconstruction to a specific time when they were 
displaced for other reasons . When the participant 
recal led the most recent incident , the interview then 
focused on the same variables as those within the 
decision to commit a crime . A concentrated effort was 
made to reconstruct events and conversations preceding 
and during the decision itsel f .  Conversations with 
others and the actual thoughts of the individual were 
probed to understand the way that the decision-problem 
was framed to determine how the decision to not commit a 
specific crime was made . Of those who could recal l a 
specific time when they decided not to commit a crime , 
all described a time when things did not " feel right . "  
Q . Did you ever have a chance to commit a crime 
such as one of these burglaries or robberies 
and then decide not to for some reason? . 
A .  Yeah . I know o f  one incident . It was j ust my 
inner feel ings told me that something wasn ' t  
right . ( # 5 6 )  
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They described times when their intuition led them to 
believe that there was some kind of risk, although they 
may not visual ly have seen anything wrong with the 
particular crime or target they were contemplating . It 
is not that they saw something that did not look right . 
Rather they felt that something was amiss . They 
described this feel ing as "butterflies , " a "qut 
feeling , " or " instinct . "  
Q . Did you ever dec ide not to commit a 
shoplifting for some reason? 
A .  Sure . If I had bad feelings about it I 
wouldn ' t  do it . You just have to go on your 
f e el ings , you know , when you ' re do ing 
something like that because you ' ve got no 
other way of knowing what ' s  happening . 
Q .  Is that like a qut-level feeling? 
A .  It was a sick feel ing like disaster was in 
front of you. ( #4 2 )  
Q . Of the times that you didn ' t  go through with a 
crime , what percentage of those times do you 
think because you thought you could go to 
prison? 
A .  Twenty to twenty-five percent . 
Q . What percentage were because of this intuition 
feel ing you ' re talking about? 
A .  Seventy-five percent . ( #57 ) 
A .  I ' ve had places planned to rob and got a bad 
feel ing about it , you know , and not done it . 
That robbery would be on my mind and I j ust 
took it as something tell ing me that ain ' t  
going to work, don ' t  do it , so I didn ' t  do it . 
I never went against my feel ings . ( #4 5 )  
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Four individuals were able to relate the ir experiences 
of dec iding not to commit a crime to similar intuitive 
feel ings about risky legitimate experiences . 
Q . Can you relate that to any , to any gut-level 
feel ing you ' ve had about other things in your 
life ,  besides criminal things? 
A .  Well , it ' d  be like , if you was going to buy a 
car and you didn ' t  feel like the guy was 
shooting straight with you , you know . You 
j ust had a feeling I don ' t  feel l ike he ' s  
tell ing me the truth , or you know , I feel like 
if I buy this car and get down the road the 
motor is going to fal l out of it . It ' d  be 
about the same deal . I feel l ike , if I get 
these [ Corvette] tops , there ' s  going to be 
more involved in it than what I anticipate , 
you know. ( # 56 ) 
Q . Had you backed out of crimes before because 
they just didn ' t  feel right? 
A .  Yeah . 
Q . Is that kind of like intuition? 
A .  I ' m not sure what you ' d  call that , it ' s  just 
l ike you going down here to this river and 
finding a place to jump in but changing your 
mind and going to another place to jump in . 
It ' s  just something that didn ' t  strike you 
right about that one place so you backed out 
of it . I don ' t  know what causes it . ( # 007 ) 
Some individuals were able to decide and act even 
with the nervous feel ings that are common among these 
respondents . The following dialogue illustrates how an 
armed robber related his decision to complete the act to 
a legitimate act . 
Q . Some people have told me about , when I asked 
them this kind of thing , a lot of people 
talked about some gut-level feeling of what 
95 
,. 
\ 
they called instinct or sixth sense . 
just sensed something isn ' t  right . 
They 
A .  Well I always get that . You ' re going to get 
that before every armed robbery and I '  11 tell 
you why , because you was brought up not to do 
them . It ' s  the same damn way man if you ' re 
out on the street and you get you a prostitute 
and you ' re taking her to this motel , you ' ve 
got the same feel ing . 
Q . Have you ever decided not to go through with 
one because of that feeling [ instinct ] ?  
A .  Not that I recall . I know that I ' m doing 
wrong and I ' m taking a chance and I j ust go on 
with a positive attitude . It ' s  the same way 
that you got in your car and you started down 
here , right , okay . What would have happened 
if you started thinking , well look here , I 
could have a car wreck around this next corner 
here . Are you going to j ust turn around and 
go back? It ' s  your j ob to get here and do 
that , right? It ' s  the same thing . It ' s  a j ob 
to me so I do my best at it . 
Q .  What does it feel like , is it a gut-level 
feel ing? 
A .  It ' s  a scared feeling , it ' s  a do wrong 
feeling . It ' s  a small feel ing of being in 
school and I do wrong and here I ' m sitting in 
the principal ' s  office , you know , it ' s  a scary 
feel ing . I do get them , yeah , sure . I think 
everybody does . 
Q .  When do those butterflies leave you? 
A .  Right after 
.
I ' ve got the money . ( #7 )  
The maj ority , however ,  considered themselves intuitive 
and took pride in following the lead of their intuition . 
When confronted with the intuitive nervousness or 
"butterfl ies , "  they typically decided to not commit the 
crime due to that intuition .  They could not point t o  a 
I 
concrete factor that led to their decision to not commit 
9 6  
the crime . In fact , during the reconstruction of the 
daily events , conversations , and thoughts leading to the 
decision-making , DQ differences were discernable between 
those occasions when the decis ion was made to commit a 
crime and those where the decision was made not to 
commit a crime . 
CONCLUSION 
\ 
This �chapter provides data on empirical decision-
making among the sample of 60 repetitive property 
criminals . Data collection was guided by , and therefore 
addresses , components or variables of rational decision-
making . 
The data show that individuals are motivated by 
that which they perceive they will obtain . Fifty-three 
of the 60 respondents reported they were motivated by 
the des ire for money . This perceived benefit , it was 
discovered , was calculated with more weight than any 
perceived risk . Risk , the other significant variable in 
the calculus , rarely was considered . Nearly all 
respondents reported they rarely considered the threat 
of capture , arrest , and imprisonment . Nearly all 
reported that risk was considered a nuisance rather than 
a real tangible threat . Risk-related negative thoughts 
were viewed as distractions from their prime obj ective-
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- committing a crime . Thus , many were able to simply 
not think about the risk , to put it out of their minds . 
These findings are in oppos ition to ' those that 
rational decision-making predicts . In prescriptive 
decisions , both the perceived benefits and perceived 
risks are calculated more carefully than that found 
among this sample . Even risky legitimate decisions , 
most would attest , are calculated with more care and 
finesse than found among these interviewees . 
Another component of rational decision-making is 
the alternative action evaluated by the decis ion­
problem-solver . The individual theoretically evaluates 
alternative actions and determines which among them is 
the best course of action . But , as the data in this 
chapter illustrate , alternative actions rarely were 
cons idered within the context of the decision-problem .  
And on those rare occasions when they were , they 
typically were illegal alternatives . But , nearly 
always , alternative actions were not considered or 
evaluated . 
The data also point to a significant pattern that 
emerged during this research . Nearly all respondents 
reported that their decision-making was facilitated by a 
mechanism that propelled them or enabled them to decide 
and also to act . These mechanisms clearly interfered 
with rational calculation and action . This finding is 
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yet another departure from rational decis ion-makinq . 
Thus , the actual decis ion to commit a crime hardly 
resembles a prescriptive decision-problem resolution . 
From the onset of this research , one obj ective has 
been to create typoloqies of decision-makinq from amonq 
this sample . As the previously discussed components of 
decision-makinq were used in the interviews , patterns 
emerqed in the form of different types of offenders and 
decision-makers . In the next chapter these broader 
comp onents of decision-makinq are situated within 
typoloqies that were constructed durinq this research . 
These components are made clearer when discussed in 
relation to specific crime types and specific modes of 
decision-makinq . Followinq the typoloqies are brief 
case studies to illustrate further the similarities and 
differences ( i . e . , the patterns ) found amonq different 
types of decision-makers . 
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CHAPTER IV 
TYPOLOGIES OF CRIMINAL DECISION-MAKING 
To offer only general accounts of decision-problem 
resolution would fail to address crime-speci ficity and 
those components of rational decision-making within 
typologies of criminal dec i s i on-probl em solving . 
Therefore , distinctly different types of decision­
problem-solvers were identified . Each had a unique way 
of deciding to commit a specific crime . Each type 
reported sl ightly different methods of resolving the 
problem .  
Criminal offender typologies have been constructed 
throughout the history of crime-related research . 
Criminological research on repeat criminals has produced 
such vague offender types as "chronic criminal , "  " career 
criminal , "  "habitual criminal , "  "hard-core criminal , "  
" successful , "  "unsuccessful , "  and recently " intensive" 
and " intermittent . "  These typologies have illustrated 
similarities and dissimilar! ties among criminals . But 
they lack precision and therefore are appl ied to 
individuals with less confidence than those with clearer 
lines of demarcation and with greater explanatory power . 
De finitional/operational debates seemingly have 
done l i ttle to il luminate the central issue for 
deterrence-minded policy makers , namely to explain the 
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variance in perceptions of sanction threats among those 
who commit many and those who commit few crimes . 
Researchers recently have relied on the frequency of 
c r ime comm i s sion a s  gu idance in construct ing 
typologies . Lambda has been defined as the "magnitude 
as measured by the number of crimes an active offender 
commits in a unit of time " ( Blumstein , � al . ,  1988b : 
58 ) . This frequency of offending is referred to as an 
individual crime rate , which distinguishes it from 
aggregate data ( Blumstein , et �. , 1988a) . 
It became clear in the analys is of the survey and 
interview data that a portion of this sample committed 
far more crimes than others in the sample ( see Appendix 
B ,  Figure 2 ,  for total crimes committed by lambda 
types ) . That is , some have a higher lambda than others . 
During the analysis a question emerged inspired by 
recent debates among researchers -- namely , are there 
clear distinctions between the low lambda and high 
lambda property offenders and their criminal decision­
making processes? To answer this question the survey 
and interview data were used to compile the individual ' s  
lambda across their lives . The individual lambda is 
"expressed as a fraction : the number of crimes committed 
divided by the number of years of street time" (Visher , 
19 8 6 :  172 ) . 
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TYPE .I AND � II LAMBDA TYPOLOGIES 
To differentiate between high and low lambda 
offenders , an arbitrary cut-off point was used . Those 
individuals who committed over 100 felony crimes across 
. 
their years of street time were cons idered high lambda 
and those who committed less than 100 were considered 
low l ambda of fenders . Thi s cut-o f f  point was 
cons iderably higher than that used in previous research . 
Visher ( 19 8 6 )  and Chaiken and Chaiken ( 19 8 2 ) , for 
example operationalized a high lambda offender as one 
who committed 1 1  or more crimes during the individual ' s  
years of " street time . " Among this sample of 60 
repetitive offenders , only one reported committing fewer 
than 11 felonies . And the great maj ority of these " low 
lambda offenders " committed far more than 11 crimes 
during the time they lived in the " free world . "  S ince a 
100-crime differentiation is a rather high number , 
lessor value-laden concepts for high and low lambda are 
used in the remainder of this work . Those individual s  
who have a low lambda will be considered � � lambda 
and those who have a high lambda will be cons idered � 
ll lambda . 
From my sample of incarcerated men , it is clear 
that Type II lambda offenders are more successful 
criminals than Type I .  The Type II lambda offenders 
have been punished for fewer crimes than the Type I 
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lambda offenders . For example , a Type I lambda offender 
may have committed 2 0  property crimes during his 
criminal career . He may be incarcerated twice (meeting 
a s amp l e  criterion ) for two felonies  ( one per 
incarceration) .  Thus , he was punished for 1 0  percent of 
the crimes that he committed and successfully avo ided 
punishment for 90 percent of his crimes . On the other 
hand , a Type II lambda o ffender may have committed 2 0 0  
c r i me s  during his  criminal career and may be 
incarcerated twice for a minimum of two felonies . Thus 
he was punished for one percent of his crimes and was 99 
percent successful at avoiding punishment . 
The characteristics of each type of decision-making 
are similar to the intensive and intermittent typologies 
developed by Petersilia n A,l. ( 1978 ) . The intensive 
criminal offender is similar to the Type I I  lambda 
offender identified in this research . The intensive 
offender is one that is criminally active over a long 
period of time , sees himsel f  somewhat as a professional , 
and concentrates on planning more than the intermittent . 
The intermittent criminal offender , which is similar to 
the Type I lambda offender identified in this research , 
commits crimes infrequently and often opportunistically . 
Thi� type is uncommitted to a criminal lifestyle and has 
a lower " success" record ( i . e . , they have been punished 
103 
for a greater percentage of their crimes than the 
intensive or Type II lambda offender) . 
Un l ike some prev ious research findings , an 
association between lambda and the offender ' s  decision­
making processes was detected in this study ( e . g . , 
Visher , 198 6 : 184 ) . Thirty-four individuals or 56 . 6  
percent of the sample were Type II lambda offenders . 
Twenty-six individuals or 4 3 . 4  percent of the sample 
were Type I lambda offenders . Forty-four percent of the 
Type II lambda offenders had a severe drug addiction-­
compared to only 7 . 7  percent of the Type I lambda 
offenders an addict ion that demanded daily attention 
( see Figure 3 ,  Appendix B) . These drug-dependent 
individuals were also dependent on accessible cash to 
make their needed purchases . Only one Type II lambda 
offender was employed legitimately and the rest defined 
their situation as one where they had no alternatives 
available to them for accessible cash . They functioned 
with the knowledge and mind set that they had to steal 
to meet their needs , however illegitimate , to survive . 
Whenever the Type II lambda offenders were faced 
with the decision to commit or not commit a crime , it 
was less of a "decision-problem" or dilemma than it was 
for the Type I lambda offenders . The Type II lambda 
offenders daily functioned with the predispos ition to 
commit crimes -- the decis ion was not one that required 
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a great deal of pondering . It was a given for them that 
they would commit crimes to meet their needs . Most had 
no other and sought no other alternatives to crime (see 
Figure 4 , Appendix B) • The decis ions they had defined 
that required careful thought and pondering were 
logistical ( e . g . , planning , target selection , and time 
of day) . They knew that theft offered "quick , easy 
money" unl ike a legitimate "square-j ohn" j ob .  They also 
knew that in their drug-addicted condition they would 
not be able to obtain and ma inta in legitimate 
employment . Thus , the decision to commit a crime for 
these Type II lambda offenders was not a decision of 
"should" or "shouldn ' t" or calculation , as the following 
quote illustrates . 
A .  With drugs you don ' t  rationalize . 
decision you make . You don ' t  
consequences , the pros the cons . 
it . ( # 1 0 )  
It ' s  j ust a 
weigh the 
You j ust do 
An interesting comparison to ·this finding of drug 
addiction is the use of alcohol by these two offender 
types . Twenty-three percent of the Type II lambda 
offenders either had an alcohol problem or the crimes 
were induced by alcohol compared to 3 8 . 4  of the Type I 
lambda offenders ( see Appendix B ,  Figure 3 ) . The Type I 
lambda offenders often needed encouragement to complete 
the risky decis ion -- encouragement from others or from 
alcohol . They first dec ided that they were going to do 
some kind of criminal act and then began drinking to 
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gain encouragement enough to participate in the risky 
venture . In retrospect they often blamed their criminal 
actions on the alcohol rather than the decis ion they had 
made prior to consuming the alcohol . In chapter three , 
mechanisms that facil itated action by these individuals 
wh en encountering a risky dec i s ion-probl em are 
discussed . Alcohol certainly is one such mechanism but 
more so for the Type I lambda offenders , as the 
following illustrates . 
A .  Drinking was the whole problem .  That drinking 
will pump you right up . ( # 17 ) 
A .  That alcohol partly made me just go ahead and 
do it . ( # 12 )  
A .  I believe i f  I never started drinking wine I ' d 
never done it . ( # 2 6 )  
Forty-four percent of the Type I I  lambda offenders 
planned their crimes compared to 11 . 5 percent of the 
Type I lambda offenders . Al so 4 7  percent of the Type II 
lambda offenders committed their crimes alone compared 
to 3 0 . 7  percent of the Type I lambda offenders ( see 
Fiqure 3 ,  Appendix B) . These phenomena indicate that 
the Type II lambda of fenders approached the ir planned 
actions with more knowledge about the decision-problem 
and with better logistical information for solving that 
problem . They also were prepared to act criminally 
nearly every day . They did not have to rely on 
encouragement or the "psyching-up " process indicative of 
Type I lambda offenders . Those Type I lambda offenders 
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who s t o l e  w i th other people o ften rel i ed on 
psychological encouragement to complete the act . The 
encouragement , however, was minimal , where previous 
successful crimes were recalled with pride to il lustrate 
that they could succeed in the crime facing them . Much 
like an athletic team that recounts past victories 
before entering a similar risky experience ( i . e . , 
meeting an opponent) these c�horts in crime often did 
likewise . 
The Type II lambda offenders are those who were 
more del iberate , calculative , better planners and 
considered crime more of a career than Type I lambda 
offenders . The Type II lambda offenders cons idered 
crime their occupation to the point that when they 
talked of "going to work" or "making some money" they 
referred to only illegal acts . They approached crime 
more professionally and viewed it as more than a short-
term venture . 
Q . What kinds of things did you suggest? 
A .  You know , I j ust wanted somewhere where we 
could go rob something . 
Q . So you suggested you all go somewhere and rob? 
A .  Yeah , make some , well we call it making money . 
Q . So whenever you all said "making money" that ' s  
what it meant? 
A .  Right . ( # 1 6 )  
1 0 7  
The Type I lambda offenders , on the other hand , decided 
to commit crimes more opportunistically and spur-of-the-
moment than the Type II lambda offenders . 
Q . Tel l me about that conversation you all had? 
A .  I said I know a place I think we can get • • • 
I asked him if he wanted to do it • I 
knowed the answer was going to be yeah . It 
wasn • t no big discussion about nothing 1 ike 
that , you know . We j ust did it . ( # 1 8 )  
I n  the remainder of this chapter , types of 
decision-making are described . These types became 
evident during the course of this research and data 
analys is . To illustrate each type , a case study of one 
individual for each type of decision-making is offered . 
The individuals chosen for these case studies were 
selected for two important reasons : ( 1 )  each is 
representative of the type for which he was selected ; 
and ( 2 )  each was selected because of his insightfulness , 
refl ectivity , and his apparent honesty and candor . Not 
every participant was able to reconstruct and articulate 
a specific crime and the events ,  conversations , thoughts 
and decision-making .that occurred prior to that crime : 
essential information for understanding the resolution 
of a specific criminal decision-problem .  
Clarke and Cornish ( 1985)  have emphas ized the need 
to be crime specific in future decis ion-making research 
to detect di ff erences among types of crime and 
criminals . This necessity for crime specificity served 
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as a guide in this research . A great deal of the 
interviews and hence case studies focus on the dec ision­
making for one specific crime -- the most recent typical 
crime that they committed and that they can remember 
clearly . By focusinq on a specific crime , each 
participant was able to respond in a much more detailed 
and methodical manner about his dec is ion-makinq 
processes and actions than woulda have been possible had 
the focus been on crimes generally .  
During the interviews , each participant was asked 
to also describe the most recent occasion that they 
could remember clearly when they decided not to commit a 
crime . They were to describe a crime type that they 
typically committed and a time when the decision was 
made for reasons other than when they saw the pol ice , or 
another party that miqht have interrupted or witnessed 
the action . As mentioned previously , given these 
conditions , the maj ority of participants was unable to 
recall a specific time when they decided not to commit a 
crime . Attention now is given to the case studies as a 
means of il lustrating the decision-making typologies . 
Floyd ; A � 11 Lambda Offender 
This case study is of one Type II lambda offender 
in the sample . Although he is a unique individual , he 
is representat ive of the Type II lambda offender type . 
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His biography is typical of most Type II lambda 
offenders with the exception of two other forms of Type 
II lambda offender the drug-addicted and the Type II 
lambda hustl er . The discussion of these types follow 
this case study . 
Floyd , who is from a broken home , lived with his 
mother , step-father, and several sibl ings in a rather 
large urban area . He considered his family ' s  social 
class at the time that he was growing up to have been 
lower working class . He began disliking school at an 
early age and dropped out after completing the seventh 
grade . 
Q . Why did you hate school? 
A .  I think it was authority more or less . In 
fact , to this day , I ' ve got a worse hate for 
school than I do the penitentiary system . 
This disdain for authority and authority figures is 
evident in much of his criminal activity and his 
decision-making about risk of an authority figure 
apprehending him and his attitudes about victims . 
Floyd ' s  earl iest criminal involvement was in 
s h o p l i f t i n g  ( h i s  e a rl i e s t  c r i m i n a l  area o f  
concentration) and burglary • •  
Q . So was shopli fting the crime you started with? 
A .  That was my main specialty . 
Floyd , like many o f  the Type II lambda offenders , 
concentrated or "special ized" typically in one crime for 
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a period of time and then "graduated " to another 
specialty area . This temporal-specialty phenomenon 
supports the idea of specialization among those involved 
in rather lengthy criminal careers . 
He claimed as a j uvenile , when he first began 
committing crimes , that he committed between 5 0 0  and 600 
shopl iftings . 
Q . So you committed them pretty frequently then? 
A .  Anytime I could . · Anytime that I only stood a 
50 percent chance of making it . Sometimes if 
I only stood a 2 5  percent chance of doing it , 
I would do it , because I enj oyed it . I ' m the 
type of pers on ,  man , if I could steal 
something from way in the back row or if the 
store manager is standing here and I could 
take something right under his nose , that ' s  
what I ' d  get . 
Q . Why would you prefer that? 
A .  Because it ' s  more o f  an accompl ishment . 
He soon developed a liking to shopl ifting and the 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards it offered . 
Q . What were your motivations to shoplift then? 
A .  Because it ' s  easy money ( and ) it ' s  exciting . 
But wanting to do it man , wanting to do it . 
Love to do it . Love to do it would be the 
word . 
He normally committed these early crimes with 
someone else and with almost no planning or conversation 
about the risky decis ion/act . He and his accompl ice 
simply would frequent different stores together · with 
ful l  intentions of stealing whatever and whenever they 
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could . Shoplifting was an adventure that they both 
found enj oyable and financially rewarding . 
Floyd , as most Type II lambda offenders , committed 
crimes at a very high rate and nearly always motivated 
by the benefits he perceived and usually obtained--
"easy money" and excitement . Floyd , however , emphasized 
the excitement variable among his decision to commit 
crimes more than most Type II lambda offenders . Most 
Type II lambda offenders reported that committing crime 
provided a l atent bene f it of excitement . But 
excitement , a psychological benefit , certainly was not a 
maj or motivating factor in their decision-making . Thus , 
the benefits from criminal participation , perceived 
within the criminal cal culus , were " easy money" and 
excitement . 
These non-drug-addicted Type II lambda offenders , 
typically reported using drugs and alcohol , but not to 
the extent of becoming addicted and not as a mechanism 
to. enable them to complete the risky decision/action . 
Alcohol and drug use were primarily social and not 
crime-related . 
Q . Were you using alcohol or drugs during the 
period you shoplifted? 
A .  Yeah . 
Q . Did you use them to build your courage up to 
shoplift? 
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A .  No , no , in fact , I could not even blame my 
shopl ifting or whatever I done wrong on drugs 
and alcohol . I ' m sure to a certain extent it 
did pump you up some , but I would definitely 
done what I was doing if I didn ' t  have it . 
When asked about alternatives he considered while 
resolving the criminal decision-problem , Floyd responded 
in a typical way for Type II lambda offenders . 
Q .  Did you see any alternatives at all? 
A. Never looked for none because there wasn ' t  
anything that I enj oyed more than shoplifting . 
When asked about the potential legal and extra 
legal risks , Floyd admitted that he was aware of some . 
He , like most , had a minimal understanding of the 
penalty for the crime that he was committing .  He knew 
enough about the risks to do what he perceived as 
necessary to avoid capture and he believed that he could 
continually do what was necessary to avoid it . He fully 
believed that he was skillful and clever enough to avoid 
capture . The only worry he had was extra-legal 
punishment from his parents . His perceptions of risk 
are typical of these non-druq-addicted Type II lambda 
offenders . 
Q .  Did you know the penalty for shoplifting at 
that time? 
A .  I knew one thing . 
in trouble , period . 
about being locked 
thought about that . 
anything it would be 
If you got caught you got 
As far as ever thinking 
up , no , I never really 
If I was to worry about 
my parents catching me . 
Q .  That was your biggest worry? 
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A .  I t  was my only worry then . They ' d  tear my ass 
up . 
Floyd soon abandoned his career in shoplifting and 
delved into burglary for a short period of time before 
he reached the age of 18 . Although he was never 
committed to burglary as a " specialty , " he claims to 
have committed between 2 0  and 3 0 . Rather than taking the 
initiative in burglary , as he ' had done with shoplifting 
and later with armed robbery , Floyd was led into most 
burglaries by associates . 
A .  I was always with someone else . Usually 
because they wanted to do it . I never was 
much into burglaries . I have never had a 
desire for burglaries . 
More than l ikely , because he never exercised his 
leadership abil ities , he was uncommitted to burglary . 
Q .  Think of things that might have influenced you 
to commit burglaries . 
A .  All the other people , man . I did a burglary 
because the person next to me or persons next 
to me wanted to go in that house and do a 
burglary . So what am I going to do , sit down 
here until they come back? So , to hel l  with 
it , "let ' s  do a burglary . " 
It became evident that his desire to be accepted by 
sign i f icant others clearly propel led Fl oyd into 
committing a type of crime that he had l ittle desire 
for . Perhaps too , since another person or persons 
suggested the crime and the target , those individuals 
allowed little opportunity for Floyd to exert his 
leadership . This may have contributed to his disl ike 
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for burglary . Floyd also thought there were too many 
un c o n t ro l l e d v a r i ab l e s  i nvo lved i n  b u rg l a ry . 
Regardless , his perceptions of risk were s imilar to 
those he held for shopli fting -- next to nil . 
It became evident during the interview that Floyd 
was will ing. to try nearly any type of crime to determine 
i f  he might like it . After his encounter with burglary , 
Floyd graduated to armed robbery -- his first area o f  
" special ization . "  
A. Bel ieve me , as soon as I first thought 
armed robbery I did it . I never did 
robbery prior to that because I 
considered them . Never thought about 
you know . I got into armed robbery 
loved that . That was a real weakness 
there , right there , armed robbery . 
Q . What did you love about it? 
A .  A lot o f  money . 
about 
armed 
never 
them, 
and I 
to me 
Again , he considered the risks of getting caught next to 
nil , until , like nearly all criminals , he was sentenced 
to prison his first time . 
A .  Never in my life , until I got locked up for 
that 15 years , did I ever consider being 
locked up . Never in my life . 
Q . Did you know the penalty for armed robbery at 
that time? 
A.  No , never thought about it . 
Q . How worried were you that you ' d  get arrested? 
A .  Never thought about it . 
Although the harsh realities of a prison sentence 
educated F l oyd t o  the rea l p o s s i b i l ities o f  
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imprisonment , he continued to bel ieve that his skill 
would enable him to successfully commit crime without 
further legal sanction . 
A .  From the age o f  1 8  until I got locked up , 
until I walked out of the penitentiary , until 
I got locked up this time , while I was out 
last time , the same thing . The same feeling , 
everything was as if it never changed . 
Q .  So , you continued to think you wouldn ' t  get 
caught and that you wouldn ' t  be arrested? 
A .  Most definitely . · 
Prior to his first prison incarceration , at age 18 , 
Floyd had planned only minimally to commit an armed 
robbery . His continued reliance on his own skill was 
re in forced by increased p lanning prior to armed 
robberies . He typically would watch the place for a few 
hours . He reported the following about the way he 
decided to commit armed robbery . 
A .  The more I would think about it the more I 
knew that I wouldn ' t  be caught for it . 
Q .  You weren ' t  worried about getting caught? 
A .  No , not at all . Like I mentioned on that 
( questionnaire ] ,  my chances of being caught I 
felt was zero to one ( on a ten-point scale ) . 
Q .  What do you think accounts for that? 
A .  Confidence and j ust doing it before . 
Q .  Think of the way you weighed the possibil ity 
of getting caught against the benefits--
A .  I only thought of the benefits . 
We see from the above that Floyd ' s  confidence in his 
ability supported by his previous success in armed 
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robbery enabled him to confidently decide with sel f-
assurance . This confidence , coupled with his one-sided 
ca l culus , enab led Fl oyd to resolve an otherwise 
troublesome decision-problem but in a non-problematic 
manner . 
During the interviews , Floyd was asked to describe 
the most recent crime he had committed that he could 
remember clearly . He described in vivid detail a recent 
armed robbery of a store manager who had brought the 
store deposits to the bank to place in the overnight 
deposit . Floyd ' s  description of his decis ion-making was 
articulate , especially compared to the difficulty a 
great number of individuals had with explaining their 
decisions and the calculus behind them . 
Q . Tell me what kind of conversation you had with 
yourself about whether you should or you 
shouldn ' t . 
A .  I knew I should .  And I was going to and it 
was going to be okay . The easiest money is 
armed robbery . 
Q . Did you , at that time , think " I  could go to 
prison? " 
A .  No . You think about coming to prison about 
l ike you think about dying . Did I think about 
prison? No . I did not have no doubt in my 
mind I was good enough to do it and make it . 
It ' s  the same way that you got in your car and 
you started down here . What would have 
happened if you started thinking "well look 
here . I could have a car wreck around this 
next corner here . "  Are you j ust going to turn 
around and go back? It ' s  your j ob to get here 
and do that , right? So the same to me . It ' s  
a j ob to me so I do my. best at it . 
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Again this illustrates how these non-addicted Type II 
lambda o f fenders consider crime an occupat ion or 
profession . They consider themselves skillful and 
resourceful enough to successfully complete the task of 
their profession . 
We went on to talk about risk perceptions and 
negative variables that he may have thought of during 
the dec is ion to commit the armed robbery and during his 
wait for the victim . 
Q . Well , did bad thoughts actually enter your 
mind and then you put the thoughts out or did 
the thoughts not enter your mind? 
A .  No , they don • t .  
man . 
They don ' t  enter my mind , 
F l oyd and these non-addicted Type II lambda 
of fenders rely heavily on their skill and past 
experiences . Thus , when they are faced with a decis ion 
to commit a crime , after having successfully committed a 
number of crimes , after arriving at the opinion that 
they are good at their j ob ,  the decision is easily made . 
Their attention , the ir mental conver sat i on , and 
conversation with others (when others are included in 
the crime) focus on the logistics of the crime rather 
than other calculable factors . They did not del iberate 
over whether to commit it or negative consequences of 
their actions . Those components of resolving the 
decision-problem were resolved , a priori . 
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DRUG-ADDICTION AND THE � II LAMBDA OFFENDER 
In � Felon , Irwin ( 19 7 0 )  typologizes various 
individuals involved in the commission of felonies and 
cal ls them criminal identities . These identities are 
useful for supporting the decision-making typologies of 
my research . One such identity is the Dope Fiend , which 
will be referred to as the "drug addict . "  
Irwin ( 19 7 0 )  informs us that the dope fiend is one 
who has a severe drug addiction for an extended period 
of time . 
. 
The use of drugs is the dominating aspect of his 
life . Irrespective of former history , former 
sub cu l tu r a l  i d e nt i t i e s , o n c e  h o o ked , the 
physiological effects and other exigencies of drug 
use take over and certain patterns . emerge ( Irwin , 
197 0 : 1 6 )  • 
From my research , it has become very clear that one such 
"pattern" is the manner in which criminal decision-
problems are framed and resolved by those severely 
addicted to drugs . · 
Irwin elaborates on five maj or themes of the dope 
fiend world which are "derived from the one dominant 
dimension -- drug use" ( 1970 : 1 6 ) . The most important 
theme identi fied for this research is steal ing to 
o b t a in drugs . But Irwin suggests that "what 
distinguishes their theft from that of other thieves is 
that the dope fiend �ends to be pettier , less ambitious , 
less pol ished , more desperate , and more impulsive" 
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( Irwin , 19 70 : 17 ) . The extreme monetary cost o f  us ing 
large and regular amounts of expensive drugs and the 
physically debil itating effects of drugs , make it nearly 
impossible for the drug addict to support his habit from 
legal earnings . 
As pointed out earl ier in this chapter , those 
individuals in this sample who committed the largest 
numbers of crimes ( i . e . , the Type II lambda offenders) 
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are 'those who were severely addicted to drugs . Their 
daily needs predisposed them to steal to feed their 
addictions . The decision was not one of " should" or 
''shouldn ' t , " but became one of � .  
A .  I was off into drugs and I j ust didn ' t  care . 
That ' s  the kind of life I was l iving , so I was 
j ust out there and I was deal ing with it , you 
know , survival or whatever .  
They had to have drugs to function during the day . 
A .  My mind kept saying , "well you know , you • ve 
got to do this to get these drugs " and it 
would ,  you know . I f  I didn ' t  get the drugs 
it ' d  make me sick , you know, but when I get 
the drugs in me I ' m okay , you know , a normal 
person . 
Steal ing for most of these addicts was an act of 
desperat ion,  and an act that required nearly no 
decision-problem resolution at all . To simplify it , 
given their addictions , they did what they defined as 
necessary . Their situation was one that predisposed 
them to decide to commit crimes defining their situation 
as such and therefore deciding in a situational ly-
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bounded way . It was a daily act and one that became so 
repetitive that the dec ision was no longer a real 
deliberative decision but merely part of the near-daily 
routine . The decis ion is , in a sense , made for them , by 
the very nature of their addictions . 
A .  A person as a drunk and an alcoholic I found 
out now , I know now , there ' s  no rational 
thinking of any sort . What you might feel is 
normal is totally abnormal . There ' s  no 
rational thinking, you know . 
A .  With drugs you don ' t  rational ize . 
dec ision you make . You don ' t  
consequences , the pros , the cons . 
it . 
It ' s  just a 
weigh the 
You j ust do 
Of the Type II lambda offenders in this sample , 44  
percent were addicted severely to drugs or alcohol . 
Since the percentage of these addicts among this 
offender type is as large as it is , it has proven 
worthwhil e ,  during the course of this research , to 
distinguish characteristics of this particular offender 
type from those of the non-addicted Type II lambda 
offenders . Non-addicts are driven by factors and make 
decis ions differently than drug/alcohol addicts . Our 
attention will turn now to the drug-addicted Type II 
lambda offender . It will become clear by comparing this 
biography to the biography of Floyd , the non-addicted 
T y p e  I I  l a mb d a  o f f e n d e r  that the o f f e n d e r  
characteristics and decision-making processes are unique 
to each particular type . 
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Hank : A Drug-Addicted � II Lambda Offender 
Hank completed his high school education and never 
married . His father now owns his own small business 
after having worked as a county government official and 
his mother works as a manager for a State agency . His 
parents divorced when he was in his mid-teens . When 
asked about their social class while he was growing up 
he reported that they "never went without" and were 
clearly middle class . 
Hank was 20 years old the first time he was 
sentenced to prison . He was not incarcerated at any 
time prior to that and he also claims he committed no 
crimes before the age of 18 . 
While in his late teens , he became involved in a 
"chop shop" operation , that is , stealing cars , stripping 
the original parts , replacing them with others , then re-
sell ing the cars . He claimed that he had always been 
exposed to this type of criminal operation and to the 
older people involved in it . As he associated with 
these older people he began , little by little , to get 
more involved in the operation until he reached the 
point of paying people to steal for him . He frequently 
wa s involved in auto the fts prior to his first 
incarceration . 
Q . Then in that period from 198 0 when you first 
came to the penitentiary , were you into crimes 
besides stealing cars? 
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A .  Wel l , that ' s  basically al l it was . 
Q . So how 
involved 
trucks? 
many cars do 
in steal ing? 
you think 
How many 
you were 
cars and 
A .  Hundreds , because when you say every night and 
sometimes three in one night , you know , it 
don ' t  take , you ' d  think that sounds like a big 
amount but it ' s  not really when you do at it 
on a steady bas is .  
We can see from the above dialogue that Hank was a 
frequent and repetitive offender who also "special ized" 
at that particular period in his life in one particular 
crime -- stealing and reselling cars . Again support is 
evident for " specialization" in a particular crime for a 
specific period of time . In other words Hank , like most 
Type II lambda offenders , went through specialty changes 
or career changes in their larger criminal careers . 
Once again , the maj or motivating force for this 
crime and the major benefit from this crime , was money-
- quick easy money . 
Q . Why do you think you stole cars at that time? 
A .  Well it was for the money . 
When asked about alternatives that he considered 
during the decision-problem resolution , Hank reported 
that at that time in his life ,  before he became addicted 
to drugs , he pursued legitimate alternatives , but soon 
opted for illegitimate . 
Q . At that time did you see any alternatives that 
you could have done besides steal ing cars? 
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A .  I had had these summer j obs at night , you 
know . I ' d made my mind up at the time that I 
would just soon as have that easy money . 
When asked about risks for this early criminal 
" specialty , " he reported that he assumed , if he was 
caught that the penalty would be pretty lenient . 
Later , through associating with these friends in 
the chop-shop business , he formed the same type of 
habits they had -- a drug addiction . 
A .  What got me in so much trouble 
dilaudid . 
has been 
When asked about how he managed to actual ly make the 
decision to commit a crime , he responded typically to 
other drug-addicted Type II lambda offenders . 
Q .  How did you manage to cope , how did you manage 
to-
A .  You know you ' re wrong , no matter • so you 
try not to think about it , you shake it off . 
Hank , l ike most drug-addicted Type II lambda 
offenders , became only marginally involved in crime 
until his drug use increased to the point of addiction . 
Parallel to his worsening addiction , his criminal 
involvement increased . After he became addicted to 
dilauded he began spending more money for drugs than he 
made . He assoc iated with people who committed 
burglaries and soon found himself for the first time in 
his life , doing likewise . 
Q .  Why do you think you did that? 
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A .  S imply for the drug money . I drifted with 
that crowd and they either shoplifted or did 
home burglaries or some kind of violation of 
the law every day , whatever it is , and you 
violate the law every single day on end . 
He claims that he knew he would eventually get caught , 
although he continued to participate in risky decisions 
and eve�ts . His drug addiction mot ivated and 
necessitated him to continue engaging in criminal 
decision-making and participation . 
A .  You know you pretty well know you ' re doomed , 
you ' re destined . It ' s  j ust a matter of time 
until the law enforcement stops you . I 
worried about it . You can ' t  violate the law 
every day , two or three different ways a day 
and survive and get away with it . Eventually 
you ' ll stumble . 
Q .  How did you handle that mentally thinking that 
you were going to get popped? 
A .  The drugs led the way . They made me think I 
could walk on water . I didn ' t  j udge anything 
at all . If I had j ust thought for a split 
second , but there wasn ' t  no looking back , 
there wasn ' t  no worries at the time . I 
decided to do it and didn ' t  think about it 
till it was over .  I wasn ' t  raised up to 
steal , I wasn ' t  raised up around people that 
stole . 
Q .  Before you had the drug problem had you ever 
thought about breaking into somebody ' s  house? 
A .  No . I didn ' t  have any desire to do that at 
all . 
Hank was asked to describe the most recent crime 
that he had committed and could remember clearly . He 
described a house burglary that he committed · with 
"another j unkie " .  He knew the morning of the burglary 
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that he would have to commit a crime that day to survive 
( i . e . , to purchase drugs ) . 
A .  In the mornings you have to have ( a  fix ] j ust 
to function as a normal person . 
He , l ike every respondent , was questioned about his mood 
that day . Almost every participant , when asked this 
question , reported that they were in no particular mood , 
no different from any other day . Mood appears to have 
been fairly insignificant in their decision-making 
processes . The drug addicted , however ,  typically 
repo rted they were feel ing "bad , "  " depres sed , "  
"desperate , "  and "anxious about the next fix" . 
A .  I was in a bad mood , I felt bad . I hadn ' t  
done any dilauded that day and l ike I said you 
have to have it to function , period . 
Q .  Typically ,  when you burglarized , were you in a 
bad mood? 
A .  Normally in a bad mood or felt bad or I 
wouldn ' t  have been doing it . It was a have-to 
situation . You really had to have them 
physically . 
Hank knew he would have to steal for his addiction 
because he was earning no legitimate money and he rel ied 
on "quick , easy money . "  He searched for a target on his 
own and then connected with the other person who he had 
committed burglaries with before . Their typical modus 
operandi was to drive around looking for suitable 
targets ,  or , as Hank said , "to make their opportunity . "  
When asked about the types of positive or negative 
factors he thought about or they talked about , he 
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reported thinking about making "easy money . " They 
talked only of logistics and the division of labor, for 
that particular criminal act , and not about previous 
successes or any risk-benefit analysis . 
Q . Did you al l talk about any negative things 
that you thought could happen to you? 
A .  Wel l ,  no , you wouldn ' t  talk about getting 
caught because the main thing is because you 
didn ' t  want to get caught so , you know , you 
more or less didn ' t  want to talk about it or 
think about it . 
He claims that he thought about negative consequences , 
such as arrest , imprisonment , and victim confrontation , 
but managed to temporarily "block" those worries from 
his mind . 
A .  You block out all those thoughts • • you 
know it ' s  wrong • • you don ' t  think about 
nobody but yoursel f ,  Mr . Greed • • •  you just 
block them out for now • it 1 s just a 
temporary block • • •  you ' ll probably never be 
hooked on those type of drugs but if you ever 
was you could see it clearly . 
The only alternative he had in mind was what he 
thought was fundamentally necessary for ending his 
criminal involvement . 
A .  I thought the only way to end my crime was to 
end the drug problem . See , the drug problem 
was the root of it all . That was the only 
alternative I had was to check myself in 
somewhere or leave town and get away from the 
drugs , period . But you go to a drug clinic 
and get out and you come back, well , you 1 re 
right back in the middle of it . Now how are 
you going to deal with it? 
Q . Did you think about any alternatives to make 
money that day? 
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A .  No , that ' s  the only way I knew at the time . 
When Hank was asked to describe a particular time 
when he decided to not commit a crime , he was unable to 
recall a specific incident . But , he , 1 ike others who 
were unable to remember one specific incident , did 
describe the most typical response given for deciding 
not to commit crime in general -- instinct . He also 
referred to those feelings as "butterfl ies . "  He had 
reported earlier in the interview that he races cars on 
a dirt track . He was asked to analogize those crime-
related "butterflies " to general nervousness that he may 
have before races -- a legitimate risky decision/action . 
Q . Do you get butterfl ies before a race? 
A .  Oh , I get nervous every time . I get nervous , 
deadly nervous . 
Q . Do those butterfl ies feel something like that 
intuition feel ing you ' re talking about? 
A .  Well ', in a way . But , they go away at the 
beginning of the race . They ' l l go away and 
you ' l l settle down , but the other , it ' ll stay 
with you , it ' ll stay with you , you know . 
Q . So , it ' s  not something you can po int to? 
A .  It ' s  just something that , you know , comes to 
you , j ust something you feel yoursel f .  
The drug-add icted Type I I  l ambda of fenders 
typically are those driven by their addictions . The 
maj ority , unl ike the non-addicted Type II lambda 
offenders , do not consider crime an occupation or 
profession . Rather , they view crime as an expedient way 
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to ful fill their need -- a need that most hope is 
temporary . Driven by their needs , they commit types of 
crimes that they would not have considered otherwise . 
Also , the ir modus operandi is desperate and more 
impul sive with little planning and one where they 
constantly "make their opportunities . "  
THE HUSTLING � II LAMBDA OFFENDER 
Irwin identifies the hustler among his typologies 
in � Felon ( 19 7 0 ) . Again , his analysis is useful in 
typologiz ing decision-making among these 60 respondents . 
A maj or theme of the hustler identified by Irwin is 
"sharpness" of appearance and language . "The language­
intel lectual skills component is the abil ity to dupe , to 
outwit through conversation" ( 197 0 :  12 ) . The hustlers 
were those who were very well guarded during the course 
of the interviews . They were the most cautious , 
distrusting participants who played their cards "close 
to their chests" , so to speak . The maj ority of the Type 
II lambda offenders , unl ike the hustler , were quite 
wi l l ing to talk o f  the ir expl oits , the i r  past 
accomplishments , and their lives . They were happy to 
volunteer information and rarely seemed guarded during 
the interviews . 
The hustler of the following biography , Archie , was 
without a doubt the most guarded respondent of the 60 . 
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Irwin informs us that the absence of trust is an 
important theme of the hustler . This was reinforced 
during the interviews with the hustlers and especially 
with Archie . 
Irwin ( 19 7 0 )  informs us that the hustler has a 
dichotomous view of others those who take and those 
who are taken , and suggests that "the sensible course • 
• is to be one of those who take " ( 1970 : 15) . The 
hustler ' s  lack of indecisiveness about committing crimes 
is evident in his belief about the social world.  
The hustler is a form of Type II lambda offender 
and one whose mindset is to commit crimes on a regular 
basis -- nearly daily . The decision problem has become 
routinized as part of his daily activities , as has 
committing crimes , and is really no problem at all . 
Resolving the de cis ion-problem rarely follows the 
processes of prescriptive decision-making . Hustl ing is 
second nature to the hustler just as using drugs is to 
the drug addict . 
Archie : A � II Lambda Rustling Offender 
Arc h i e , who was ra i s ed i n  a n  inner-city 
environment , is 39 years old , single , and the father of 
three children . He completed the seventh grade of 
school and has never attempted to obtain his GED . He 
has four siblings , none of which has been in legal 
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trouble . His father worked as a custodian and his 
mother spent some time , periodically , in hospitals for 
nerve-related problems . 
His most stable period of employment was as a 
presser for a dry-cleaning business . When asked about 
his impression of performing that type of work he 
replied :  
A .  Well , I seen nothing wrong with it , as long as 
I could make enough money to keep up with the 
cost of living to my standard of l iving , you 
know . It wasn ' t  nothing wrong with it . 
Archie became involved in crime at the age of 12 or 
13 when he and friends began shoplifting minor items 
( e . g . , candy bars , pop bottles ) . They then progressed 
to breaking into businesses . He soon adopted this 
lifestyle and the mindset of stealing to support his 
" standard of living . " He volunteered the following : 
A .  As you get older and s ee these same 
opportunities I guess your desire for the 
taste of candy is going away , but you know 
this holds a value . 
Q . So when did it become bigger stuff? 
A .  When I started liking girls more or less , you 
know dating and cared about my appearance and 
the clothes that I wore . 
Archie was sent to a j uvenile reformatory twice 
between the ages of 13 and 15 . He was 19 when he first 
was sentenced to prison for burglary ,  for which he 
served one year . The next time he was incarcerated was 
when he was 2 9  years old , again for burglary . When 
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relating his age at his first two incarcerations , he was 
asked about his criminal activity during the ten years 
between prison sentences . The following dialogue 
illustrates how cautious the hustler is when asked to 
divulge sensitive information . 
Q .  Did you burglarize during that ten year 
period? 
A .  During that ten year period , is that what 
you • re saying? Did I burglarize in between 
that ten year period? 
Q .  Yeah , in that ten year period . 
A .  Did I? 
Q .  Yeah . 
A .  Your asking me that question? And you ·expect 
me to give you a straight answer? 
Q .  You don ' t  have to answer it i f  you don ' t  want 
to . It ' s  j ust odd that if somebody was into 
burglaries a lot that there would be this ten 
year gap where they managed to get away with 
it , you know . 
A .  Well , no , it • s not necessarily • • it • s a 
number of . other things that you can do that 
work for you for a certain lenqth of time and 
then when that particular thing is not working 
you go into this thing that you rely in , maybe 
a thing that you might feel that you ' re more 
experienced at . 
Q .  Did you do very many before you were caught? 
A .  Did I do very many? Now that ' s  one question 
that I find it hard to come out of my mouth to 
even say that . You see what I ' m saying? 
Archie claimed that he occasionally relied on hustl ing 
in a different way -- by gambl ing and selling marij uana . 
The hustler is able to move easily from one hustle or 
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"specialty" to another . The hustler is street-wise and 
always is alert for new opportunities in a variety of 
hustles . 
After serving one year for his second burglary 
conviction , Archie was reincarcerated seven years later 
again for burglary . He received a four year prison 
sentence , during which he was interviewed for this 
research . 
When Archie was interviewed during the second wave , 
after his release from prison , he continued to play his 
cards as close to his chest as he had during the first 
interview and responded very cautiously to sensitive 
questions , but typical to hustlers . He was questioned 
about the period since his release from prison and if he 
had thought about committing any crimes . 
Q . How long were you out before you thought about 
doing something wrong? 
A .  How long was I out before I thought o f  doing 
something? What do you mean wrong? Wrong in 
what way? 
Q . You know, illegal . 
A.  Thought about it? What kind of question is 
that? 
Q . It ' s  a good straight-forward question . 
A .  ( Laughs) This a in ' t funny , not much . I t  ' s 
j ust you ' re asking me and the things that I 
know that I could be telling you . 
During the interviews Archie was asked about the 
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decision-making of those early shoplifting/petit theft 
sprees . 
A .  We didn ' t  ever decide . We ' d  j ust take off to 
walking, you know , it was a thing of kids j ust 
going to town all the time , you know , you go 
to town and wander around downtown and 
whatever you run into in between town and back 
home , it was , " come on , let ' s  do this and do 
that , " and then , you know , you ' re doing it . 
It wasn ' t  no diabol ical plot , j ust spur-of­
the-moment . 
He reports that about age 17 , the way that he approached 
burglaries and the way that he made the decis ion 
changed . He began hustling as a l ivelihood . 
A .  I would say it changed to the fact that I 
would go at more at the professional level . 
It was a serious thing now to me . 
Q . If  you had to say , "this is the reason I broke 
into places , "  what would it be? 
A .  I basically needed the money to 
standards of living . When I seen 
of l iving fa ll ing ,  you know , 
reinforce it with some currency . 
keep up my 
my standard 
I had to 
Archie was asked to describe the most recent crime 
he had committed and could remember clearly . He related 
one spec i f ic burglary that he committed and his 
decision-making prior to it . He was asked about the 
amount of time he had contemplated doing the crime . 
Q . You had been thinking about that for awhile , 
then? 
A .  No , it ' s  not like that . I f  you do things l ike 
that it ' s  not a matter of thinking about doing 
it . You see valuable things as you go along 
day by day . It might be something that you 
can knock off when you might need some money . 
You spot things l ike that day by day as you 
go . 
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Q . How worried were you that you would get 
caught? 
A .  Not at all . I was rather bold . I didn • t 
think about that much . ( The worry] comes but 
you can wipe it away . 
Q . How do you wipe it away? 
A .  You j ust blank it out . 
Archie was also qliestioned about a speci fic time 
when he decided not to commit a crime . He , l ike many , 
was unable to remember one speci fic time , but remembered 
generally . He attributes those decis ions not to commit 
a crime to instinct . 
Q . What percentage of the burglaries that you 
thought about doing would you say that you 
didn • t  go through with , that you decided not 
to do? 
A .  I ' d say 1 0  percent . 
Q . For reasons l ike you ' re describing to me now? 
A .  Yeah , just bad feel ings . 
Archie , l ike most hustlers , knows the system and 
its ins and outs . Prison represents little threat to 
him for he knows through experience that he can do time 
and that it is a relatively easy experience for him . 
Hustlers do not enj oy being incarcerated , but when that 
is the result of their decisions and actions , they 
accept it . Prison and the threat of prison , are not 
fears that are part of their calculus and decision-
making before committing crimes . 
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The hustler is a criminal who calculates more 
carefully than the drug-addict and the Type I lambda 
offender . The hustler thinks l ittle in advance about 
the logistics of doing the crime and certainly does not 
use a prescriptive weighing of the expected costs and 
benefits of completing the act . The hustler decides 
first to do a crime and then searches for an amenable 
target . He searches for opportunities and targets 
rather than j umping at the first opportunity that 
presents itsel f .  This is not to say that he does not 
take advantage of opportunities , but his typical modus 
operandi is to decide first and then selectively choose 
a target . 
Abel : A � .I Lambda Offender 
As mentioned earl ier in this chapter , the research 
participants are typologized as Type I and Type II 
lambda offenders . The various forms of Type I I  lambda 
offenders do not apply to the Type I lambda offender 
type . The Type I lambda offender is one who has 
committed fewer than 100 crimes during his l ife of 
" street time . " Differences in decision-making emerged 
as the typologies were constructed along the course of 
this research . These dif ferences are apparent when the 
Type I lambda offend�r biography is compared to the Type 
II lambda offender biographies . 
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Abel attended school until age 17 at which time he 
had completed nine grades , a few of which were in 
special educat
-
ion . While he was growing up his father 
and mother were disabled and he claims that they 
certainly were lower social class . Abel has 10 
sibl ings , two of which have been involved in legal 
trouble . He has worked only menial j obs , typically as a 
laborer . He and his wife have been married seven years 
and are expecting their first child. 
The first serious crime Abel committed was a home 
burglary at the age of 17 with his older brother .  He 
continued dabbl ing in burglaries with his brother , who 
strongly encouraged and pressured him to commit nearly 
every crime that he was involved in . 
A .  My brother and them they ' d  get with me and 
stuff and they ' d  maybe say , "yeah we know 
where so and so place is and we can go and get 
some money and make a little money off of 
this . "  My brother he ' s  real ly the 
reason I ' m in here today . He would always 
kind of encourage me . 
He claims to have committed 10 to 15 burglaries across 
his l i fet ime . They occurred infrequently and were 
distributed across the 10 years of his l i fe that he was 
involved in crime . 
Abel was 1 9  years old when he was fi rst 
incarcerated . He served _ three years for accessory to 
murder that originally was intended as an armed robbery . 
After his release from prison he spent seven to eight 
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years in the " free world" before he was reincarcerated 
for burglary . At the time of the first interview , he 
was serving his second prison incarceration . 
When Abel was asked about the decision to commit 
crimes he spoke of his perceptions of both the risks and 
benefits . His wife , the most signi ficant other in his 
life ,  was also the most significant extra-legal risk he 
thought of prior to committing crimes . He claimed to 
have thought about her and their marriage prior to 
committing most crimes . 
A.  ( I ]  knowded I was going to get in trouble and 
I didn ' t  want to be away from my wife . Just 
l ike I ' ve , hey , I ' ve laid a many a night and 
cried because I knowed that I had hurt my wife 
and she even cries every time . Every week I 
get two or three letters from her and she 
writes stuff in there that makes me cry . 
He claimed that she , in a caring and not nagging way , 
encouraged him to cease his criminal activities . 
A .  My wi fe , she told me , she said , "you ' re going 
to get locked up away from me , "  and said , 
"you ' re going to be gone for hard to tel l how 
many years , "  and said , "you might liable end 
up getting killed sitting down there in them 
prisons , "  said , "because , "  said , " they ' s  a lot 
of that , a lot of that goes on . "  
He claimed to also have thought about the legal 
risks prior to committing a burglary . 
Q . How worried were you that you would get 
arrested or sent to prison when you were doing 
those burglaries? Is it something that you 
thought very much about? 
A .  I thought about it very , very much . 
Q . When did you usually think about it? 
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A .  After . 
Q . So how long after the burglary would pass 
until you would stop worrying about getting 
caught? 
A .  Sometimes it ' d  be about a month . I would lay 
in bed and think about it , think to mysel f ,  
I ' d  lay on the bed with my eyes closed and 
j ust imagine a lot of times that the pol ice 
was going to walk up any time and arrest me 
for doing so and so thing and take me and lock 
me up away from my wi fe . 
The perceived benefits that he thought he would 
derive from burglary were typical benefits found among 
nearly all offender types , namely , money , excitement , 
and enj oyment . 
Q . When you thought about doing the burglaries • 
what were the benefits that you saw coming 
out of doing burglaries? 
A .  Well ,  when I was doing them I thought I was 
having fun and I thought I was making money 
for me and my family . 
Abel , as did most Type I lambda offenders , relied 
on alcohol or drugs as a mechanism which enabled him to 
participate in the risky decision/action . 
A .  I would always be a drinking when I would do 
that stuff .  It would always kind of boost me 
up and build my hopes up that I could do it . 
That booze and stuff ,  just l ike i f  you drink 
one can of beer you ' re going to want a second . 
You get that drunk you ' re going to want 
another one and it ' s  going to keep on and keep 
on until it leads you on and on and then 
you ' re going to be out here doing this and 
that and then end up you ' re going to be 
sitting up here behind bars . 
A second and very powerful mechanism in Abel ' s  
decision-making process was his older brother who also 
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committed the murder during the armed robbery . This 
mechanism was used almost exclusively by the Type I 
lambda offenders . Abel attributes most of his criminal 
involvement and legal trouble to this very important 
mechanism in his criminal decision-making . 
Q . Was [your brother] the one that initiated the 
steal ing? 
A .  Oh , yes . He ' s  really the reason I ' m in here 
today . He would always kind of encourage me 
for to go . He ' s  say , "come on , let ' s  go . "  Go 
over there where so and so is and we might 
make so much money and we ' d  hal f  it . My 
brother, he would come by one day and he would 
talk to me . I ' d a lot of times I ' d tell him 
I ' d say, "No , I don ' t  want to do this . " And 
then , maybe the next day , he would come by and 
we ' d  sit around and talk about it and stuff 
and then we ' d  get out maybe a l ittle drinking 
and something another and then ' s  when we ' d  go 
do it . 
Abel , when describing the most recent crime that he 
committed and could remember clearly , described the 
robbery/ murder that he , his brother ,  and another 
accomplice committed . That was the only armed robbery 
that he participated in . 
his brother . 
He was convinced , again , by 
Q . Just briefly tell me the circumstances of that 
murder . 
A .  Well my brother ,  he talked me into that . He 
said , " I  know this man , " said , "he ' s  got all 
kinds of money , " said , "come on , " said , "we ' ll 
go over there and do this , "  said , "they ain ' t  
going to be nothing happen . "  
His brother had committed armed r:obberies before and 
140 
Abel rel ied on the expertise of this older , more 
experienced individual . 
Q . Had he armed robbed before? 
A .  Yeah he had did that a lot . 
Q . So you never had . What was your reaction when 
all of a sudden this guy said , "hey , why don ' t  
we go over here and stick this guy up? " I 
mean , you ' d  never done an armed robbery 
before . 
A .  Wel l ,  it was , it was kind o f  a shock to me and 
I asked , I asked him , I said , I said , " is 
anybody going to get hurt doing this , " and 
they said , " no . " Said , "all we ' ll do is j ust 
go over there , "  and said, "draw the gun on the 
man , " and said , "tell him to set the money 
out , " and said , "he ' ll set it out . " 
Abel , relying on his brother ' s  expertise and his 
previous criminal accomplishments ,  was able to make the 
leap in seriousness from committing burglaries to armed 
robbery . 
Q . Tell me about the conversation that you all 
had , you know , what kinds of things were said , 
what kinds of things went through your mind . 
A .  I was scared . I said , "Ronnie , I ' ll tell you 
what , "  I said, "we may get in trouble or we 
might end up getting killed by doing this , "  
because I hadn ' t  never did nothing l ike that . 
But he had and he sa id , "no , " sa id , 
"everything will be alright , "  said , "you ain ' t  
got nothing to worry about . "  
Q . Did that convince you everything would be 
okay? 
A .  S o  I kindly figured to myself well I guess 
maybe it will be alright . 
Q . So why did you think it would be? 
A .  Because he had got out , got out o f  a lot of 
stuff and he had did a lot of stuff and had 
never got caught at it . I figured well if he 
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can get by with all them things I know we can 
get by with j ust this one thing . 
The calculus in this case , unlike the calculus 
among other types discussed in this chapter, was not 
one- s ided . The expected benefits certa inly were 
discussed and counted on similarly to other criminal 
decision-makers . 
A .  Well we talked about when we got all that 
money . • • we was going to do this and do 
that with the money . We was going to go and 
buy some nice , nice cars and make us some hot 
rods and stuff out of them and build them up 
and make them mean and stuff .  
But , Abel , as other Type I lambda offenders , typically 
tho ught about p o s s i b l e  l egal and ext ra- legal 
consequences of his decisions/actions . 
Q . Were there other things you were worried 
about? 
A .  Well , I was thinking , I was thinking about my 
wife too . And I thought that I ' d get this 
money . Shoot , , I ' m going to , I '  11 think I ' m 
rich . I ' ll have plenty o f  money . I figured 
(my wife ] would j ust up and leave me and I 
would never , I would never be back with her 
any more . 
Q . You thought about that too? 
A .  Yeah . 
He attributes his abil ity to make the decis ion to take 
part in the armed robbery on the mechanism alcohol . 
Q . How did you mange to , thinking about all those 
things , how did you mange to do that crime? 
A .  Well , one thing , well that alcohol and . stu ff 
where I was drinking that partly , that partly 
made me just go ahead and do it . Because when 
you get to drinking and you drink so much and 
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you get so drunk or something or another l ike 
that you ' l l do anything . 
Abel , as most Type I lambda offenders , felt guilty 
for committing crimes even· at the time of commiss ion . 
Type I lambda offenders are unable to rationalize away 
the moral and ethical dilemmas that they face when 
resolving a criminal decision-problem and those they 
face afterwards . Not only did the Type I lambda 
offenders feel guilty but they also realized the extra­
legal sanction threats from neighbors and friends and 
how their criminal actions would reflect badly on their 
famil ies . 
A .  I felt bad about doing that stuff . I felt bad 
about mysel f because I knowed people are 
looking , looking down on me saying , "well 
there ' s  nothing to him . Why he ain ' t  good for 
nothing . "  
HABITUAL THEFT 
Irwin ( 19 8 5 )  reports from his study of the ja il , 
that many criminals he observed are highly impulsive in 
their behavior , both in and out of j ail . They steal 
habitually without any forethought and believe that 
items belong to no one , but are "up for grabs . "  They 
constantly are alert to opportunities for personal gain . 
"This attitude becomes second nature , and the impulse to 
appropriate anything that is not carefully guarded 
carries over to life on the outside " ( Irwin , : 8 8 ) . 
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Several of these participants reported that many of 
their criminal actions took place with little or no 
forethought about the acts themselves , as opposed to 
forethought about perceived consequences , benefits , 
motives , and alternatives . Much of the minor crimes 
were committed habitually . These minor offenses had 
been committed so often that they became a normal 
inconsequential action by some of these offenders . For 
\ \ 
example, a common comment among these respondents was " I  
\ 
never pay for cigarettes . "  
, A .  Used to , when I ' d go in a store and I had 
money in my pocket , it was j ust , used to when 
I ' d to in a store if I was going to get , 
cigarettes I wasn ' t  going to pay for them . I 
would j ust steal them . ( # 1 )  
They developed a pattern o-f steal ing cigarettes and 
other petty items to such an extent that it became a 
nonchalant , habitual act , absent of forethought about 
the act or possible negative consequences . 
According to their descriptions , which are short on 
detail , the act itself is a rather simple one . It 
involves a quick visual appraisal of the setting , 
"lifting the items " and successfully concealing them 
until away from the premises . Even this description , as 
simple as it sounds , makes the action seem more complex 
than it aCtually is . The decision about habitual , petty 
theft is much simpler than the decision-making process 
and action of shoplifting , as described by those who 
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shopl i fted . Shopl ifters typically would go to the place 
of business with full intentions to shoplift . Such is 
not the case with the habitual thief . 
One individual when asked about habitual minor 
theft responded in the following manner . 
· A .  Hell , sometimes I couldn ' t  walk in a store 
without stealing something . You know , j ust to 
see if I could do it . It wasn ' t  something I 
needed , it ' s  j ust , I just felt I needed to 
steal something .  
Q . The way that you approached that habitual 
stealing ,  was that the same way that you 
approached burglaries? 
A .  No , it was impulsive . ( # 4 1 )  
Thi s  type o f  de c i s i on-making is the least 
calculative of the types identified in this work . As 
often as not , the offender arrives at the crime scene 
with no forethought of steal ing . But , after having 
habitually stolen petty items , when presented with 
another opportunity , the habitual thief engages in the 
risky action with little or no forethought about the 
action or consequences thereof .  
CONCLUSION 
These typologies , accompanied with a case study of 
each � are useful in understanding patterns and processes 
of decision-making found among repetitive property 
criminal s .  Each decision-making type i s  unique in its 
framing and resolving criminal decis ion-problems . The 
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interviews revealed that each viewed crime commission 
and committed crimes distinctly different from the other 
types . Those components of rational dec ision-making 
( v i z . ,  al ternatives , ri sk/bene f it percept ions , 
mechanisms ) are also unique to each dec ision-making 
type . 
Early in this research , I began to question · my 
confidence in the interviewees '  accounts of the ir 
decision-making , particularly in its simplicity .  Two 
po ssible explanations for this apparent simplicity 
surfaced . Each , in turn , was evaluated . First , the 
op erational i zation of decision-making variables was 
questioned since it was possible those theoretical 
properties of rational decision-making were not being 
"tapped . "  A second explanation was arrived at , that 
when evaluated makes more analytic sense than the 
f o rm e r . E a ch p a r t i c i p a n t  showed d i f f i cu l ty 
articulating the atomistic steps and processes that they 
were pressed for . They had di fficulty in analytically 
sepa rat ing components of their decisions and had 
difficulty reconstructing thought processes during the 
decision . This explanation makes more analytic sense 
when we cons ider their difficulty in reconstructing 
illegitimate decisions compared to the difficulty of 
legi t imate dec i s i on-makers ' to reconstruct their 
decis ion-problem resolution . Like criminal decision-
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problems , many legitimate decisions also are risky 
( e . g . , those involving purchases of substantial monetary 
s i z e , e l e c t i v e  surge r ies , organi z ed athleti cs , 
international travel ) .  From personal experience , those 
who resolve legitimate risky decision-problems also 
experience difficulty in recall ing speci fics about their 
decisions to act . They are unable to provide accounts 
of alternatives to the decision and many legitimate 
decis ions are made with the facil itative aid of a 
mechanism ( e . g . , drinking and conversation) .  Al so , many 
legitimate decisions are made without knowledge of the 
po s s ible outcomes and without calculation between 
perceived benefits and risks . Therefore , the difficulty 
in reconstructing criminal decision-problem resolution 
may be typical of reconstructing all types of decisions . 
It may wel l be that these cognitive human processes 
elude precise social science measurement . 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
This research describes an important and , until 
now , overl ooked component of criminal activ ity , 
particularly among a problem population of repetitive 
criminals .  It offers a descriptive analytical look at 
criminal dec i sion-making and how it departs from 
decision-making as described in theoretical l iterature . 
During the research , three important topics emerged 
that are important for the future of research guided by 
decision-making theories . First , criminal decision­
problems typically are resolved with the aid of a 
mechanism that facilitates both the decision to commit a 
·crime and the actual commission of the crime . As shown 
in Figure 3 ,  Appendix B ,  many of the criminals in this 
study decided to commit crimes while they were under the 
influence or addicted to drugs and alcohol . This single 
mechanism was used in the maj ority of the crimes they 
described . This is not to imply a causal relationship , 
but merely a significant factor in explaining criminal 
decision-problem resolution . 
S econd , while resolving a criminal 
problem ,  that is calculating between the 
positive and negative outcomes , very few 
considering possible negative consequences 
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decision-
perceiv�d 
reported 
of their 
actions . This failure to calculate negative outcomes ,  
even s impl istically , does not support empirically 
prescriptive decision-making theories . 
Third , this research ful f i l led an important 
obj ective by constructing decision-making typologies . 
As various patterns of decision-making emerged , along 
with various motivations , and mechanisms , typologies of 
decision-making were constructed , guided by previous 
distinctions o f  offending . 
These research findings , and those detailed in 
previous chapters , have important implications for 
current debates in the l iterature . One such debate is 
over whether career criminals special ize or general ize 
in types of crimes during their careers . Another debate 
has to do with the relevance of deterrence and decis ion­
making theories and future research guided by such 
theories . 
SPECIALIST/GENERALIST DEBATE 
Previous research on 
e x a m i n e d , among o t h e r  
repetitive criminals has 
th i n gs , the i s s ue o f  
specialization among the chronic career offenders . 
Debate has focused on whether the repeat offenders are 
specialists in a given area of criminal ity or whether 
they are general ists who commit a variety of types of 
crimes . 
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An early study of criminal careers found that 
generali zation is common among young criminals who 
reported they committed three or more types of crime . 
As they grew older , they committed fewer types of 
crimes , but committed them opportunistical ly and as 
generalists ( Peters il ia gt gl, 1978 ; Petersi l ia , 19 8 0 ) . 
In a similar study , Walsh ( 19 8 6 )  interviewed 1 2 2  British 
robbers and found that the participants were general ists 
who did not distinguish between robbery and burglary . 
His robbers reported that they associated with all types 
of criminal s .  He also reported that his robbers were 
abl e  to sh i ft eas ily from committ ing robbery to 
committing burglary and then back to robbery . 
These findings are dissimilar to my research 
findings . Although the maj ority of the 60 o ffenders in 
my study could not be cons idered spec ialists in the 
s oph i s t i cated use o f  the word , they typ i c a l l y  
" speciali zed" in one type o f  crime for a period of time , 
then moved on to another type of crime or " specialty 
area . " Individuals usually began their careers with one 
crime type and then "graduated" to another type . 
Sometimes they returned to the original crime type but 
typically did not . 
A .  When I became an adult • • •  I didn ' t  really 
do too much burglaries because . . • I 
graduated from that , you know, to armed 
robbery . 
Q . So you graduated , you said graduated? 
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A.  When I first started hanging out I was doing 
shoplifting and then I went from shoplifting 
to burglarizing and then I went from that to 
armed robbery so , you know , each step you go 
further and further .  ( # 16)  
Other individuals reported they could adapt to long-
range career changes by changing their " spec ialties . "  
A .  It ' s  a number o f  other things that you can do 
that work for you for a certain length of time 
and then when that particular thing is not 
working you go into this thing that you rely 
in, maybe a thing that you might feel that 
you ' re more experienced at . ( #57 ) 
Few .reported shi fting from one crime to another with the 
ease that Walsh found among his sample . My findings are 
closer to those of Feeney ( 19 8 6 )  who interviewed armed 
robbers . He di scovered that many thought that 
committing burglary was too risky and unpredictable j ust 
as I found with many in my sample . 
Those individuals who special ized in burglary 
generally reported an aversion to armed robbery for l ike 
reasons . The most common reasons given were that : ( 1 ) 
they desired to avoid confront ing the victim ; ( 2 )  armed 
robbery was too dangerous ; and ( 3 )  armed robbery carried 
too much prison time . Likewise , "specialists " in 
robbery reported they did not commit burglary for 
similar reasons . With burglary they reported there was : 
( 1 ) a lack of control of the situation ; ( 2 )  fear of 
being attacked by a home or business owner ;  ( 3 )  disl ike 
for the physical work of transporting the spoils ; and 
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( 4 )  disdain for the trouble and time involved in fencing 
the goods . 
S ome i n d i v i du a l s  r e p o rt e d  chang i ng the i r  
11 specialty 11 to avoid further arrest or a severe 
punishment for the same crime type for which they had 
been previously incarcerated . 
A .  I changed crimes . 
Q .  Why did you change? 
A .  I was told, you know, if you come back on the 
same MO that , you know, they ' d  lock me up 
longer if I was caught for burglary , which 
there was a lot of charges l ike that on my 
records., burglary . So , if I was going to do 
anything I need to change . ( # 2 3 ) 
In sum, my findings suggest that over time , . offenders 
tend toward special ization . There clearly is a need for 
more systematic research on the topic of special ization . 
Long itud inal designs should be utilized in these 
investigations . 
IMPLICATIONS FOR DETERRENCE AND DECISION-MAKING THEORIES 
Perceptual deterrence and decision-making theories 
inform us that individuals , prior to acting , think about 
the potential positive and negative consequences of 
their actions . The decision of whether to engage in 
those actions is a product of some rational calculation 
of the perceived benefits and risks associated with each 
act . The theories ' logic , then , informs us that if the 
action is believed to produce greater positive than 
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negative results , the actor more than l ikely , will 
proceed with the act . In this case the rewards are 
perceived as "outweighing" the risks . On the other 
hand , if the actor believes the act will produce greater 
negative than positive consequences the actor , more than 
l ikely , will not engage in the act . In this case , the 
risks are perceived as "outweighing" the benefits . 
Perceptual deterrence and decision-making theories 
emphasize the ability of the actor to relate action to 
c o n s equence , which is of utmost impo rt ance i n  
understanding risky decision-problem resolution and 
risky actions . These theories also emphasize that the 
actors ' perceptions of the l ikely outcome of actions 
propel them to act one way or another . 
My research findings , however , do not support the 
th e o r e t i c a l  p r e s upp o s i t i o n s  o f  d e t e rrenc e and 
prescriptive dec i s i on-making theories . For the 
respondents in this research claimed that they and 
nearly every thief they have known simply do not think 
about the possible legal consequences of their criminal 
actions prior to committing crimes . This is especially 
true for those criminals of grave concern to deterrence­
minded pol icy makers -- the drug-addicted and the non­
addicted Type II lambda offenders . Rather than thinking 
of the negative consequences of their actions , the Type 
II lambda offenders claimed to have thought primarily of 
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the perceived positive consequences of their actions . 
Deterrence and decision-making theories inform us 
that "risk" ideally is conceptualized and evaluated 
prior to acting . But , again , contrary to decision­
making theories , those few participants who reported 
considering the possible negative consequences of their 
actions when deciding to commit a crime also managed to 
put those thoughts out of their minds to complete the 
crime . This certainly is supportive of the social 
psychological domain assumption that fear "can be 
escaped by turning away from signs of danger (which] is 
one of the weaknesses of trying to use fear to influence 
behavior" (McCarroll , 1972: 3 63 ) . Deterrence theory ' s  
presupposition that the threat of legal sanction is a 
fear-inducing control , may not hold water ,  especially 
among very high frequency repetitive offenders . 
Up to this point in their l ives , these repeat 
offenders certainly have been undeterred by the threat 
of legal sanction . Only now , after having served at 
least two prison incarcerations and after suffering 
mammoth extra-legal consequences do the maj ority claim 
they will desist from committing property crimes . They 
possibly may be deterred now , but only after having 
committed numerous property crimes and after having 
served two or more prison terms . The questi�n of 
importance for deterrence theory , theorists , and pol icy 
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makers , is -- why were they not deterred before now? 
The most common threads among their responses that 
explain this absence o f  deterrent effects on their 
actions are that they ( 1 ) thought they would not get 
caught , ( 2 )  thought if they were caught they would be 
incapacitated for a relatively short time , and ( 3 )  
considered prison a non-threatening environment . 
These first two points are �ddressed in chapters 
\ 
three and four of this work . In\ those chapters the 
decision-making and the individual ' s  perceptions of the 
consequences of their actions are elaborated . The third 
p o i n t  deserves furthe r  elaborati on . I When the 
p a rt i cipants actual ly thought about the prison 
environment prior to their first incarceration , they 
thought o f  the same types o f  threats as most 
individuals . Then , when they were incarcerated the 
first time , they concluded that the State ' s  punishment 
for committing property crimes was not � severe . In 
other words , the worst punishment that the State could 
invoke on property offenders , they discovered , could be 
endured relatively easily and hence was no great threat . 
Even more important , they rarely thought of the prison 
environment or their being incarcerated there . They 
simply believed they would not get caught and refused to 
think beyond that . 
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. 
While in prison many of these offenders experienced 
a typical education about prison sentences and the 
"going rate" for various crimes . With this new 
knowledge and after experiencing the realities of 
prison , some offenders desisted from crime for a time . 
Those who desisted attribute their decision to the 
realization of legal punishment and extra-legal factors 
in their lives ( e . g . , new-found family commitments , 
abst i n e n c e  f rom drugs and al cohol , l egitimate 
employment ) .  During this period , some claimed to have 
c o n s i d e r e d  and pursued a l ternat i v e s  to the i r  
illegitimate occupations for the first time since they 
began . 
Those who continued committing crimes changed their 
decision-making approach to crimes in one of two ways . 
Some thought about the possibil ity of legal sanction 
much more than they ever had before . This often led to , 
at best , a minimal increase in planning . Others claimed 
that they simply chose not to think about the legal 
sanction threats . Choosing not to think about the 
consequences of their actions was one of a number of 
mechanisms used by the participants to enable them to 
make the decision to commit a crime in the face of very 
real consequences (these mechanisms are discussed in the 
preceding two chapters ) .  Some consciously chose to put 
thoughts of legal sanction out of their minds . This 
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failure to evaluate the legal consequences of their 
actions does not support prescriptive rational criminal 
decision-making although it does support util itarianism . 
All of these individuals considered themselves immune 
from arrest and incarceration , although they bel ieved 
that eventually every person who habitually commits 
crime will be arrested . Their perceptions about 
immunity disallowed adequate consideration of the legal 
consequences . 
Clarke and Cornish ( 19 8 5 : 17 3 )  recently reported 
that desistance " is not necessarily permanent and may 
simply be part of a continuing process of lull s  in the 
offending of persistent criminals . "  A great maj ority of 
these 6 0  persistent offenders reported periods in their 
l ives when they were not actively committing crimes . 
They reported going through phases of des istance which 
were not related to the threat o f  legal sanct ion . 
Rather , the phases were related to periods when 
conditions other than legal , were positive or rewarding 
( i . e . , when they could say , "My life is good" ) . These 
o f fenders could be labeled cycl ical or temporary 
desisters . Still , the most significant point , for 
deterrence theory and deterrence-guided policy , is that 
they temporarily desisted for reasons other than being 
deterred by the threat of legal sanction . 
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A recent review of previous deterrence-guided 
research by a recognized deterrence scholar , yields an 
insightful and sobering conclusion about the util ity of 
deterrence theory and deterrence-guided policies . And 
his comments well serve as a conclusion to this 
dissertation . 
Perceptual deterrence researchers and proponents of 
the deterrence doctrine should also begin to 
prepare themselves for possible bad news . No 
matter how sophisticated the study or how val iant 
the effort , very l ittle relationship may exist 
between people ' s  estimates of the certainty and 
severity o f  puni shment and the i r  behavi or . 
Deterrence theory assumes that even if people do 
not perceive accurately the obj ective certainty and 
severity of punishment , at least they are motivated 
rationally by their perceptions of those risks . 
Perhaps not ; it may not be in the nature of the 
beast to be so rational . Thus , however much we 
pride ourselves on being intelligent , rational 
creatures ,  the truth may be that we are tempered 
somewhat with humanity ( Paternoster , 198 7 : 2 13-15 ) . 
Perhaps these uniquely human characteristics , thought 
processes , evaluations , and actions are beyond the realm 
of scientific measurement . And perhaps the theoretical 
propositions are not indicative of human behavior . 
Research such as this illuminates the utility of theory 
and theoretical assumptions . This illumination also has 
pol icy impl ications that logically follow the direction 
of the research findings . 
Although these participants have served several 
cumulative years in prison , few have served many .years 
in one prison term . Now , with their habitual records 
and being several years older , they are faced with the 
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threat of being incarcerated as a habitual criminal 
should they be convicted of further property crimes . 
Approximately 55 percent of the sample claimed to have 
been threatened with being tried as a habitual criminal . 
Under Tennessee law ,  a habitual criminal conviction 
carries a life sentence . All of these individuals 
claimed that the punishment severity was too great a 
risk to j ustify continued property crime commiss ion . 
Al l also indicated that their chances of re-arrest are 
greater now than at any point in their l ives and all 
bel ieved that re-arrest certainly would result in 
another prison sentence . This very severe penalty 
appears to act as a deterrent on these repetitive 
property offenders who , have already served several 
years in prison and perceive the habitual criminal law 
as a threat . 
Pol icy makers could interpret this as evidence that 
very long prison sentences act as a deterrent . This 
research suggests this interpretation , but � among 
those individuals who have been incarcerated twice 
previously for felonies . Most of these men served a 
very short prison sentence when they were first 
incarcerated , and they subsequently were undeterred by 
the threat of prison . Some policy makers could endorse 
and work toward the implementation of severely long 
prison sentences for first-time property offenders . 
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Thi s  pol icy would selectively incapacitate " risky 
offenders , "  and would send out a threatening message to 
would-be property offenders who would be forced to re­
calculate the going rate for various crimes . However , 
this "deterrent effect " among this sample , can only be 
generalized to populations of "two-time losers , "  that is 
to those who have been incarcerated twice or more and 
who face the threat of being tried as a habitual 
criminal . Generalizations from this research cannot be 
unilaterally applied to other criminal populations for 
there is no scienti fic evidence to support such 
applications . 
Given that previous research has examined changes 
in the severity of punishment and found very little 
impact on individual ' s  perceptions , deterrence-guided 
pol icy may indeed be misguided and one that operates on 
false premises . Deterrence theory , l ikewise , seems 
incapable of predicting behavior since it is unable to 
account for individuals ' perceptions and decision­
problem resolution ,  no matter how rational . 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
S i nce this research illuminates some serious 
questions about deterrence and decis ion-making theories , 
perhaps another theory should be used for this type of 
research in the future . This type of qual itative 
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rese arch de s ign and data ana l y s i s  cal l s  for a 
qual itative theory that both expl icitly and implicitly 
embraces the idea of "getting inside" peoples ' heads . 
Phen omeno logical soc iol ogy may prove use ful i n  
understanding criminal decis ion-making not only for 
future research but also in reanalyz ing the data from 
this research proj ect . 
Phenomenology , more than any other social theory , 
is concerned with how individuals think and , for 
research such as this ,  how they frame decision-problems . 
Part of decision-problem resolution is assembl ing and 
proc ess ing in format ion o f  var ious kinds , drawing 
comparisons and acting on what is considered best for 
the actor . Phenomenology ' s  maj or focus is on how 
individuals use such procedures to make their lives 
coherent and consistent . Phenomenology does not take 
for granted that people can decide "what is going on . " 
Rather , it questions how people reach conclus ions about 
what is " going on" ( Freeman , 19 8 0 : 13 9 ) . Phenomenology 
is concerned with the ways in which individuals 
" construct in their own consciousness the meanings of 
things " ( Douglas , 198 0 :  17 ) . This "practical reasoning" 
may be the most important component of phenomenology 
since it entails the proces�es that individuals use to 
make sense of obj ects and events . 
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Phenomen olgy c l early takes into account the 
subj ectivity of decision-problem resolution and the 
various perceptions that individuals use in the ir 
decision-making . Future research may opt to pay less 
attention to rational choice and deterrence theories and 
more attention to phenomenology to understand decis ion­
making among repetitive property criminals . This new 
th e o re t i c a l  app r o a c h may provide much clearer 
explanations of decision-making and explanations firmly 
situated in and supported by sociological theory . 
This research , its des ign , and its findings 
bene fitted from previous research endeavors . Much was 
l e a r n ed from prev ious research about samp l i ng , 
measurement , data analysis , and the kinds of data needed 
at this point in the development of this research 
tradition . Likewise , this research suggests some 
important l ines of pursuit for future research that is 
des igned to "get ins ide " criminals ' heads . 
One such line of pursuit , not only for these data 
but also for similar data col lected in the future , is to 
analyze them along the l ines suggested by Wilson and 
Herrns tein ( 19 8 5 ) . Their concern is with those 
offenders of concern to pol icy makers -- the high rate 
offenders , or identified in my research as Type I I  
lambda offenders . In their seminal work , Wil son and 
Herrnstein repeatedly ask why these particul ar criminal s 
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commit high rates of crime while others do not . They 
suggest that alcohol and drug addictions may indeed 
explain some of this variance . My research certainly 
supports this l inkage . To explain this variance in 
lambda offender types ,  future research des igns should 
take into account those variables that Wil son and 
Herrnstein refer to as "constitutional factors . "  
One constitutional factor is intell igence which can 
be operational ized as IQ or psychological evaluations . 
such data are available in the form of psychological 
evaluations found in the offender ' s  official state 
records . The evaluations typically are performed 
immed iately a fter incarcerat ion a s  part o f  the 
classification process . Thus , such information should 
be readily available . 
Personal ity is another constitutional factor of 
Wilson and Herrnstein ' s  that can be operationali zed and 
obtained in the form of personal ity evaluation scores 
found in the official records . 
Last , " devel opmental factors " such as family 
backgrounds are important l ines of inquiry for future 
re search . such information as family stabil ity , 
geographical region during the developmental years , 
criminal behavior among parents , grandparents , uncles , 
aunts and siblings are variables that may explain some 
of the variance in Type I and Type I I  lambdas .  This 
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information , however , may be obta ined only by the 
participants ' self-reporting since family genealogies 
are somewhat difficult , time-consuming , and costly to 
reconstruct . 
Wilson and Herrnstein are concerned with decis ion­
making and those variables of "human nature" that may 
s h a p e  d e c i s i o n -mak i ng processes among p roperty 
criminal s .  Thus , these constitutional and developmental 
factors should be evaluated among a sample of Type I and 
Type II lambda criminals to determine i f  they explain 
variance in their frequency of crime commiss ion . 
Future research may benefit from us ing QQth a 
phenomeno l o g i c al app r o a c h  a nd m e a s u r ing those 
constitut ional and developmental variables suggested by 
Wil son and Herrnstein ( 198 5 ) . This new direction in 
criminal-decision making would almost certainly yield 
better results if placed within a longitudinal research 
des ign . Thus , the research could examine personal and 
background , variables , "get inside " peoples ' heads , and 
compare responses across time . In this way , both 
retrospective and prospective accounts of criminal 
decis ion-making could be obtained to understand further 
the dynamics of the criminal calculus and account for 
some of the variance in lambda offender types . 
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APPENDIX A 
Informed Consent Form 
I ,  , affirm that the deta ils ------------------------
of the research proj ect "Doing Crime : A Study of 
Criminal Decis ion-Making" has been explained to me by a 
member of the research staff . I understand that I have 
the right to refuse to participate in the research . I 
also understand that if I consent to participate I may 
refuse to answer any questions and to discontinue 
participation at any time without penalty for doing so . 
I understand that my responses to the quest ions are 
conf idential and that no one except the members of the 
research staff will have access to them . I understand 
' 
that if I participate in the research I will rece ive 
$50 . 0 0 after the first interview and $100 . 0 0 after the 
second interview . I understand that if I have any 
further questions about the research or about my rights 
as a participant I can cal l the proj ect director , Dr . 
Neal Shover ,  at ( 61 5 )  974-09 3 1 . 
The research has been explained to me and I agree 
to participate in the proj ect . 
Participant Date 
Researcher Date 
Witness Date 
In the future , i f  you would l ike additional 
information about the research proj ect you may contact 
Dr . Shover , Kenneth TUnnell , or David Honaker at : The 
University of Tennessee 
905 McClung Tower 
Knoxville , TN ( 61 5 ) 974-09 3 1  
L.. Demographics 
1 .  Age 
TOPICAL INTERVIEW GUIDE 
2 .  Marital status (how many times married/ 
divorced? ) 
3 .  Children 
4 .  Education ( school experiences? ) 
s .  Parents ' occupation and income 
6 .  S iblings 
7 .  Type of area where born and reared 
8 .  Last place of residence 
� Employment History 
1 .  Types of legitimate employment 
2 .  Longest period of employment . 
3 .  Most recent free-world j ob and 
4 .  Experiences from working 
s .  Expectations about working 
� Incarceration History 
When? 
salary . When? 
1 .  For each incarceration including j uvenile 
a .  Age 
b .  Crime 
c .  Location 
d .  When 
e .  Sentence 
f .  Calendar years served 
g .  When released 
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� Exploring Variation in Past Criminal Behavior 
A .  Describe the first period of sustained 
criminality . ( For each discernable period , 
probe for the following) 
1 .  Describe the first period 
2 .  How did you get started? 
3 .  Number 
4 .  Motivations 
s .  Did alcohol or drug use precede decision? 
6 .  Typical social context of the decis ion to 
become involved? Probe for : 
a .  Were there interactional or 
interpersonal influences on the 
decision? What were they? Time 
frame • . • single instance . . . 
during a day . . . over the course 
of a week? 
b .  Spec ific events or focal points 
which influenced decision • . . time 
frame 
c .  Alternatives to the course of action 
you chose? Why? 
7 .  Knowledge of penalty? 
8 .  F e a r s  o f  l e g a l  s a n c t i o n dur i ng 
preparation , during crime , after crime 
( Probe for percept ions of capture , 
arrest , conviction , incarceration) 
a .  Were you sanctioned? Penalty? 
b .  Effect on criminal calculus? ( Probe 
for how, when , why it changed ; Age­
related? Sanction related? Extra­
legal related? ) 
9 .  Perceptions of the likel ihood of personal 
loss ( Probe for extra-legal sanction 
fears ) 
a .  Personal losses or sanctions 
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B .  
10 . Perceived benefits 
11 . Describe your mental weighing processes 
of potential risks vs . benefits for a 
typical situation 
12 . Average take . . •  other benefits 
13 . Decision not to commit this type crime 
ever made? ( Probe for general social 
context ; deterred by legal andjor extra­
legal factors? ) 
14 . Typical dec ision-making practices to 
avoid detection 
Did this calculus change? 
neutral ize fears? 
How did you 
v. Criminal Decision-making 1n the Future 
A .  Hopes and plans for the future 
1 .  Anticipated future crimes ( if none have 
them suppose) 
2 . Social context in which return to crime 
would occur 
3 .  Circumstances that would most account for 
return or desistance 
a .  Threatened with bitch? Effect? 
4 .  Types ( Probe for serious or less serious 
types ) 
a .  Types you may and may not commit 
5 .  What size "take" would motivate criminal 
re-involvement? 
B .  Perceptions o f  likely legal sanction (Probe 
for perceptions of the likel ihood of arrest , 
incarceration) 
c .  Perceptions of extra-legal sanctions ( e . g . , 
f am i ly ,  friends , c o-workers ,  emp l oyment 
difficulties 
D. Crime worthwhile? What type ( s ) ? 
191 
INTERVIEW GUIDE : POST-RELEASE PERIOD 
I .  Post-Release Behavior 
A .  Problems? Arrests? outcomes? 
B .  Crimes Considered 
1 .  Why? Types? How often? 
2 .  How did you decide? (Probe for rich 
deta i l  about perceptions o f :  risks ; 
rewards ; sanctions ) 
3 .  Social relationships (Probe for detail 
about settings or situations ; influence 
o f  others ; effect on perceptions of 
consequences ) 
4 .  Alternatives (Probe for kinds ; knowledge 
about them ; perceived consequences o f  
each) 
5 .  Describe typical setting and all daily 
events during the decision-making (Probe 
for conversation with sel f)  
c .  Crimes Planned 
1 .  Why? 
2 .  Ca re fulness of planning 
avoidance 
detection 
3 .  Social relationships ( Probe for detail 
about influence ; effect on planning ; 
perceived consequences )  
4 .  Describe typical setting and all events 
during the planning (Probe for time 
lapse ; booze or drugs ) 
D .  Crimes Committed 
1 .  RANDQMIZE : I f  you have done X ,  or if you get 
a yellow marble ,  answer YES ; 2 times or less 
or if you get a yellow marble , answer YES ; 3 
times or more or i f  you get a yellow marble , 
answer YES . 
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a .  armed robbery f .  forgery 
b .  strong armed robbery g .  shoplifting 
c .  home burglary h .  credit card fraud 
d .  business burglary i .  grand theft 
e .  auto theft j .  dealing hot goods 
2 .  Describe first serious crime that you 
remember clearly . f;z;:Qbe for changes in 
decision-making 
3 .  Describe the most recent crime you 
committed that you can recall clearly and 
in detail -- PrQbe for : 
4 .  
a .  age category (viz . ,  j uvenile ; 18-2 6 ;  
over 2 7 )  
b .  type 
c .  mood/motivations 
d .  daily activities 
e .  social setting and relationships 
f .  influence and e f fect o f  thes e 
relationships 
g .  alcohol or drug use beforejduring? 
h .  perceived worries or fears (Probe 
f o r  perceived legal/ extra-legal 
consequences 
i .  h o w  y o u  r a t i o n a l i z e d  t h o s e  
perceptions 
j .  how you made decision ( i . e . , how you 
moved from worry or fear to the 
c r i m e  c om m i s s i o n ; frobe f o r  
conversation with sel f )  
k .  a lternatives (frobe for kinds ; 
knowl edge about them ; perceived 
consequences of each) 
1 .  relate to legitimate experience 
H a b i tu a l  th e ft ?  
different? 
De c i s i o n -making 
5 .  Describe most recent occasion when 
decision DQt tQ commit a crime was made 
(Probe for more depth than when they saw 
the man and for : ) 
a .  age category (viz . ,  juvenile ; 18-2 6 ; 
over 2 7 )  
b .  type 
c .  mood/motivations 
d .  daily activities 
e .  social setting and relationships 
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f .  influence and e f fect o f  these 
relationships 
g .  alcohol or drug use? 
h.  perceived worries or fears ( Probe 
f o r  perce ived l egal/ extra- lega l 
consequences )  
i .  why you decided not to 
j .  how you made the decis ion ( Probe for 
conversation with self )  
k .  relate to legitimate experience 
II . Future Behavior/Expectations 
A .  Anticipate Future Crimes? 
1 .  Why? Under what circumstances? Types? 
Context? 
2 .  Legal/extra-legal worries? 
3 .  How would decision-making change? What 
explains it? 
B .  Self concept--compare current sel f concept 
with past conceptions 
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DOING CRIME : A STUDY OF POST-PRISON DECIS ION-MAKING 
Professor Neal Shover , Principal Investigator 
and 
Kenneth Tunnell and David Honaker , Research Assistants 
Department of Sociology 
The University of Tennessee 
Knoxville 3799 6-04 9 0  
Phone : ( 6 15)  974-09 3 1  
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Instructions 
Thank you for participating in our study . This 
questionnaire is similar to the one you completed during 
the first interview while you were in prison . This one 
deals with your life since your release from prison . 
You may refuse to answer any question without 
penalty at any time . You also have the right to end 
your participation without penalty . Your responses on 
this questionnaire are completely confidential . After 
you complete the questionnaire , we will keep it under 
lock and key until it is destroyed . Only the research 
staff will have access to the information you provide . 
The maj ority of the questionnaire is divided into 
three sections . One set of questions asks about crimes 
that you may have thought about committing since your 
release from prison . Another set of questions asks 
about crimes that you may have planned since your 
release from prison . The third set of questions asks 
about crimes that you may have committed since your 
release from prison . It is important for you to read 
the instructions carefully and answer the questions to 
the best of your knowledge . 
The questionnaire also contains several types of 
questions . Some questions require that you answer by 
fill ing in a blank while others ask you to circle the 
best answer . Other questions require you to rank the 
answers that are provided . Therefore , you wil l need to 
pay close attention as you go through the questionnaire . 
Unless a question asks you to choose more than one 
answer ,  be certain to mark only one . 
Again , thank you for helping us in with this 
research . If you have any questions , feel free to ask . 
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1 .  What date were you released from prison? (Write in 
the month , day , and year) 
2 .  Altogether , how many months have you worked for pay 
since your release from prison? ( Speci fy the 
number of months in the blank) 
MONTHS 
3 .  Since your release from prison , what has been your 
average weekly take-home pay from working? 
$ ----�---- TAKE-HOME PAY PER WEEK 
4 .  s ince your release from prison , where have you 
l ived the majority of the time? 
1 WITH MY PARENT ( S )  
2 WITH RELATIVES OTHER THAN MY PARENTS OR 
WIFE 
3 WITH MY WIFE OR GIRLFRIEND 
4 WITH FRIENDS 
5 BY MYSELF 
6 OTHER ( Speci fy) 
__
__________ 
_ 
The follpwing series of questions asks about crimes that 
you have thought about committing since your release 
from prison . When answering these next few questions , 
think only about whether you have thought seriously 
about committing crimes . For now , do not think about 
planning or committing crimes . 
5 .  Have you thought about committing any crimes since 
your release? 
1 NO 
2 YES 
6 .  How often do you think about committing crimes? 
1 NEVER 
2 SOMETIMES 
3 OFTEN 
4 NEARLY ALWAYS 
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7 .  When the possibility of committing a crime crosses 
your mind , how much time do you usually spend 
thinking about it? 
1 NONE (Go to Question 14 ) 
2 ONE HOUR 
3 A FEW HOURS 
4 ONE DAY 
5 A FEW DAYS 
6 ONE WEEK OR MORE 
8 .  Usually , where are you when you think about 
committing crimes? 
1 RIDING AROUND IN AN AUTOMOBILE 
2 IN A BAR 
3 HANGING OUT WITH FRIENDS 
4 AT WORK 
5 AT HOME 
6 OTHER ( Specify) 
9 .  Are you usually alone or with others when you think 
about committing crimes? 
1 ALONE 
2 WITH OTHERS 
10 . S ince your release , are you usually drinking when 
you think about committing crimes? 
1 NO 
2 YES 
11 . Are you usually using drugs when you think about 
committing crimes? 
1 NO 
2 YES 
12 . How carefully do you think about your family ' s  
reactions when you think about committing crimes? 
1 NOT CAREFULLY 
2 SOMEWHAT CAREFULLY 
3 CAREFULLY 
4 VERY CAREFULLY 
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13 . How carefully do you think about the possibility of 
being arrested and incarcerated when you think 
about committing crimes? 
1 NOT CAREFULLY 
2 SOMEWHAT CAREFULLY 
3 CAREFULLY 
4 VERY CAREFULLY 
Instructions : The next few questions ask about crimes 
you may have planned since your release from prison . 
When answering these next few questions , think only 
about whether you have planned any crimes since your 
release from prison . For now , do not think about 
committing crimes . 
14 . Have you planned any crimes since your release? 
1 NO (Go to Question 2 1 )  
2 YES 
15 . How often do you plan crimes? 
1 NEVER 
2 SOMETIMES 
3 OFTEN 
4 NEARLY ALWAYS 
16 . When you plan a crime , usually how much time do you 
spend? 
1 NONE 
2 AN HOUR 
3 A FEW HOURS 
4 ONE DAY 
5 A FEW DAYS 
6 ONE WEEK OR MORE 
17 . Where do you usually plan crimes? 
1 RIDING AROUND IN AN AUTOMOBILE 
2 IN A BAR 
3 HANGING OUT WITH FRIENDS 
4 AT WORK 
5 AT HOME 
6 OTHER ( Specify)  
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18 . Are you usually alone or with others when you plan 
crimes? 
1 ALONE 
2 WITH OTHERS 
19 . Are you usually drinking when you plan crimes? 
1 YES 
2 NO 
2 0 . Are you usually using drugs when you plan crimes? 
1 YES 
2 NO 
2 1 .  S ince your release from prison , what has been your 
main source of income? 
1 EMPLOYMENT 
2 FAMILY AND FRIENDS 
3 ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES 
4 SOCIAL SECURITY OR WELFARE 
5 I HAVE HAD NO INCOME 
6 OTHER ( Specify)  
Instructions : The next series of questions asks about 
crimes that you may have committed since your release 
from prison . When answering these questions , think only 
about crimes that you have committed since your release . 
22 . S ince your release from prison , have you committed 
any misdemeanors? 
1 NO 
2 YES 
23 . S ince your release from prison , have you committed 
any felonies? 
1 NO 
2 YES 
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Instructions : I f  you answered YES to Questions 2 2  or 2 3 , 
you may skip the next three questions and go directly to 
Question 2 6 .  
24 . S ince your release from prison , how important has 
the Habitual Criminal Act been in your decision not 
to commit crimes? 
1 NOT IMPORTANT 
2 SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT 
3 IMPORTANT 
4 VERY IMPORTANT 
2 5 .  Now we want to know why you think you have been 
successful in staying away from crime , since your 
release from prison . Look over the following list 
of reasons and rank the four most important 
reasons that you have managed to not return to 
crime . · Place a 1 beside the most important reason 
that you have not returned to crime , a 2 beside the 
second most important reason , etc . 
I DO NOT WANT TO BE SENTENCED TO PRISON 
AS I HAVE GOTTEN OLDER , DOING TIME IS 
HARDER 
I DO NOT WANT MY PAROLE REVOKED 
I DO NOT WANT TO BE TRIED AS A HABITUAL 
CRIMINAL 
I NOW HAVE MORE SELF-RESPECT THAN IN 
THE PAST 
I NO LONGER WANT TO CAUSE MY FAMILY ANY 
HARDSHIP 
MY DRINKING IS NOW UNDER CONTROL 
I NOW USE LITTLE OR NO DRUGS 
I NO LONGER KEEP BAD COMPANY 
I NOW HAVE A JOB 
I NOW CONSI DER THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
CRIMES MORE CAREFULLY 
I NOW WANT TO DO THE RIGHT THING 
I NOW HAVE MORE RESPECT FOR THE POLICE 
AND COURTS 
MY FRIENDS WOULD THINK BADLY OF ME 
Instructions : Go directly to Question 3 7 . 
2 0 1  
2 6 .  S ince your release from prison , have you usually 
committed crimes alone or with others? 
1 ALONE 
2 WITH OTHERS (Go to Question 2 8 )  
27 . Now we would l ike t o  know why you have committed 
these crimes alone instead of with others , since 
your release . Look over the following list and 
n,nk those reasons that apply to you . Place a 1 
beside the most important reason that you chose to 
do crimes alone , a 2 beside the second most 
important reason , etc . 
CRIMES ARE EASIER DONE ALONE 
CRIMES ARE MORE EXCITING DONE ALONE 
THERE IS LESS RISK OF GETTING CAUGHT 
AND PUN I S H E D  WHEN CRIMES ARE 
COMMITTED ALONE 
I DO NOT WORRY AS MUCH ABOUT MY 
PERS ONAL SAFETY WHEN COMMITTING 
CRIMES ALONE 
I CAN MAKE MORE MONEY WHE N  
COMMITTING CRIMES ALONE 
I DO NOT WORRY AS MUCH ABOUT BEING 
ARRESTED WHEN COMMITTING CRIMES 
ALONE 
OTHER ( Specify) 
__
__
__
__
__
__
 
__
 
Instructions : I f  you answered Question 2 7  ,· skip the next 
question and go directly to Question 2 9 . 
2 02 
' ' 
28 . We are interested in knowing why you decided to 
commit crimes with others since your release . 
Look over the following list and rank the reasons 
that apply to you . Place a 1 bes ide the most 
important reason that you have committed crimes 
with others , a 2 beside the second most important 
reason , etc . 
CRIMES ARE EASIER WHEN DONE WITH 
OTHERS 
CRIMES ARE MORE EXCITING WHEN DONE 
WITH OTHERS 
THERE IS LESS RISK OF GETTING CAUGHT 
AN D PUN I S H E D  WHEN CRIMES ARE 
COMMITTED WITH OTHERS 
I ENJOY OTHERS 1 RESPECT WHEN DOING 
CRIMES WITH THEM ' 
I DO NOT WORRY AS \ MUCH ABOUT MY 
PERSONAL SAFETY WHEN I COMMIT CRIMES 
WITH OTHERS 
I THINK I CAN MAKE MORE MONEY 
COMMITTING CRIMES WITH OTHERS 
OTHER (Specify) 
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
 _
 
Instructions : In answering the next question , please 
circle the number on the scale of 1 to 10 that best 
applies to you since your release from prison . on the 
scale ,  a 1 means you thought there was NO CHANCE and a 
10 means you thought it was CERTAIN . 
2 9 . When committing crimes , what do you think the 
chances are that you will be arrested and sentenced 
to prison? 
1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - s - 1 - 6 - - 1 - - 8 - - 9 - 10 
NO CHANCE EVEN CHANCE CERTAIN 
3 0 .  When committing crimes since your release from 
prison , have you thought your chances of being 
arrested are LESS THAN , ABOUT THE SAME , or GREATER 
THAN other men who commit similar crimes? 
1 LESS THAN OTHERS 
2 ABOUT THE SAME AS OTHERS 
3 GREATER THAN OTHERS 
2 03 
3 1 .  Please look over the following l ist and think if 
you have eXJ;)erienced any of these circumstances 
since your release from prison . Think about how 
important these circumstances have been to you as 
you have committed crimes since your release . Then 
� the circumstances that apply to you by placing 
a 1 next to the most important , a 2 next to the 
second most important , etc . 
I HAVE HAD PROBLEMS WITH MY FAMILY , 
MY WIFE , OR MY GIRLFRIEND SINCE MY 
RELEASE 
I HAVE BEEN OUT OF WORK SINCE MY 
RELEASE 
I HAVE BEEN KEEPING BAD COMPANY 
SINCE MY RELEASE 
I HAVE BEEN DRINKING HEAVILY SINCE 
MY RELEASE 
I HAVE BEEN USING DRUGS SINCE MY 
RELEASE 
I HAVE HAD PROBLEMS WITH MY PAROLE 
OFFICER SINCE MY RELEASE 
OTHER { Specify) 
THERE HAS BEEN �N�OT�H�I=N�G�UNU=�s=u=-AL ABOUT 
THE TIMES WHEN I COMMITTED CRIMES 
SINCE MY RELEASE 
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3 2 . Listed below are reasons that people sometimes give 
for committing crimes . Look over the list and 
think about how important these reasons are to you 
when committing crimes since your release from 
prison . Then rank the � most important reasons . 
Place a 1 in the blank next to the most important 
reason you commit crimes , a 2 in the blank next to 
the second most important reason , etc . 
I want money for the necess ities of l ife 
I want money for high l iving 
I enj oy being my own boss 
I enj oy the excitement of do ing crime 
Doing crime gives me a sense 
of accomplishment • • • 
Doing crime makes my friends look up to me 
and respect me • • • • • • • • • • . . • 
Doing crime is easy money 
I want money for drugs • • • . 
I enj oy it more than working . . . . . 
It is satisfying to outsmart the pol ice 
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3 3 . Many people who commit crimes say that while 
committing them they are concerned about some of 
the things that could happen to them . Please think 
about the period since your release from prison and 
the things that you have been concerned about when 
committing crimes . Then look over the following 
list and indicate how often you have been concerned 
about each item when committing crimes since your 
release . Answer by circl ing one of the numbers 
next to each item . 
While committing crimes since my release , I have 
been concerned : 
Never Occasionally Often 
That I would be arrested . 1 2 3 
That I would be " roughed 
up" by the pol ice . . . . 1 2 3 
That I would be convicted . 1 2 3 
That I would be put 
in j ail . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 
That my parole would 
be revoked . . . 
. 
. 
. 
• 
. 1 2 3 
That I would be charged and 
and convicted as a habitual 
criminal . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 
That I would lose my j ob . 1 2 3 
That I would feel guilty 
or be disappointed 
with mysel f .  . . . . . 1 2 3 
That it would harm my 
relationship with 
my family . . . . 1 2 3 
That it would harm my 
relationship with my wife 
or girl friend . 
. 
. 
. 1 2 3 
That my friends would 
think badly of me . . . . 1 2 3 
That my neighbors would 
think badly of me . . . . 1 2 3 
2 0 6  
That I would have trouble 
finding a j ob . . • . . • 1 2 3 
3 4 . Since your release from prison , how carefully have 
you thought about the possible consequences before 
committing crimes? 
1 NOT CAREFULLY 
2 SOMEWHAT CAREFULLY 
3 CAREFULLY 
4 VERY CAREFULLY 
3 5 . Before committing a typical crime since your 
release , which have you usually considered more 
important --the poss ible rewards or the possible 
risks from committing crimes? 
1 THE REWARDS 
2 THE RISKS 
3 6 . Think about the rewards that you have obtained from 
the crimes you have committed since your release . 
Did you usually obtain the kind and amount of 
rewards that you thought you would when you planned 
the crimes? 
1 NO 
2 YES 
2 07 
3 7 . We would l ike to know whether getting older has had 
any effect on your decision to commit or not commit 
crimes . Look over the following l ist . Please rank 
the four most important statements that best apply 
to you . S imply place a 1 in the blank beside the 
statement that most appl ies to you , a 2 in the 
blank beside the second most important , etc . 
GETTING OLDER HAS HAD NO EFFECT ON 
MY DECISIONS TO COMMIT OR NOT COMMIT 
CRIMES 
GETTING OLDER HAS MADE ME REALIZE 
THAT CRIME PAYS 
GETTING OLDER HAS MADE ME MORE 
CAREFUL 
GETTING OLDER HAS MADE ME REALIZE I 
HAVE NOTHING TO LOSE 
GETTING OLDER HAS MADE ME THINK MORE 
CAREFULLY ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
CRIMES 
I CONSIDER MY FAMILY ' S  FEELINGS MORE 
THAN I DID WHEN I WAS YOUNGER 
I HAVE MORE RESPECT FOR THE LAW NOW 
THAN WHEN I WAS YOUNGER 
I NOW THINK DOING CRIME IS A WASTE 
OF TIME 
TIME NOW MEANS MORE TO ME THAN WHEN 
I WAS YOUNGER 
I NO LONGER HAVE THE ENERGY FOR 
CRIME 
WORKING FOR A LIVING IS NOW MORE 
SATISFYING THAN WHEN I WAS YOUNGER 
OTHER ( Specify) 
Instructions : Now we are interested in knowing what 
kinds of crimes you have been will ing to commit since 
your release from prison . The next series of questions 
asks about specific crimes . Even if you have not 
committed these offenses , we would like to know if you 
have been willing to commit them if you had an 
opportunity to do so . For each crime l isted , check 
either YES or NO and then check the � reason that you 
would or would not have been willing to commit that 
particular crime . 
38 . Today , would you be willing to commit armed 
robbery? 
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YES , because 
I THINK I CAN GET AWAY WITH IT 
IT IS EXCITING 
I WANT TO BE PART OF THE CROWD 
I KNOW HOW TO DO IT 
OTHER ( Specify) 
__
__
__
__
__
__
 
_
 
NO , because 
I AM AFRAID I WOULD BE ARRESTED AND 
RECEIVE A LONG PRISON SENTENCE 
I AM AFRAID MY PAROLE WOULD BE REVOKED 
I AM AFRAID MY PARENTS , WIFE , CHILDREN 
OR GIRLFRIEND WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED 
WITH ME 
I AM AFRAID I WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED 
WITH MYSELF 
I DON 1 T KNOW HOW TO DO IT 
OTHER ( Specify) 
__
__
__
__
__
__
 
_
 
39 . Today , would you be will ing to commit burglary? 
YES , because 
I THINK I CAN GET AWAY WITH IT 
IT IS EXCITING 
I WANT TO BE PART OF THE CROWD 
I KNOW HOW TO DO IT 
OTHER ( Specify)  
NO , because 
I AM AFRAID I WOULD BE ARRESTED AND 
RECEIVE A LONG PRISON SENTENCE 
I AM AFRAID MY PAROLE WOULD BE REVOKED 
I AM AFRAID MY PARENTS , WIFE , CHILDREN 
OR GIRLFRIEND WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED 
WITH ME 
I AM AFRAID I WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED 
WITH MYSELF 
I DON ' T  KNOW HOW TO DO IT 
OTHER ( Specify)  
________ __ 
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40 . Today , would you be will ing to commit auto theft? 
YES , because 
I THINK I CAN GET AWAY WITH IT 
IT IS EXCITING 
I WANT TO BE PART OF THE CROWD 
I KNOW HOW TO DO IT 
OTHER ( Specify)  
NO , because 
I AM AFRAID I WOULD BE ARRESTED AND 
RECEIVE A LONG PRISON SENTENCE 
I AM AFRAID MY PAROLE WOULD BE REVOKED 
I AM AFRAID MY PARENTS , WIFE , CHILDREN 
OR GIRLFRIEND WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED 
WITH ME 
I AM AFRAI D I WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED 
WITH MYSELF 
I DON ' T  KNOW HOW TO DO IT 
OTHER ( Specify) 
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
_
 
4 1 .  Today , would you be willing to forge checks? 
YES , because 
I THINK I CAN GET AWAY WITH IT 
IT IS EXCITING 
I WANT TO BE PART OF THE CROWD 
I KNOW HOW TO DO IT 
OTHER ( Specify)  
NO , because 
I AM AFRAID I WOULD BE ARRESTED AND 
RECEIVE A LONG PRISON SENTENCE 
I AM AFRAID MY PAROLE WOULD BE REVOKED 
I AM AFRAID MY PARENTS , WIFE , CHILDREN 
OR GIRLFRIEND WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED 
WITH ME 
I AM AFRAID I WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED 
WITH MYSELF 
I DON ' T  KNOW HOW TO DO IT 
OTHER ( Specify)  
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
__
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42 . Today , would you be willing to shoplift? 
YES , because 
I THINK I CAN GET AWAY WITH IT 
IT IS EXCITING 
I WANT TO BE PART OF THE CROWD 
I KNOW HOW TO DO IT 
OTHER ( Specify) 
NO , because 
I AM AFRAID I WOULD BE ARRESTED AND 
RECEIVE A LONG PRISON SENTENCE 
I AM AFRAID MY PAROLE WOULD BE REVOKED 
I AM AFRAID MY PARENTS , WIFE , CHILDREN 
OR GIRLFRIEND WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED 
WITH ME 
I AM AFRAID I WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED 
WITH MYSELF 
I DON 1 T KNOW HOW TO DO IT 
OTHER ( Specify) 
__
________ 
_ 
43 . Today , would you be will ing to buy or sell stolen 
goods? 
YES , because 
I THINK I CAN GET AWAY WITH IT 
IT IS EXCITING 
I WANT TO BE PART OF THE CROWD 
I KNOW HOW TO DO IT 
OTHER ( Specify) 
NO , because 
I AM AFRAID I WOULD BE ARRESTED AND 
RECEIVE A LONG PRISON SENTENCE 
I AM AFRAID MY PAROLE WOULD BE REVOKED 
I AM AFRAID MY PARENTS , WIFE , CHILDREN 
OR GIRLFRIEND WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED 
WITH ME 
I AM AFRAID I WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED 
WITH MYSELF 
I DON ' T  KNOW HOW TO DO IT 
OTHER ( Specify) 
__
_
_
_
_
_
 
_
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Instructions : The next four questions asks about crimes 
that you may commit in the future . The questions ask 
that you assume or suppose that you are faced with an 
opportunity to steal a sum of money . Please mark the 
answers that best represent your opinion to each 
situation . 
4 4 . Assume that in the future you commit property 
crimes . Do you think your chances of being 
arrested are LESS THAN , ABOUT THE SAME , or GREATER 
THAN other men who commit similar crimes? 
1 LESS THAN OTHERS 
2 ABOUT THE SAME AS OTHERS 
3 GREATER THAN OTHERS 
45 . Assume that in the future you have an opportunity 
to steal a sum of money . Look over all the items 
in the following l ist . While deciding whether to 
steal the money , which of the following would you 
worry about? Please � the four things that 
would cause you the most worry . Place a 1 beside 
the most important , a 2 beside the next most 
important , etc . 
While deciding to steal a sum of money , I would 
worry : 
THAT I WOULD BE "ROUGHED UP" BY THE 
POLICE 
THAT MY PAROLE WOULD BE REVOKED 
THAT I WOULD SERVE TIME IN PRISON 
AGAIN 
THAT MY PARENTS , WIFE , CHILDREN , OR 
GIRLFRIEND WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED 
WITH ME 
THAT MY CLOSE FRIENDS WOULD BE 
DISAPPOINTED WITH ME 
THAT MY CO-WORKERS WOULD BE 
DISAPPOINTED WITH ME 
THAT I WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED WITH 
MYSELF 
THAT I WOULD HAVE TROUBLE GETTING OR 
KEEPING A JOB 
THAT I WOULD BE CHARGED AS A 
HABITUAL CRIMINAL 
OTHER ( Specify) 
__
__
__
__
__
__
 
_
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4 6 .  Again , assume that in the future you have an 
opportunity to steal a sum of money . Please look 
over the following l ist . Other than the fear of 
being arrested and sentenced to prison , which of 
the following would you worry about while deciding 
to steal the money? Please rank the four most 
important items that you would worry about . Place 
a 1 beside the most important item , a 2 beside the 
second most important , etc . 
While deciding to steal a sum of money , other than 
worrying about being arrested , I would worry : 
THAT MY PARENTS , WIFE , CHILDREN , OR 
GIRLFRIEND WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED WITH ME 
THAT MY FRIENDS WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED 
WITH ME 
THAT MY CO-WORKERS WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED 
WITH ME 
THAT I WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED WITH MYSELF 
THAT I WOULD HAVE TROUBLE FINDING A JOB 
THAT I WOULD LOSE MY JOB 
OTHER ( Specify) 
47 . Assume that in the future you decide to steal a sum 
of money . Look over the following l ist of reasons 
for committing crimes . Then , place a 1 next to the 
most important reason for committing the crime and 
a 2 next to the second most important reason . 
FOR THE EASY MONEY 
FOR THE EXCITEMENT 
FOR THE SATISFACTION OF OUT-SMARTING 
THE POLICE 
FOR MY FRIENDS ' RESPECT OR ADMIRATION 
FOR THE SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT 
OTHER ( Specify)  
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APPENDIX B 
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Mean Years Qt Education 
10 
Mean Age At First Arrest 
11 
Race Composition � Percent 
White=63% 
Black=3 7% 
-· ·. : 
FIGURE 1 
SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS 
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. � . .... . 
. : •. ':', }' .�  . .  
CRIME TYPE � II LAMBDA 
Armed Robbery 9 3 5  • 
Strong Armed Robbery 887  . 
Home Burglary . • • . • • 4894  • 
Business Burglary • • 2 3 67 . 
Auto Theft • 3 3 2 7  • 
Forgery • •  . .�: 
I • 
• • 6401  • 
Shoplifting • fl • • 
\ 
• • • 3 9 2 6  • 
Credit card Fraud . • 7918 • 
Grand Theft • . 7528  • 
Petit Theft • . 3772  • 
Dealing Stolen Goods • . .  1 3 8 4 3  • 
Type II Lambda N = 3 4  Offenders 
Type I Lambda N = 2 6  Offenders 
Total N = 60 Offenders 
FIGURE 2 
� .I  LAMBDA 
145 
2 0  
117 
74 
73 
40  
114 
5 
53 
107 
103 
TOTAL NUMBER OF CRIMES COMMITTED 
BY DECISION-MAKING TYPE 
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FIGURE 3 .  PERCENTAGES OF TYPE I AND 
TYPE II LAMBDA GROUPS FOR PLANNING ALONE , 
ALCOHOL USE , AND DRUG ADDICTION 
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FIGURE 4 .  PERCENTAGES OF TYPE I AND 
TYPE II LAMBDA GROUPS AND THE ALTERNATIVES 
CONSIDERED DURING DECISION-MAKING 
2 1 8  
VITA 
Kenneth D .  Tunnell was born in Kingsport , Tennessee 
on January 4 ,  19 5 6 .  He attended elementary schools in 
Sul l ivan County and was graduated from Sull ivan Central 
High School in June 1974 . The following September he 
entered Anderson College in Indiana and , a year later , 
ente red East Tennessee State Univers ity where he 
received a Bachelor of Science Degree in June 1978 . 
After a two year absence from academics , he began 
study toward a Master ' s  Degree in Criminal Justice at 
Middle Tennessee State Univers ity ,  in September 198 0 . 
This degree was awarded in December 19 8 3 . 
The fo l l owing Fall he accepted a teaching 
ass istantship at The University of Tennessee and began 
study toward the Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology . 
This degree was awarded in December 19 8 8 . 
The author is an active member in the American 
Society of Criminology and the Southern Sociological 
Society . 
2 19 
